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Viewing ‘risk’ in a Foucaldian sense makes ‘risk' like ‘power' productive. Its 
attempted eradication multiplies it: as we evade it, it encounters us at every turn. We 
live with it and within it. Our bodies carry its markings) as we become ‘always at 
risk'. In these processes, as we attempt to evade risk we learn to doubt such 
possibility. Doubt, rather than knowledge, becomes the discourse o f the ‘self' as 
subject. (Calas 1999p.692)
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ABSTRACT
Risk management has become one of the major issues facing nurses. Its role in 
healthcare organisations has gained increased recognition as the consequences of 
risky decisions have become more visible. The project was primarily concerned 
with exploring issues that confront one particularly group of professionals -  
psychiatric nurses -  as they experience a particular approach to risk management. 
The study used the advancement of the risk management agenda as an opportunity 
to examine the nature of risk management and consider what nurses understood to 
be the nature of a proficient risk management. Case studies analyses were provided 
of four psychiatric imits. Data were collected over four years through observation, 
interviews and documents. It used an integrated approach to examine the 
development of risk management processes in its social, environmental and clinical 
contexts. Drawing on sociological theories of risk, it introduced the theoretical 
framework of arena concept and explained how this concept affect the decision 
making process. It was suggested that the decision making process is a social 
process in which regulative, nonnative and institutional effects influence the 
perceptions and management of risk. The processes were shown to involve a 
dynamic interweaving of certain structured interests mixing with both clinical and 
societal considerations inside and outside the healthcare settings. Risk was 
considered to be the outcome of a complex process of social construction 
comprising of cultural and political elements in which both the influence of 
institutions and individual evaluation can be discerned. The findings showed that 
psychiatric nurses presented a creative and critical understanding to the issues 
involved in risk management by adopting and absorbing new approaches to risk
management in order to advance their professional work. This study formulates a 
new conceptual framework of understanding risk management in organisational 
context and contributes by drawing together previously unrelated research and 
shows how it provides the basis for a theoretical model risk management that is 
more complete.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
We have seen the emergence o f a notion o f risk as way o f making intelligible and 
manageable a whole series o f difficulties in our contemporary experience, from 
those o f organisational management, through loss o f work, ill-health or criminal 
victimhood. The language o f risk is indicative o f  a shift towards a logic in which the 
possibility o f  incurring misfortune or loss in the future is neither to be left to fate, 
nor to be managed by a providential state. Problems previously understood in other 
ways are recorded in the language o f risk. New zones o f  intervention become visible 
and ‘risk management ’ is added to the responsibility o f individuals and authorities. 
Understood in this sense, the notion o f risk enables us to highlight a number o f 
relatedfeatures o f  the contemporary vacation ofpsychiatry. (Rose N 1996p. IS)
Mental health professionals increasingly are required to justify risk 
management strategies and to ensure that standards, procedures and protocols have 
been carefully been followed and documented (Dent 1997; NHS Executive 1994; 
NHS Health Advisory Service 1994; Royal College of Psychiatrists 1996). The 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) -the new regulatory body that has replaced 
the UKCC (United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health 
Visiting) - is contemplating including a new clause on indemnity insurance in the 
Code of professional conduct that provides financial compensation in respect of a 
practitioner’s failures and/or omissions. In a piece “Indemnity insurance: a matter of 
trust or a compulsory requirement?” (MNC News Summer 2002 p8) it declares that: 
“Under this option, a practitioner could not register or re-register with the NMC 
unless they had professional indemnity insurance cover or could prove that their 
employer provided vicarious liability for them. The simplest way to effect this 
option would be for practitioners to self declare that they had indemnity insurance 
and to provide proof of this cover if  required to do so.” Prominence is being given 
to actuarial or statistical techniques to risk management as a response to the
evidence of the limitations of the predictive ability of clinicians (Monahan 1997; 
Monahan & Steadmann 1988). Risk decision making approach within psychiatric 
nursing is not a recent development. There is a long history of using risk 
technologies in psychiatric nursing interventions for example, the use of devices 
such as a strait waistcoat and restraining chair to control patients. So in many 
instances, what are portrayed as new risk technologies mainly entail new labels for 
established technologies and practices. Notwithstanding this lineage, there are new 
and fundamentally changing dimensions of contemporary society to argue that risk 
has become the key decisive factor for nursing intervention.
Risk assessment and risk management are central to patient care with front­
line professionals increasingly aware of their accountability for, mistakes in, 
assessing and managing patients. Described as a “vogue” both clinically and 
politically (Vinestock 1996), Davison (1997) notes that risk assessment is an 
important, integral and unavoidable part of clinical practice whilst Webster et al 
(1994) point out that it as an expanding responsibility for mental health 
professionals. Thus, there is expectation that health professionals should be able to 
assess risk and take the appropriate action (Duggan 1997). Rose (1996 p.15 
emphasis added) echoes this observation by his assertion that risk management “is a 
challenge to each individual professional rather than to the abstract rational qualities 
of some overarching system. Risk management -  the identification, assessment, 
elimination, or reduction of the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss -  is to 
become an integral part of the professional responsibility o f each expert: 
government of risk is to take place through a transformation o f  the subjectivity o f  
each professional\
What is the significance of the concept of risk in the organisation of mental 
health professionals? Do the system-wide procedures, driven by management-based 
reforms that demands efficiency, control, standardisation and codification of 
knowledge erode the need for discretion and the deployment of tacit knowledge and 
specialist expertise or are they going to be accommodated by professionals? Has the 
phenomenal spread of risk management permeated the social life of psychiatric 
nurses?
The study explores how nurses construct understandings of risk analysis as it 
affects their lives as individuals, professionals and organisational members 
(McAuley et al 2000). It probes how psychiatric nurses make sense -  that is, 
imderstand and share understandings about assessing and managing risk, what 
issues and problems their organisations face and how these problems and issues are 
resolved. This approach to sensemaking refers to the processes of interpretation and 
meaning production where actors reflect on and interpret risk analysis and produce 
intersubjective accounts (Weick 1995). Rooted in the interpretativist concept, 
sensemaking sees risk analysis not as an objective phenomenon, but instead enacted 
through the social construction and interaction of information processes of actors 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966). This is in line with the interactionist perspective which 
emphasises the central place of interpretation in social life and argues that social 
problems cannot be understood in terms of “objective” social factors rather such 
problems are rooted in the “processes of collective definition” (Blummer 1971 
p.298). From this stance, I argue that responses to risk management strategies are 
shaped and reshaped as a result of ongoing activity by different professionals 
groups. An interactionist approach, which will be developed in chapter four, implies 
seeing risk management strategies as problematic where risk management
interventions emerge out of a set of negotiations among relevant actors and are 
always subject to further negotiations.
Such a paradigm contrasts sharply with the rational and calculative view of 
risk analysis, which has dominated social science research. Risk analysis is driven 
by scientific and technical consideration and combines risk assessment and risk 
management (Short 1984); where risk assessment is the process of estimating a risk 
to determine whether current risk strategies are appropriate and adequate and risk 
management as the process of ensuring that risks are managed in the most efficient 
and effective way (Waring & Glendon 1998). Risk analysis has been presented as a 
technical procedure which can be undertaken through simple sequence of steps -  
that is through rational calculation of ends and means (Department of Environment 
1995). Within such a situation, all risk could be predicted so that accidents are 
minimised or prevented (Johnstone-Biyden 1995). With little research, standards 
have been offered of how risk can be identified and managed. In the words of 
Norman (1997 p.87), “The standards set for nurses are existing tools which should 
be integral in any risk management strategy. Their utilisation cannot wait for 
research findings.” Thus without knowing the relative value of risk management 
(whether indeed it controls or reduce risk) nurses are being asked to adopt these 
standards which contradicts the call for evidence-based practice. In a word, much of 
the literature makes the assessment and management of risk non-problematic. My 
quarrel, then, with most mainstream approaches to risk management is that little 
attention is given to the social, political and economic contexts leaving us with a 
somewhat flat one-dimensional view of the concept that fails to grasp the richness 
and complexity of healthcare organisations in the current period.
Indeed, literature on investigating the effect of guidelines on the practice of 
clinicians suggests that compliance is often low (Grill& Lomas 1992; Glynn et al 
1997; Mayor & Eaton 1992). Caper (1988) found an unsatisfactory response to 
implementation of protocols by American doctors because they resented the 
imposition into their clinical autonomy. This observation echoes UK’s Department 
of Health report on the use of chemicals in food which questioned the routine use of 
quantitative risk assessment for chemical carcinogens and concluded that “This is 
because the present models are not validated, are often based on incomplete or 
inappropriate data, are derived more from mathematical assumptions than from a 
knowledge of biological mechanisms and at least at present demonstrate a 
disturbingly wide variation in risk estimates depending on the model adopted.” 
Difficulties in deploying risk assessment have been noted by a number of studies. 
Clinical assessment of risk of violence has been criticised for its poor accuracy 
(Litwack et al 1993; Monahan 1981, 1988). McNeil and Binder (1991) found that 
there was over prediction in overall rates of assaults. Mullen (1997) noted that 
whilst risk prediction is reasonably reliable in the medium term, it is less so in the 
long term.
So whilst clinical risk assessment has facilitated much debate within 
psychiatric nursing and has become one of the major issue facing nurses (Hollin 
1997 Monanhan 1997) there are differing viewpoints. Thus although Woods et al 
(1999) portray a therapeutic approach to risk, Rose (1998) argues that the language 
of risk is more about control than care. Crighton (2000) points out the lack of 
structure in the approaches to both risk assessment and risk management. Moreover, 
empirical data on the performance of professional risk assessors does not inspire 
confidence. Monanhan’s (1981) review of five major studies noted that psychiatrists
and psychologists were accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of 
violent behaviour. Kettles et al (2000) in a study to identify the nature and extent of 
current risk assessments in use within forensic psychiatric settings revealed the 
variety of instruments in use. Though every organisation was attempting to use 
some form of clinical risk assessment, there was little uniformity. Many of the 
organisations have or were developing their own forms of risk assessment that have 
some basis in research evidence. Others were using some form of tool or 
instruments that did not have a research background. The implication of the study 
was that there was lack of consistency of views for inclusion in the types of risk 
reviewed. This evidence has shown that there is much work to be done on how 
clinical risk management is utilised to the best advantage for both patients and staff. 
Given that risk assessment is prevalent within psychiatric nursing, it is appropriate 
to ask what might impinge upon risk management that are currently in use. This 
growing recognition of the shortcomings of risk assessment techniques has not been 
accompanied by a sociological research concerned with how psychiatric nurses both 
as individuals and in groups, used various tools and techniques. We have relatively 
little understanding o f the ways in which clinical practice guidelines are used within 
the developing course of practical activities; still less of the ways in which they 
feature in interaction and collaboration between professionals. This analysis 
suggests a need for a rigorous, empirically based approach to risk management in 
the area of mental health.
This study rather than focusing on how the choice of particular risk strategies 
leads to more or less optimal performance explores the process of risk management 
by analysing how in one environment - a management technology - risk 
management was received and made to perform in four psychiatric settings. The
emphasis is on studying the process’s construction and investigating how meaning 
emerges and changes in organisational settings (Czamiawska 1997). The contention 
is that people make sense of organisational events and organisation by inventing 
new meaning for occurring organising processes so creating “frames of reference” 
(Weick 1995), or “patterns of meaning” (Porac et al 1996). The research focuses on 
organisational actors and the meanings they construe as they interact with their 
environments. The interpretative sensemaking process seeks to identify theories of 
action that guide nurses’ decisions and behaviours (Hedberg 1991). The approach 
embraces Weick’s (1995) ideas of interpretive constructivism. First, that 
maintaining and establishing identity is the most important property of sensemaking 
because definitions of what is self and what is “out there” is constituted in social 
interaction with others. So that identities are continually defined and re-defined in 
social encounters displaying situational elements in the representation of self. 
Second, sensemaking is on-going acts of communication in which individuals 
continually re-negotiate what is the organisational reality in social interaction. Past 
experience embedded in frames of reference meets with present experience, 
triggered by “cues” extracted from on-going organisational events to produce 
inventions and interpretations of reality. Therefore, collective sensemaking and the 
development of shared meaning are processes exemplified by actors trying to make 
sense of common experience, interpreting the importance and contents of cues 
differently because they may not necessarily share the same frame of reference.
The study follows the approach that addresses the socially constructed and 
historically specific character of the conceptualisation of risk and its management. 
A cautionary warning must be made in advance. In following social constructionism 
I am not advocating idealism of which more in chapter three. I am claiming that
there is room for variety of interpretations and meanings and that behind risk 
knowledge are social processes and that such processes involve negotiations and 
conflict, both overt and implicit. Here the material world is constantly shaped and 
interpreted through human actions and consciousness. Indeed, it has been argued 
that experts, policymakers and individuals operate in a social context that influences 
how they construct their views of risk issues (Douglas 1992; Schwarz & Thompson 
1990; Wildavsky & Dake 1991). Others also argue that the public and expert values 
inevitably influence risk assessment (Jassnoff 1986; Wynne 1991). Worldviews and 
interests can influence how issues are framed and how risks are perceived. The 
context of risk entails more than just expert assessments of the probability and the 
harm of an activity: work on risk perception shows that risks are multidimensional 
and that the public perceptions are related to among other factors whether risk is 
voluntary or controllable (Slovic 1987). Moreover the public has become acquainted 
with rights, standards and expectations from healthcare as part of the Patients 
Charter Initiative. Additionally the changing public perception recognises that 
professionals are not infallible in their decision making processes and is more likely 
to seek litigation as a source of redress against untoward clinical incidents. Nurses 
therefore may be in a complex, ambiguous, shifting and contradictory field of risk 
management in relation to other actors - theoretical argument about risk issues will 
be developed in the next chapter. This shows that the context within which nurses 
think and act is determined not only by administrative, informal rules of 
professional culture, but also by the risk decision rules, formats, and technologies by 
external influence. In other words, the external risk decision criteria, limits the 
discretion and autonomy of nurses. I argue further that the role of nurses as risk 
managers may change the way in which they provide care to patients; the traditional
focus on welfare is supplanted in favour of a focus on risk surveillance and security. 
I do not however, see nurses as passive but active individuals who have the choice 
when positioning themselves in relation to various discourses.
The study opens up the possibility for re-conceptualising taken-for-granted 
aspects of practice of risk management and the taken-for-granted understandings of 
risk. It has three potential contributions, first, the stress on subjective meaning of 
risk decision making to all categories of participants, the many negotiations which 
transpires within and around interventions, the ever changing nature of services has 
the potential to deepen our understanding of the face-to-face encounters between 
relevant actors within risk management context and offers a framework with which 
to make sense of these observations. It may also enable us to think harder about 
processes and interactions that are regarded as unproblematic. Finally, in a more 
macro-sociological sense, the project can enrich our understanding of the larger 
social role played by other actors in the decision making process. Seemingly 
disparate events can be seen as part of a larger pattern in clinical practice.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section briefly reflects on the 
various issues and theoretical perceptions/perceptives within contemporary debates 
on risk and provides a rationale for the particular stance taken in the studies. This 
sets the stage for the next section recounting the reasons for the recent interest and 
responses in risk management in mental health services. In the discussion that 
follows it highlights how risk management strategies may contribute to the 
reconstruction of identity and plays into the existing modes of psychiatric nursing.
Background of the Study
It is virtually impossible to move around healthcare settings without hearing 
nurses talking about risk. It is argued that in the world of mental health
professionals, risk analysis (combination of risk assessment and risk management) 
has become or rather becoming the organising concept that gives meaning and 
direction to clinical practice; with the language o f risk taking over from that of need 
or welfare, in which risk analysis and monitoring of risk and risk taking are 
becoming the rationale and the organising principle of mental health organisations 
(Rose 1996). Risk related discourses and strategies are seen to have taken key roles 
in the decision making about patient care (Dean 1997). As Castel (1991 p.289) 
reminds us the “modem technologies of prevention are overarched by a grandiose 
technocratic rationalising dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood 
irruption of the unpredictable.”
The category of “at risk” currently underpins cmcial aspect of health policy 
documents. The notion of “risk” has become woven into the fabric of patient care, 
where patients can now be measured against graded and cumulative sets offactors. 
The effective practitioner is supposed to identify, assess, calculate and reduce risk. 
The domain of the “risky” and “at risk” becomes the space for the multitude of 
professionals organisations, in which the notion of risk reshapes the obligations of 
psychiatric professions. Rose (1996) argues that risk management and risk reduction 
as logics for professional action, have come to supplement or replace other forms of 
professional action and judgement. This can be seen in situations where the 
management of everyday life of the patient has taken prominence over clinical 
judgement and the logic of prediction has taken over patients’ likely future conduct. 
For example, under the draft Mental Health Bill currently out for consultation, 
people with severe personality disorders should be placed in secure mental health 
hospitals to prevent them from committing crimes. This is an invention of a 
psychiatric diagnosis “dangerous and severe personality disorder” referring to
people with severe personality disorders who pose a serious risk to the public 
without a research base. There is therefore the defining of mental illnesses by the 
effects that an individual has on our society rather than the problems of the patient. 
It seems patient care within this rationale has reconfigured the organisational form 
of psychiatry to containment for the “risky” until their risk can be fully assessed and 
controlled. Psychiatric care from this stance, attempts to address administrative 
questions about what is to done with patients and how decisions are to be made in 
response. This observation indicates a shift in the rationalities underpinning the 
government of mental pathology and mental health and it is reasonable to argue that 
this may lead to a subordination of the clinical to the administrative function of 
expertise. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) in the “Policing the Risk Society” suggest 
that orientation to risk alters the structure and practice of police organisation. In 
particular, that orientation led to a preoccupation with the collation, collection and 
dissemination of information for the purpose of risk management. Perhaps we can 
argue that the functions of social protection previously associated with psychiatry 
may be reconfigured in somewhat similar terms. This development is illustrated in 
the increasing emphasis on keeping records, sharing information, making plans, 
establishing networks for the surveillance of patients, case conferences and 
multidisciplinary teams.
Psychiatric nursing contexts have changed dramatically in recent years as 
social, cultural, and economic factors have modified the resources tools in their 
lives. The experience of organisational life for nurses and most professionals is 
characterised by monitoring of tasks, extensive use of financial targets and controls, 
standardised packages, audits and assessments. Thus nurses cannot possibly remain 
untouched by their contexts. Just as their contexts are shaped by their presence,
nurses and their contexts mutually constitute each other. To portray the richness of 
nurses lives across the many contexts in which nurses find themselves require a 
careful analysis of the relationship between the local and the larger societal 
contexts, power/knowledge relations and the contemporary circumstances in which 
they are embedded. My emphasis of attending to the process of doing interpretation 
in a cultural-historical framework requires attention to the fit between the local 
situation within which I was immersed and the larger picture. This means that in 
addition to the systematic observing and listening that constitute fieldworks it will 
be useful to focus on the broader contexts that comprise the lived experience of 
nurses.
The contextual perspectives taken in this study suggest that a setting is best 
thought of as a complex web of personal and temporal interactions that make up 
everyday life. Settings are not static entities to be captured by a sense of descriptive 
variables but instead are fluid and dynamic, constantly reconstituting themselves 
within activity and are inherently social, reflecting and framing interaction. Geertz 
(1973 p.360) encapsulates this observation neatly. “Human thought is 
consummately social -  social in its origins, social in its functions, social in its 
forms, social in its applications.” Therefore as we begin with a unit o f analysis that 
includes the individual and his/her culturally defined environment we must 
remember that individual action is generated out of social interactions and the 
meanings they create. As noted by Geoffrey et al (1994 p. 277): “These patterns of 
interaction become recursively recreated over time and ultimately become shared 
knowledge. This shared knowledge is then used by organisational members to make 
sense of past experiences and provides a framework for interpreting situations and 
deciding present and future actions. In other words, whilst the interplay between
individual sense-making and group discourse is complex, it is also critical to an 
understanding of how reciprocal patterns of influence are formed and reconstructed 
within organisations.” This means that individual action is generated out of the 
social interactions and the meanings they create.
The discussion so far suggests the need for studies to locate nurses’ experience 
in specific cultural and historical contexts. Implicit in such an approach is the 
understanding of caring practices through narratives about real life experience in 
meaningful contexts (Benner 1984). This provides a locally grounded perspective 
on the experiences of particular individuals that can then be linked to other 
descriptions. The consequence of this perspective can be a rich narrative that is at 
once general and particularistic, broadly focused while thickly descriptive (Geertz 
1973). Getting at what it means to be a nurse in today’s society requires that we 
explore how clinical practice is viewed both by nurses and by the larger culture. 
Societal views of clinical practice are part of the cultural-historical context within 
which nurses exist. What does it mean to be a nurse in a culture with many 
competing and contradictory views of who nurses should be? Because nursing is a 
continual construction, it must be viewed from many angles to be understood. 
However in traditional research on nurses, little attention is paid to the social, 
political, and economic contexts of health and healthcare.
In this study, I make the case for orientation to caring practices that are 
particular, historical, contextual and societal in nursing inquiry. If it is important to 
study in context, it is particularly important to study psychiatric nurses in context. 
Frequently psychiatric nurses are placed into contexts over which they have no 
control, are constantly challenged to develop competences in settings and are 
continuously under watchful eye of society. As mentioned above, it is not to say that
nurses are powerless. Clearly, they resist directives, are able to invent within 
environmental-created contexts, their own contexts.
Risk discourse has gained a dominant focus on contemporary life as the 
consequences of risk decisions by organisations have become more visible. Giddens 
(1991; 1994) concept of ‘reflexivity’ of modem social life notes how our lives have 
been enveloped by constant monitoring of risk that pervades our sense of how to 
manage ourselves in the world. Luchmann (1993) observes how our world is 
obsessed with risk and for Beck (1992), the ‘risk society’ is a new and different 
modernity in transition from the industrial society where people are constantly 
aware of and anxious about environmental risks to human health. Douglas (1990 p2) 
has characterised the idea of risk as a “central cultural construct” of our time where 
“health risks seem to loom around every comer, posing a constant threat to the 
public” which continually make headlines in the media and increasingly the topic of 
public communication campaigns. Indeed this fascination with risk is reflected 
through the media reporting of and public and professionals’ response to cases such 
as; bovide sponiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease), the threats from 
ebola vims, climate change of the ozone layer, E.coli contamination of meat, cases 
involving water quality and toxic waste, the release of known paedophiles into the 
community, the failings in paediatric cardiac surgery in Bristol and failings in 
cervical screening programme. In this context, risk has been conceptualised as a 
social state engendered by an increasing lack of trust in both the project of 
modernity and expert knowledge (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991; 1994).
Mental health organisations are faced with unique set o f problems when 
dealing with issues of risk given that they are often both regulator and risk 
generator, and the fact that no other organisation is organised so centrally around
the issue of safety. When patients encounter the psychiatric system, clinicians 
intervene using technologies, which may cany with them their own inherent 
dangers, which unlike general medicine, may result in suffering of the general 
public and staff. The mental health profession currently faces some of the greatest 
challenges to its credibility it has ever encountered. Until the past few years, when 
patients were kept in large remote institutions, the institution was the focus of 
formal inquiry when mistakes were made. Changes in society as noted above have 
resulted in a dramatic development of public awareness and expectation in terms of 
clinical practice. The public now has a far deeper insight into errors in treatment or 
clinical judgement through the media and as a result come to expect rather more of 
their clinicians than has been in the past. Consequently, there is now a requirement 
that a formal external inquiry (there were around 40 such inquiries by early 1996) is 
held in any situation in which a patient with psychiatric disorder commits a 
homicide focusing on decision making by individual clinicians. A cursory look at 
those patients who have killed illustrates this observation; Christopher Clunis killing 
Jonathan Zito, Dennis Archer who axed his wife to death and then killed himself, 
Rodney Rollins killing his father and Andrew Robinson killing Georgina Robinson 
(no relation) after being taken in and out of community care. These unfortunate 
cases have led to demands that practitioners are more vigorous and methodological 
in their decision-making, which is especially true for patients who pose risk to 
themselves and others.
It is now assumed that improvements in practice and therefore outcomes for 
patients could possibly be achieved if research evidence (the development of 
clinical practice guidelines to assist practitioners) on health care interventions from 
well-conducted studies was carefully identified and utilised by practitioners
(Grimshaw & Russell 1993). This focus towards evidence-based practice could 
change our understanding of clinical risk because it challenges the traditional legal 
definition of clinical negligence as specified in the Bolam test (Bolam v Frien 
Hospital HMC 1957). In the Bolam test, a practitioner is not guilty of negligence if 
his/her intervention was based on accepted practice in the field. Such a normative 
definition of negligence placed reliance in court on the testimony of respected 
clinicians acting as expert witness. This is however problematic. In cases where two 
sets of expert witnesses (plaintiff v defendant) have different clinical opinions, it 
may be difficult to prove negligence as each apparently represents a legitimate body 
of clinical opinion. The changing nature of legal definition of clinical negligence is 
illustrated in one recent case (Bolitho v City & Hackney HA 1997) where the House 
of Lords ruled that courts had to be satisfied that exponents of the body of opinion 
relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis. Therefore in the 
future, we can expect point of views about clinical negligence to turn more on 
evidence and less on opinion. Without a doubt moving from a normative to an 
empirical definition of negligence may widen the scope for such actions 
considerably. For instance, where evidence on the effectiveness of health care 
interventions is at odds with common clinical practice, successful legal actions 
could be, launched by patients. In other words, the move towards evidence-based 
practice may redefine negligence and risk in healthcare in much broader terms that 
may require a new approach to risk management.
The phenomenal rise of risk management discourse can be seen as the latest of 
many management fashions used for constructing realities (Brunsson & Olsen 1993) 
or schemes for “sensemaking” (Weick 1995) by mental health nurses. Discourse is 
used here as a set of language patterns, including rhetoric, making sense of practice,
thoughts and actions which are forms of life for practitioners. The way that 
discourse is used impacts on the thoughts and actions of individual actors and 
groups and is self-generating in directing perception, concepts of what is admissible 
fact. Actors within the discourse are both caused to think and act in certain ways 
because of it, and also contribute to the ongoing construction of the discourse. As a 
result language and action cannot be regarded separately but are intertwined and 
mutually causing (Bakhtin 1981; Fairclough 1992). It is important to note that a 
discourse does not constitute a single coherent knowledge of practice, but rather, is 
formed by many acting often in conflicting ways (Foucault 1972). The same 
discourses in different places may have contrasting effects. Therefore risk discourse 
may be dominant in policy deliberations and clinical arena, but such discursive 
dominance will produce different problems and practices for nurses in different 
locations. Nurses’ lifeworlds and histories will mean that they heed the essence of 
risk management discourses in different ways and apply them differently in their 
clinical practice. Within this particular analysis, transformations in risk management 
practice are seen as the outcome of the interplay of various socially and historically 
situated discourses and practices which may have had, and continue to have, 
unforeseen and unintended consequences. This means that a discourse can be 
regarded as located within a broader milieu of social-cultural and historical meaning 
and so extend beyond its context.
Following Watson (1995) risk management can be regarded as a “discursive 
resource” because it is a linguistic pattern, which is used to make sense of identity 
and activities and a set of processes in which meanings, and interpretations are 
made and socially negotiated. This suggests that rhetorical strategies and linguistic 
conventions play a formative role in guiding how people interpret situations and
construct versions of experiences. Thus it is contended that discourse is the essence 
of the change process since it is through patterns of discourse that relational bonds 
are formed and structures are created and maintained. Through discourse, 
individuals co-create and form their social reality in a sense where utterances are 
practical forces in determining and negotiating of meaning within organisations. In 
this sense, it may be useful to think of the concepts risk assessment and risk 
management as steering devices that allow organisation members to coordinate 
ongoing relations with one another, where meaning making is shared (Wittgenstein 
1968). A vital premise of this argument is the unfixed position of meaning. The 
conventional meaning of a concept does not determine how it will be applied; 
meaning is never final but always postponed in relation to other terms that are 
evolving themselves, and developing meaning through new applications that 
transform the structure of interpretive assumptions thus repeatedly extending the 
confines of their existing applications (Derrida 1978; Wittgenstein 1968). But why 
is this discourse risk attaining prominence?
The Emergence of Risk Management
The impetus for introducing risk management techniques in the NHS is 
consistent with the ‘hegemonic’ ideological changes that began in the 1980’s. Risk 
management has been a key element in the introduction of what has become known 
as the “new managerialism” or “new public management (NPM). The focus on 
NPM approaches includes establishing performance measures, classifying 
objectives, standardising practices through mechanisms such as clinical pathways, 
guidelines and protocols, formalising accountabilities via markets and formal 
purchasing contracts, providing financial incentives and consumer empowerment, 
and application of private-sector management styles (Dunleavy & Hood 1996;
Ferlie et al 1996; Hunter 1993). Rise in health care costs and demand for health 
services from the mid 1970s coupled with cash limits led to the emergence of NPM 
in the NHS. Thus NPM is concerned with cutting costs and doing more for less as a 
result of management techniques and structural changes. The NHS is facing 
unparalleled expectations for high quality, safe and timely care. Patients now have 
more effective mechanisms for registering complaints if  these expectations are not 
met. The changing public perception recognises that professionals are not infallible 
in their decision making processes and are more likely to seek litigation as a source 
of redress against untoward clinical incidents. The management o f risk is now 
synonymous with reduced monetary costs to trusts and it has become imperative 
that change is effected to reduce the likelihood of error and the associated costs to 
the health service. The concept of risk management has been characterised as a 
reduction of risk in juxtaposition with a desire to increase client satisfaction and 
care (Macdonald 1994; East 1995; Wilson 1995). Within this environment nurses 
are professionally accountable for their practice and risk management strategies 
(UKCC 1992). These challenges to the NHS are due to developments such as The 
Clinical Negligence for Trusts (CNST 1996), Working for Patients (DOH 1989), 
The patient’s Charter (1991) and The 1997 White Paper The New NHS.
The removal of Crown Immunity meant that NHS Trusts were subject to fines 
and other penalties from the Health and Executive instead of by the District Health 
Authorities. Survey data suggests that the cost of clinical negligence litigation rose 
from around: £1M in 1975, £50M in 1990, and £200M in 1996 (Dingwall & Fenn 
1995; Evans 1998). The transfer of financial burden led to the formation of Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST 1996) with the aim at providing individual 
trusts with financial support in cases of litigation. Medical negligence claims were
increasing by 5% per annum above inflation, which was identified as an increase in 
real terms from £53 million in 1990/1991 to £175 million in 1995/1996 (McCaghy 
et al 1997). The National Audit Office recently reported (National Audit Office 
1995-1997) that there was an average of 0.5 patient incidents per 1000 in-patient 
days. It has been estimated that trusts are losing almost about £1300 million per 
annum in financial resources in direct and indirect costs as a result of inadequate or 
ineffectual risk management strategies (Lloyds 1995). There also has been a 
dramatic rise in the number of legal actions being taken against General 
Practitioners -  up some 100% from 1993-1995 (Hale 1997). The response of the 
financial pressures from litigation for clinical negligence has been to introduce a 
series of new standards and preventive measures, which sought to identify and 
reduce the risk exposures patients’ have (NHS Executive 1996). Each Trust 
developed risk management structures and procedures to undertake risk assessments 
in a proactive way.
The Working for Patients (DOH 1989) set out plans to create an internal 
market. The focus was designation of some groups as purchasers of health services 
(health authorities and fund-holding general practitioners) and other groups as 
providers of services (hospital trusts, most general practices, community services, 
voluntary and private health care agencies. The purchaser-provider split enabled 
purchasers to set out through contracts, the types of services they required and agree 
with the provider on the level of cost of services. The logic was that purchasers 
would commission the most efficient and economic providers, thus improving 
efficiency, treating more patients and decreasing costs in the process. To integrate 
users into the quality process, The Patient’s Charter (1991) was launched. It gave 
performance targets and required the publication of data about actual outcomes
which: could be used to measure and check professional performance and 
consumers could use to make choices about their treatment. Both of these measures 
increased imperative of higher standards and care with increased pressure on 
reducing costs.
The 1997 White Paper The New NHS -  Modem and Dependable placed a 
statutory duty for quality on all health organisations. At the heart of the changes is a 
local responsibility for clinical governance. Clinical governance as part of a new 
approach for assuring quality health care is a framework intended to ensure that all 
NHS organisations have in place proper processes for monitoring and improving 
clinical quality. For the first time it makes the executives of NHS trusts legally 
responsible for clinical quality. Before this new approach, hospitals and trust boards 
have been responsible for balancing the books with responsibility for patient care 
being with individual clinicians. High-profile cases such as the inquiry into heart 
operations on babies at the Bristol Royal Infirmary (Smith 1998), and the failings in 
the cervical screening programme at a hospital in Kent (National Audit Office 1998) 
have raised questions about clinical responsibility. Why had no one noticed? How 
could such poor performances be allowed to continue for so long?
Underpinning clinical governance is an emphasis on an organisation-wide 
transformation, which includes effective leadership; working as teams; dealing with 
poor performance; evidence and good practice and professional development.
Effective Leadership: While clinical governance is the responsibility of 
clinicians, strong leadership, commitment and direction will be needed to ensure 
successful outcomes. The challenge for leaders will be the active creation of 
cultures of working environment, which are open and participative, where ideas and 
good practice are shared, where education and research are valued and where blame
is used exceptionally. Successful clinical governance will depend upon the strength 
of the working relationship between leaders and health professionals.
Working as Teams: Clinical governance is seen as multidisciplinary activity in 
which the quality of care a patient receives depends upon a whole chain of people. 
Thus there should be encouragement for both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
collaboration, where quality is viewed from the patient perspective and not as 
separate compartments for separate disciplines.
Dealing with poor performance: Involves the development of performance 
procedures where cases of deficiencies are dealt with in a sympathetic manner.
Evidence and Good Practice: Support for, and application of evidence-based 
practice is a key feature within clinical governance. Processes for evidence-based 
care involve: identifying relevant evidence, critically appraising the evidence for 
validity and clinical usefulness, implementing and incorporating relevant findings 
into practice and continual measurement of performance against expected outcomes.
Professional Development: Staff within the health organisation is key to
meeting the challenges of the new approach. Thus the recruitment, retention and 
development of staff are essential. Equally important are, supporting and training in 
modem information technology, access to evidence, participation in developing 
quality strategies and encouragement to look critically at existing processes of care 
and improve them.
Clinical governance requires health care providers to ensure that:
• clinical audit is in place;
• there are clinical risk management systems;
• practice are changed through evidence;
• continuing health needs assessments are held;
• leadership skills are developed at clinical level;
• untoward events are detected openly investigated and lessons learned;
• continuing education is in place;
• high quality data are collected to monitor clinical care.
The strengthening of professional self-regulation is to run parallel to 
managerial systems of quality control. A National Institute o f Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) will promote and maintain higher standards of professional practice by 
overseeing the development of National Service Frameworks to ensure clear 
standards of clinical practice and the Commission fo r  Health Improvement (CHI), 
using the national framework, will monitor the implementation of the service 
frameworks and supporting quality plus participation in clinical audit and review of 
how poor clinical performance is dealt with locally.
Policy Driven Structures for Risk Management
In mental health, high profile incidents and subsequent inquiries (eg Bloom- 
Cooper et al 1995; Heginbotham et al 1994; Sherperd 1995) have raised public 
concern over the safety of people with mental health problems. Each enquiry 
highlights specific deficits in the care and treatment provided with recurring themes: 
paucity of actuarial systems to measure risk, limited psychometric assessments risk, 
inadequate multidisciplinary input to the assessment of risk, lack of effective 
collaboration and sharing of information between differing agencies and limited 
implementation and audit risk factors (O’Rourke et al 1997). This has led to 
demands that practitioners are more rigorous in their decision-making for caring for 
the mentally ill. In response a number of guideline documents have been issued:
The Care Programme Approach (CPA)
The most important policy initiative in recent years has been the Care 
Programme Approach (CPA) (DOH 1990). The CPA was introduced to provide a 
framework for the care of the mentally ill in the community. It requires health and 
social service departments to devise and implement care packages for all patients in 
contact with the mental health services. The CPA has four main elements:
• assessments of the health and social care needs of the individual including 
assessment o f risk
• production of a plan of care which incorporates the identified health and social 
care needs of the individual
• nomination of a key worker to maintain contact with the individual and to 
monitor implementation of the agreed care plan
• regular review and monitoring of care plan.
Other underlying principles are that, mental health professionals should work 
as part of a multidisciplinary team and involvement of patients and their carers in 
drawing up, agreeing and reviewing the agreed plan of care. A central theme of the 
guidelines was the need to encourage patients and their families, or carers, to 
participate in all stages of the CPA process. This is to commit health and social 
workers to the concept of joint working in which the patient is placed at the 
forefront of care. The nomination of a designated professional as a key worker 
created a range of responsibilities and accountability. These are the use of skills and 
knowledge in assessing the patient and maintaining contact, act as a consistent point 
of contact for patients and their carers as well as other professionals, ensuring that 
documentation is completed, signed by the patient and circulated to all members of 
the care team, providing support and arranging regular reviews of the treatment plan
with the patient and care team. There were subsequent guidelines on supervision 
registers, those on the discharge of mentally ill patients from hospital and 
supervised discharge:
The Supervision Register
Supervision registers were introduced in an attempt to identify people who are 
considered to be at a significant risk of committing serious violence, suicide or 
serious self-neglect as a result of mental illness (DOH 1994). An important feature 
of the register is the formalisation of multidisciplinary and multi-agency risk 
assessment. The registers has been designed to keep close scrutiny on people who 
have difficulty in maintaining contact with services ensuring that those most at risk 
do not become lost to follow up.
Discharge Guidance
The discharge guidance document (NHS Executive 1994) called for a risk 
assessment on discharge ensuring that the relevant information is available 
including: past histoiy of the patient, information from others and accurate 
information about past behaviour. It also involves defining future circumstances 
likely to present increased risk, proposing how these changes might be brought 
about, seeking expert advice when necessary and recording the risk management 
strategy and deciding the review date.
Supervised Discharge
The purpose of supervised discharge (HMSO 1995) is to ensure that a patient 
who has been detained in hospital for treatment receives aftercare services. The 
decision to apply the guideline depends on the level of risk to the health and safety 
of the patient, the safety of other people or to the patient due to serious exploitation. 
The guidelines potentially extend the boundaries of duty of care because they go
beyond the boundaries of the mental hospitals. With CPA duty of care follows the 
patient into the community setting in which the mental health professional feels a 
unique weight of responsibility for the safety and care of his/her patients regardless 
of other professionals. The introduction of supervision registers, also extend duty of 
care beyond the patients consent. Mental health professionals are responsible for 
taking all reasonable steps to remain in contact with a patient who has been judged 
to be at risk regardless of their consent. This duty extends until the patient becomes 
detainable or until the risk is no longer present, but given that a particular risk factor 
will always remain in the patient’s histoiy, it is difficult to know how long the duty 
to supervise should be. This development has an important civil right element 
because the patient ability to discharge him/herself unless detained under the Mental 
Health Act is removed. In addition, the guidelines create a climate of expectation 
regarding standards of care and obligations of mental health professionals in 
protecting the public from untoward incidents.
The Mental Health Act
Legalism has been a central component of social reform in the area of mental 
health since the nineteenth centuiy; the 1890 Lunacy Act governed admissions, 
treatment, control, and supervision of patients. Historically legalism has been used 
to counteract what was viewed as the shortfall of professional management. In the 
twentieth century the 1983 Mental Health Act and the Mental Health (Patients in the 
Community) Act are the regulation for the care and treatment of mentally ill in 
England and Wales. Most of the treatment under the Mental Health Act takes place 
on hospital wards, involving a range of essential activities such as dealing with 
documentation of people who are detained and the holding power of nurses 
(detaining of people who are hospital and not already detained). Under the Mental
Health (Patients in Community) Act, a patient subject to supervised discharge is 
required to abide by the care plan. The appointed key worker has powers to require 
the patient to reside in a particular place, and the patient to attend for medical 
treatment and rehabilitation. Non-compliance by patients leads to a review with a 
possibility of compulsory admission. The Human Rights Act, which became 
effective in October 2000 throughout the United Kingdom, would affect the above 
Acts. Mental health professionals will need to strike a balance between rights of the 
individual, the demands of the family and the local community and the social 
requirement that mentally ill are treated. How far has the introduction of standards, 
protocols, legislation and social factors triggered new work practices and 
responsibilities of nurses?
Transformation of Psychiatric Nursing?
Castel’s (1991) observation of a vital strategic shift from dangerousness to 
risk within the care professions appears to encapsulate the contemporary preventive 
strategies. He suggests that the original justification for intervention was always 
around the notion of dangerousness namely, detecting, diagnosing and 
treating/confining dangerous individuals. Dangerousness was seen as a quality 
inherent to a given individual who was deemed capable of dangerous actions. In 
contrast, the notion of risk is more selective but at the same time applies to a larger 
group of people than the notion of dangerousness, where the category “at risk” is 
placed within a system of factors drawn from observations of others. The above 
view suggests innovative strategies in clinical practice, in that, the prominence of 
combination of factors affect how intervention is carried out. Intervention is no 
longer “the direct face-to-face relationship between the carer and the cared, the 
helper and the helped, the professional and the client. It comes instead to reside in
the establishing of flows of population based on the collation of a range of abstract 
factors deemed liable to produce risk in general” (Castel 1991 p. 281). Identifying a 
person as posing a risk no longer means observing him/her for signs of 
dangerousness. It is now sufficient to identify a person as a member of a “risky 
population”, based on a “risk profile.”
Patient behaviour has been a key focus o f violence research. The Violence 
Risk Assessment Study (Monahan & Steadman 1994) designed to improve the 
validity of clinical risk assessment offers one of the most comprehensive set of 
factors that could be used in risk assessment. There are four domains within which 
risk factors for violence are conceptualised, namely, dispositional, clinical, 
historical, and contextual factors. Individual dispositional tendencies include 
demographic, personality and cognitive variables; clinical factors refer to diagnostic 
or mental state aspects of patients; historical factors refer to biographical events; 
and contextual factors refer to the contemporary social networks and social support 
of patients as illustrated in Fig. la.
Figure la : Factors in Clinical Risk Assessment
Dispositional Factors Demographic -  age, race, gender; Personality -  anger, 
impulsiveness and psychopathy or personality disorder; 
Cognitive -  intelligence.
Clinical Factors Symptoms -  delusions, hallucinations, violent fantasies; 
Functioning -  substance abuse, alcohol and other drugs.
Historical Factors Social history -  family histoiy, child rearing, child abuse, 
family deviance, work histoiy, employment, job 
perceptions, educational history. Hospitalisation history -  
prior hospitalisation, treatment compliance. History o f  
crime and violence -  arrests, incarcerations, self-reported 
violence, violence towards self.
Contextual Factors Perceived stress -  social support, living arrangements, 
activities of daily living, perceived support, social 
networks.
The category of ‘at risk’ patients deemed to be a danger to themselves or 
others has had a high profile in social policy debates and has been the recurrent 
focus of legislative deliberations. Douglas (1990) characterises the idea of risk as a 
central cultural construct and argues that its use rather than ‘danger’ or ‘hazard’ has 
the rhetorical effect of creating an aura of neutrality and of cloaking the concept in 
scientific legitimacy. Danger reworded as risk, is removed from the sphere of the 
unpredictable and placed at the feet of individuals. Risk becomes, in Douglas words 
a ‘forensic resource’ where individuals can be held accountable. Similarly, Ewald 
(1991) notes that the notion of risk incorporates a secularised approach to life, 
where God is removed from the scene, leaving the control of events entirely in 
human hands.
An approach based upon inherency of danger posed a problem for 
professionals in its limitation of the possibility of establishing and maintaining an 
effective prevention, which could lead to criticisms over lack of consistency. 
Snowden (1997) believes that risk is a more attractive term than dangerousness, as it 
does not contain pejorative connotations. Dangerousness however continues to be a 
major consideration of practitioners when deciding, for example, whether to detain 
or release a patient. This is illustrated in the guidelines on the discharge of the 
mentally disordered and their continuing care in the community with a section on 
assessing potentially violent patients (NHS Executive 1994). The importance of 
dangerousness is also obvious in the supervised discharge proposals (DOH 1993) 
and the supervision registers proposals (DOH 1993). Owen’s (1992 p. 239) 
observation that “the spectre of dangerousness both defines the function of 
psychiatry and legitimates its operation” is apposite. In any discussion of risk 
assessment, there seem to be the presence of the concept “dangerousness” and this
has a particular significance for the perception of a person as “dangerous” in two 
related issues. The concept of dangerousness can be seen as a fixed personality trait 
which is questionable because a person may pose a risk at certain times and 
response to certain situations but not in others (Gostin 1986). In addition, the 
absence of “objective” criteria for recognising dangerousness may lead to 
assessment based on myths or ordinary “common sense” and misconceptions.
This new approach to interventions, as signalled by the shift from 
dangerousness to risk may have three important implications for the care of patients. 
First, preventative policies associated with risk are constituted in terms of factors 
rather than individuals. Future problems such as risk of violence to others risk of 
self-harm and risk of serious self-neglect are now to be found within recognisable 
constellations of risk factors and not within individuals. In attempting to make a risk 
prediction, the practitioner has to take account of factors which correlate with a 
particular harmful behaviour and which are therefore associated with the increased 
likelihood of a particular risk occurring. Secondly, intervention is no longer 
primarily based upon professional expertise but rather around the notion of risk. The 
dependency on abstract factors deemed likely to produce risk raise an interesting 
point about the role of the practitioner being indistinguishable in many ways from 
that of the administrator. That is, the therapeutic task of the practitioner takes 
second place to administrative knowledge. The final implication of the general shift 
away from “dangerousness” is that the employment of risk brings with it a new 
powerful form of surveillance. In the words of Castel (1991 p.288 emphasis added) 
“ ....it is no longer necessary to manifest symptoms of dangerousness or 
abnormality, it is enough to display whatever characteristics the specialists
responsible for the definition of preventative policy have constituted as risk 
factors
Whilst the factors do not guarantee the accuracy of any prediction, the 
suggestion is that they provide a starting point for professionals. It is argued that 
predictions can be made more accurately when practitioners take into account 
interactive factors such as gender, prior histoiy and use of drugs (Meloy 1987). For 
example, Monahan (1981,1984) identified prior convictions and prior violent 
incidents as consistent predictors of further violence and homicide. Taking an 
implicit positivist stance, it is assumed that the relationships between risk factors 
and outcomes are given, with the prediction of future events seen as technical ones 
that can be overcome with the use of more detailed data bases and more complex 
statistical analyses, and more accurate measures of risk. The success of using such 
an approach, it appears, depends upon the ability of risk factors to accurately predict 
future outcomes and the ability of practitioners to measure risk factors and evaluate 
them appropriately. Such a standpoint does not however address the ontological and 
epistemological questions about the nature of prediction and uncertainty.
Research in clinical decision-making (Benner 1984; Harbison 1991 Schon 
1983) identifies three major models for prediction: the linear/rational model, the 
hypothetico-deductive model, and the risk assessment model (Gottfredson & 
Gottfredson 1988).
Linear Model
In the rational model, the practitioner follows a problem solving approach (for 
example, decision tree or critical pathway) with some notion of probability and 
weighs outcomes according to factors or guidelines. Decision in the rational model
is determined by a formula to be followed. For example, Towl and Crighton (1997) 
propose five steps to follow when conducting risk assessments:
• Step 1: Specification of target behaviour
• Step 2: Examine relevant knowledge base by exploring and examining; client’s 
account, accounts by significant others and relevant documentation. Identify factors, 
which may increase/decrease the risk of target behaviour.
• Step 3: Estimate probability of target behaviour occurrence. Assess 
consequences of target behaviour occurrence.
• Step 4: Assess the acceptability of the estimated risk, given the consequence of 
target behaviour occurrence.
• Step 5: Specify appropriate management, monitoring and review arrangements.
The model does not offer actual factors to consider by the practitioner. Implicit 
in the guidelines however, is the need to establish the events* use functional 
analysis, actuarial and statistical evidence while identifying specific factors related 
to the identified ‘risk’ behaviour. The strength o f the linear model is that it provides 
relatively clear direction for the practitioner, as well as a “logical” argument for the 
decision. The weakness is that decision is determined by a formula to be followed 
without consideration of contextually relevant information.
Hypothetico-Deductive Model
The hypothetico-deductive model considers different factors in the specific 
context. Past experiences with similar situations provide the practitioner with 
patterns of cues to the risk behaviour. Such cues are developed into theoretical 
position, which is then tested against previous experience and existing knowledge as 
regards the person being assessed and others previously assessed. Monahan & 
Steadmann (1994) suggest that three aspects are considered during risk assessment:
first is the relationship between cues or risk factors (for example, anger, age, past 
history) and clinical judgement and prediction; second, the relationship between 
clinical judgement and prediction and the criterion of risk behaviour; and third, the 
relationship between the cues or risk factors and the criterion of risk behaviour The 
weakness of this model is that the accuracy and validity of prediction may be 
limited by the practitioner’s favoured methods of intervention and previous 
experiences.
Risk Assessment Model
The final model incorporates environmental and personal factors in any given 
situation. The practitioner considers types of harm possible across a multitude of 
variables, (for example alcohol, drug use, and prior histoiy might influence the 
likelihood of harm), and provide risk factors that may contribute to risk behaviour. 
Thus it allows the practitioner to weigh both environmental factors and personal 
factors present in any given situation. While practitioners are encouraged to rely on 
their clinical judgement in risk assessment (Reed 1997), there has been an increase 
in the range and diversity of formal, standardised and actuarial measures. 
Distinction is made between clinical risk assessment and actuarial risk assessment. 
The former is defined as the process that occurs when information about risk factors 
is collated and interpreted through personal judgement of the practitioner, the latter 
is the process by which human judgement is eliminated and deductions rest 
exclusively on empirically established data and the event of interest (Davison 1997). 
Davison (1997) review of the literature, observes that actuarial approaches to 
predicting behaviour are more accurate than clinical judgements and Monahan 
(1997) describes it as an exciting and promising development in the mental health 
law. However, it is argued that actuarial approaches are seldom used in practice
because clinicians may be hesitant to the use of actuarial methods due to the 
calculations required (Gardner et al 1996), and Davison (1997) noted that actuarial 
approach could not fully replace clinical assessment.
Depending on the goal of assessment, the practitioner may use aspects of one 
or more of these models. A general, purpose patient dynamic risk assessment and 
risk management strategy is the Risk Assessment Management and Audit Scheme 
(RAMAS). RAMAS, a standardised schedule for measuring, monitoring and 
managing risk addresses four areas of risk, namely, dangerousness, mental 
instability, self-harm/suicide risk and vulnerability. RAMAS requires clinicians to 
collect information from a variety of sources; historical, dispositional, clinical and 
contextual data (see Fig. la). The framework allows professionals to move from a 
process o f often subjective and individualised risk assessment to a more 
comprehensive, systematic, actuarial, multidisciplinary risk assessment and strategy 
(O’Rourke et al 1997).
The clinical decision-making model assumes processes of human reasoning 
and behaviour that are based on rationality, with practitioners weighing up the cost 
and benefits of various actions and making decisions based on these assessments. 
As noted above decisions need not necessarily take place on a conscious or 
‘rational’ basis. A distinction can be made between reflexive actions against 
habitual conduct that does not require conscious problem solving activities. Such 
actions may be products of acculturation that do not involve step-by-step problem 
solving approach but rather acquire as an outcome of habits. Risk related practices, 
therefore may include both activities that may need high levels of statistical 
reasoning but also those practices that do not involve such deliberation, but rather 
are experienced regarded as second nature. Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of ‘habitus’
which may be interpreted as a set of dispositions and techniques that become 
organising principles by which practice are maintained is useful in exploring the 
habitual acculturated nature of risk-related actions. A reflexive behaviour, the 
feeling that a considered action is the right one, is often a vital element in risk 
analysis but as indicated, promblematisation also has its role in this context, 
sometimes as an important starting point, and sometimes mainly for checking the 
plausibility of the preferred action alternative.
While the three clinical decision-making models appear distinct, they are not 
necessarily exclusive means for deciding on interventions. Because decisions in the 
clinical arena are rarely precise, practitioners are supposed to approach their 
decisions from multiple perspectives. It is possible to detect the development o f the 
three models as following a sort of progression driven by the attempt to be more 
contextual. An important characteristic of the three models is the dominance of 
science illustrated in the distinction between ‘objective risk’ and ‘perceived risk’. 
The former is regarded as ‘true’ risk estimated by risk assessment procedures; the 
latter, the uninformed view of risk often held by the public or others not exposed to 
‘good’ risk assessment analysis. A number of critics o f these approaches have began 
to articulate an alternative perspective which is based on the idea that technical risk 
assessment alone cannot account for the full range of risk consequences (Douglas 
1985; Kasperson et al 1988; Kasperson & Kasperson 1996). Bingley (1997) 
suggests that professionals cannot follow a recipe or formula in the arena of risk 
assessment, and must constantly re-evaluate his/her own role in relation to each 
individual case. Furthermore, Taylor et al (1997) assert that in risk assessment the 
practitioner is confronted with a person with unique constellation of characteristics, 
environmental issues and the nature of the mental disorder. They propose that
professionals interpret research findings and act differently in risk assessment and 
management, since they are influenced by personal and professional experience. 
Consequently their judgement will be shaped by their own temperament, 
experiences and professional backgrounds. As will be outlined in more detail later, 
research has identified that individual factors such as risk preferences, risk 
perceptions, risk propensity and organisational characteristics namely group 
behaviour, cultural risk values and organisational control systems affect the decision 
making process. From this context, risk is conceptualised partly as a social construct 
and partly as an objective property (Short 1989).
There are some key points to emphasise from our analysis. First, within the 
risk approach, the reach of “risk” is endless and nothing remains outside its 
territoiy, and nothing remains beyond intervention. Since ‘risk’ can be legitimately 
found anywhere there is no patient who is not at risk of something. The entire 
category of the mentally ill may be considered to be at risk. As Ewald (1991 p.199) 
observes “...anything can be a risk. It all depends upon how one analyses the 
danger.” By turning risk into a self-directed ubiquitous force in this way, every 
human experience may be transformed into a safety situation with the presumption 
that quantifiable and generalised risk factors are straightforward. But what does it 
mean for a patient to be ‘at risk’? A category such as history of mental illness, may 
sound well defined enough, but in practice they may be interpreted much more 
broadly. The term ‘risk’ is also open to the widest of interpretations. Thus a 
patient’s history can stretch over many years going back as far as childhood. So that 
there is no real way of assessing how much, for example, a patient is ‘at risk’ of 
self-injury or suicide apart from plunging into the patient’s history to look for 
patterns of behaviour, which may repeat itself. In other words, anybody with a past
blemish on their records should be considered as a permanent risk to themselves and 
others. It is clear that all kinds of mental health patients with a huge variety of 
illness may be lumped together with the expectation that successful strategies may 
be identified for various outcomes.
Secondly, one of the profound and ethical challenges faced by 
practitioners and society at large lies in the definition of risk (an issue which we 
shall return to later on) that leads to intervention and the accuracy of the prediction 
of that risk. Predictions of the future can go wrong in two ways. For any group at 
risk, there will be some predicted to be at risk who are not (false positives), and 
some predicted as not being at risk who in fact are (false negatives) as illustrated in 
Fig lb. Prediction also involves the possibility that a practitioner’s own biases will 
influence his/her own judgement. In clinical assessment there is a danger of 
hindsight bias (Pollock et al 1989).
Figure lb: Outcomes of risk Prediction
True Positive
Correctly predicting that an event will 
occur
True Negative
Correctly predicting that an event will 
not occur
False Positive
Predicting an event that does not occur
False Negative
Predicting an event will not take place 
that subsequently occurs
This observation is important in the context of a public inquiry, where 
reflection after tragedies is focus selectively on the factors that appear to have 
contributed to the outcome. As a consequence, it heightens expectation that 
untoward incidents can and should have been avoided.
Finally, there may be an emphasis on defensive practice where professionals 
may become cautious in order to limit their liability. Here, Menzies (1960) concept 
of ‘social defence’ is useful in showing how features of risk assessment and
management techniques can be used to reinforce the individual psychological 
defensive needs of practitioners. Her research concerns the powerful anxieties 
stimulated in the course of fulfilling the nursing role. To prevent painful anxieties 
arising from intimate contact with patients (issues of life, death and sickness) 
practices and policies arose more to help nurses evade such anxieties than care for 
patients. For our purpose, prediction of risk based on factors may diminish nurses’ 
awareness of responsibility for patients as whole people, and instead becomes, for 
example, ‘ the dangerous’, or ‘the violent’. As a result practitioners may adopt a 
protective ideology that all patients are dangerous or violent which defensively 
simplified their complex realities and therefore avoid making troubling and painful 
judgements on an individual basis. This might lead to an improvement in safety 
issues, but it might equally well have other consequences. For example, patients 
who are deemed to pose a higher than manageable risk may be excluded from 
services; furthermore professionals may tend to over-predict dangerousness in order 
to insure themselves against making mistakes.
We may note en route that assessing and managing risk is not an exact science 
(Bingley 1997). Front-line practitioners are daily making risk decisions, often of 
great complexity, in an inherently, uncertain situations. Most risk assessments are 
based on contingent knowledge (Jasanoff 1996) because it is impossible to know the 
complexities of every situation and all future possibilities and impacts which can 
result from any situation of risk. In addition, as risk decisions are about the 
prediction and control of the future (Kemshall et al 1997), it is an attempt to predict 
the unpredictable. Schon’s (1983; 1987) concepts of “technical rational view” and 
“artistry view” of professionalism capture the situations facing professionals. The 
former, which seems to be in vogue currently, views professional practice as the
assessing of risk through a pre-determined set of clear-cut routines and behaviours. 
By contrast, the latter views clinical practice as complex and less certain where 
professionals make complex risk decisions, relying on a mixture of professional 
judgement, intuition and common-sense which cannot be set down in absolute 
routines or measured. Practitioners from this standpoint, are confronted with 
“messy,” indeterminate situations which often do not fit existing theories or 
available bodies of knowledge. In these situations, practitioners without clear 
guidance have to frame and resolve the problem, which is particularly so in the 
uncertain world of risk.
Indeed Carson (1996) argues that risk assessment is highly fallible exercise 
with the unlikelihood that any method could be found which will provide perfect 
safety. Under the impact of reforms in the 1990’s, Annandale (1996) found how 
nurses and midwives developed strategies to protect themselves in the “risk culture” 
of the new NHS. Clearly, a risk management procedures, with its controlled step- 
by-step procedures, strict monitoring and inspection with well prescribed rules 
covering every eventuality of risk is difficult to achieve in practice. Wynne (1988) 
suggested that when such procedures are translated in practice it presents 
ambiguities and complexities. Clearly, how risks are defined, measured and 
assessed depends on the values, interests, priorities and epistemologies of those who 
have been charged with the task of risk assessment (Wayne 1996). This is done 
within the context of broader organisational factors such as culture, power and 
professional practices (Clarke & Short 1993; Kaperson & Kaperson 1996). In light 
of this, it is important to explore the ways in which psychiatric nurses make sense of 
risk assessment and management within clinical decision-making. It is clear that 
sense making (Weick 1995) is an integral part of effective management of risk, for
how can practitioners frame problems and comprehend the nature of risk if they 
cannot make sense of the concept?
The requirement of intensive interaction with patients as co-producers of care 
means that professional control and legitimacy over “specialised knowledge” seem 
to be changing (MacStarvic 1988). Indeed, contemporary social theories emphasise 
that we are living an age of uncertainty and draw our attention to the instability of 
knowledge. This suggests that the status of expert knowledge is becoming 
increasingly contested (Carter 1995). This calls into question the reliance on rational 
analytical approaches, where practitioners will ultimately be expected to know and 
be responsible for any decisions and interventions. There are also doubts about 
whether practitioners do or even can operate in purely rational way. Scholars have 
suggested that in practice people do not actually operate in this rational way as other 
types of motivations for doing analysis are common. For example, Meyer (1984) 
noted that a great deal of formal analysis is more concerned with the justification of 
decisions already made and Brewer (1981) described how analysis may be used to 
deflect attention away from issues by giving the impression of action and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) gave us insight into the symbolic and ritualistic uses of language.
Uncertainty in decision making
The dominant view of clinical decision making as a precise, certain and 
scientific practice is questionable. When clinicians make decisions they take a lot of 
clinical “facts” from variety of sources about individual patient and often depend 
more on their sense of the situation than on general medical knowledge (Fogel 
1980). This indicates that clinicians often compensate for uncertainty by drawing on 
commonsense understandings of the situation. Thus instead of following guidelines 
to explain clinical phenomenon, clinicians frequently renegotiate these guidelines.
There is immense diversity among varying circumstances in which judgements may 
be required and as significant are the logistics limitations in making these 
judgements within a clinical or organisational context. As pointed out by Borum 
(1996 p.953) “Different settings may require information about different types of 
decisions of risk, or they may have varying time frames for prediction of relevant 
behaviour. Different risk assessment tasks require different types of decisions and 
vary in their critical action thresholds.” Indeed, Shorter (1993) suggests that 
following a model is inadequate because in following rules people create, challenge, 
change, check and correct them as well. Similarly Berg (1992) in introducing the 
concept of “routines” observes that the decisions clinicians make routinely embody 
the safety norm and suggests that clinical practice does not always adhere to 
universal rules. To make a decision clinicians need a lot of different types of 
information in order to build up a sufficient clinical picture; which leads to a degree 
of uncertainty about how to combine all the information available.
The prominence of risk analysis may bring with it the potential to redefine the 
boundaries and relations between professionals and service users. Pressures to be 
more efficient coexist with standardising procedures and professional judgements 
that challenge notions of professional accountability and regulation (Pollit 1993). 
Furthermore there is likely to be blurring of role distinctions and demands for multi­
professional collaboration and therefore rise in complex ethical issues that require 
interdisciplinary collaboration. The theme running through our analysis has been 
that clinical uncertainty characterise the experience of mental health professionals 
from several directions. Clinical uncertainty arises from the fact that professionals 
have limited and varying capacity to deal with information in other words, they are 
subject to bounded rationality - the assumption that all rational humans would take
decisions to maximise their profit, or preferred advantage (Simon 1979). In practice 
perception would intervene between the decision maker and the ‘objective’ 
environment. Human perception is therefore a filter through which risks are viewed. 
Since not all the alternatives are known or reliably assessed, the decision maker 
would aim for a satisfactory rather than a maximum outcome when faced with a 
complex situation. This suggests that imperfect knowledge compels the decision 
maker to construct a simpler and more personalised model on which to act. Here the 
choice from a range of alternatives would be based on individual 
knowledge/experience; an experience which determines perceptions upon which the 
assessor respond to risk. Also there may be differences in the capacity of 
professionals due to varying competencies, resources and positions. The way 
professionals experience various kinds of uncertainty (risk aversion) may vaiy, as 
does their evaluation of different combinations of stakes and probabilities. There is 
another ambiguity linked to risk analysis, that is, uncertainty concerning the 
evaluation of risk factors: how do practitioners know whether the outcome of their 
assessment and management of risk will be successful?
At this stage it is important to mention that the role of expertise is not being 
underestimated. In arguing that the role of professionals may be changing as a result 
of new statistical and administrative techniques of knowledge acquisition and 
dissemination, I am not suggesting that professional expertise is now less important 
or that professionals are inflexibly captivated by risk discourse, preventing them 
from imaginatively modifying the specific discourses which informed their practice. 
To suppose that clinical practice is colonised by risk discourse, denies the actions of 
professionals to negotiate actively the application of risk analysis in their daily 
work. My suggestion is that the effects in practice may be both complex and
unpredictable, for example, the possibility that such initiatives may result in 
unintended consequences and destroy some elements of professional work. Having 
outlined what I think might be happening to psychiatric nurses with the prominence 
of risk discourse, the next section briefly presents the likely impacts on mental 
health professionals.
Impact on Mental Health Professionals?
How would such vast bodies of sophisticated quantitative tools, ideas, tools, 
strategies, policies and methods aimed at enhancing clinical decision-making affect 
practitioners? There might be a danger that the tools or techniques of risk 
management are treated as magical solution, with practitioners investing their hope 
in the technique or approach as if it, by itself, will help resolve complex situations. 
Such a stance refers to care which divorces the techniques of risk management from 
any appreciation of, integration with, or accountability for the whole patient, or 
consideration with the substantive questions of the field of psychiatry. In Bion’s 
(1961) terms risk management ideology represent basic assumptions dependency 
functioning in which the profession evades anxieties stemming from confrontation 
with its tasks by creating a magical investment of hope and expectation in some 
invincible object. Such an argument centres around, the emergence of a type of 
social defence, which is that, by focussing its hopes on methods instead of 
sophisticated attention to its primary task; the profession relieves itself of painful 
awareness of its challenges and responsibilities.
In the shift from ‘dangerousness’ to ‘risk’ demands are being made on the 
profession to innovative in profound ways that diffuse deeply into practitioner’s 
ways of thinking and relating to patients. Such adjustments, which can be 
understood from Argyris & Schon’s (1975) concept of type 11 learning, involve
changes in the values, orientations, assumptions and basic frameworks of 
practitioners. This observation is similar to the concept ‘frame-breaking’ changes, 
which by the intensity, depth, breath and complexity of their impacts, cause 
organisations to rethink completely their purposes, structures, processes and 
cultures. It can be hypothesised that practitioners are likely to be affected in their 
experience to their ways of caring which may stimulate severe uncertainty. For 
example, the conventions governing the professional life and behaviour are going 
through profound transformation. This means that the historic norm of professional 
autonomy and practice orientation of technical rationality are giving way to vastly 
different professionals’ roles. The presences of array of tools the practitioner must 
contend with heighten complexity within as well as without. There is, also an 
increasing number of stakeholders making a greater number of demands on 
professionals. The goals and purposes of interventions are called into question as 
groups claim knowledge of risk management. These developments create massive 
uncertainty about clinical care. Given the observations about the conditions under 
which anxiety is stimulated (Menzies 1979; Hischhom 1983), it is reasonable to 
argue that the current demands for change being made on professionals could elicit 
deep and painful anxieties and a conflict between professional ideology and 
management ideology.
From the above observation, we can argue that there are diverse ideologies, 
values, historical events and frames of reference influencing nursing practice. Based 
on a research in a hospital, Meyer (1982) concluded that ideologies wield strong 
forces in guiding the adaptation of organisation. Other scholars have highlighted the 
importance of ideology in the structure and functioning of organisations, 
emphasising the influence of ideological beliefs on organisational-level action
(Alveson 1992; Beyer 1981; Czamiawska-Joerges 1988; Dunbar et al 1982). 
Therefore healthcare organisations like any other social organisations reflect the 
ideologies of the greater society in their cultures and actions; the management 
ideologies of hospitals in turn affect beliefs, values and behaviour at all levels of the 
organisation. In this way, ideologies of the greater environment influences extend 
to organisational, professional and individual entities affecting their decisions, 
behaviour and conduct. Accordingly, the impact of risk management may be seen as 
outcomes of the complex influences of organisational, political, and economic 
structures and ideologies in the health care environment. In a related vein, Chua and 
Clegg (1990) observed how the nursing profession in the United Kingdom has used 
different discourses in their pursuit of professional identity at different historical 
periods reflected in views held about the professions, their relationships with peers, 
patients, other professions with whom they interacted, and with society at large. 
Professional knowledge is therefore constructed within a societal, historical, 
political, philosophical and the environment context
If we accept the above premise then, how does the dominant ideology of 
British nursing that encompasses concepts of humanism, holism and empowerment 
centred on nurse-patient relationship fit in with the dominant perception of the risk 
attributable to mental disorder in society and the increasing use of risk management 
technology? Risk management techniques are seen as rational systems in which 
professionals behave in a logical, purposeful and coordinated approach. This 
ideology of rationality lays emphasis on efficiency, predictability and calculability 
of outcomes, with control over uncertainty. Does this meet the criteria of ideologies 
of nursing? The central ideology of nursing, the holistic approach, refers to the 
patient as a complex human being within a specific social context. It is the total
social situation of the person that is of importance, not the single problem that the 
patient first presents or is identified as having by others. In practice, holism refers to 
the notion of regarding information as more than a collection of factors but instead 
interpreted within its context and never in isolation. Holism espouses the idea that 
people are multiple, interacting, open sub-systems, that are greater than the sum of 
their parts. Moreover, professionalism is among the strongest of ideologies; with 
claims for ownership of special knowledge, definitions of what tasks make up a 
profession, possession of rigorously attained systematic body of knowledge, a norm 
of autonomy and control of work (Abbott 1988; Freidson 1994). However, within 
the pure risk management framework, taking an individual and holistic caring 
perspective to patient care is impractical because assessment is tailored to group 
approaches that are uniform and formulaic to the care of patients. From this angle it 
can be argued that, the nursing ideology holism makes an uneasy fit with the 
dominant ideology of the corporate culture.
This chapter set the scene by critically looking at risk management 
technologies in relation to mental health nurses. It discussed how existing literature 
points to the fact that psychiatric nursing operates in terms of rules, formats and 
technologies of risk decisions systems which connects with the features of the “risk” 
society within which nursing now takes place.
Chapter 2 presents a review of various epistemological and methodological 
approaches to analysis. Using the arena metaphor, it provides a conceptual 
framework for conducting the research.
Chapter 3 provides theoretical and methodological framework for 
understanding autobiographies and argues that autobiographies of researchers are 
useful research tools for clarifying the assumptions underlying the project. It
provides a short account of how the research was developed. The stance taken is 
that the traditional researcher/subject distinction is inappropriate. Here research 
involves a process of self-engagement and change for the researcher as well as for 
the subjects, the researcher and the researched is seen as part of the whole. Who am 
I as a researcher? Why do I study the phenomena I study? How have my 
experiences as a person shaped my research questions? My argument is that the 
development of a research interest is a personal experience and then delineation of a 
focus of concern, is affected by both the practical and theoretical aspects of one’s 
research. In a hermeneutic or interpretive approach, the researcher’s bias, existing 
pre-understandings and interpretive framework is necessary ingredient in evolving 
an understanding of phenomenon under study. It highlights methodological issues 
that arise in the field research among peers. This intellectual account is intended to 
supplement the methodological analysis in chapter 4.
Chapter 4 describes the theoretical background to my research methodology 
and discusses the methods used. It presents the philosophical and methodological 
approach of the project. Symbolic interactionism provided the epistemological 
background. Given this stance, the research methods used were qualitative, intended 
to capture the rich array of subjective experiences of organisation members. 
Research activities on the sites proceeded along similar lines. The predominant 
method of data collection was extensive observations at the four sites over a period 
of four years. Attempts were made to stagger my observation in order to witness the 
units at each time of the day. There were attendances at unit handovers, risk 
decision making reviews and multidisciplinary meetings -  events relevant to 
decision making. The purpose of the participant observation was to provide 
ethnographic data concerning formal and informal activities that constitute the
decision making process. Under optimal circumstances, it was possible to follow a 
particular decision as it was discussed informally on the units, presented at 
handovers and debated in formal patient’s reviews. Participant observation was 
supplemented by interviews. Three major goals of the interviews were first to draw 
more thorough conclusions about perceptions of organisation members than could 
be obtained by observations. Second, to explore in detail the values, beliefs and 
reasoning used by participants in risk decision making and third, to pursue 
theoretical leads that were suggested in the course of observations. The interviews 
also served as a validity check, to ascertain whether observations were consistent 
with the perceptions of participants. Self-scrutiny was aided by critical incident 
analysis, for instance, why certain events are regarded as important and what 
participants learn from incidents. Other information was obtained from documents.
Chapter 5 offers an ethnographic analysis of how nurses assess and manage 
risk. It provides descriptions of four case studies. It provides an empirical analysis 
of how nurses participate in decision making and how nurses make sense and handle 
decisions. Following the logic of theoretical sampling, the cases were drawn from 
diverse environments so that common themes could be developed across a variety 
of settings and build a stronger and more consistent understanding. I selected three 
settings from the National Health Service and one setting from the independent 
sector. The four units differ from each other in their clientele and their clinical 
dynamics. My interest was not in their distinctive dynamics but the social processes 
that link all units.
Chapter 6 provides an empirical analysis of how nurses participate in risk 
decision systems and examines how nurses make sense and handle risk decisions. It 
extrapolates from the case studies conclusions about risk decision making in
psychiatric settings and shows how the professional knowledge of risk becomes 
embedded in communication rules, formats and technologies.
CHAPTER TWO
RISK AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE
Risk analysis is a unique field in that it has no academic boundaries. It admits all 
creeds. Whereas traditional disciplines tend to specialise, we seek to integrate 
across disciplines. Our role, viewed broadly, is to draw upon the best available 
scientific knowledge in pursuit o f societal goals -  health, safety, and environmental 
protection. (Fiksel 1990p. 195)
Discourse on “risk” today occupies a prominent place in a variety of 
intellectual disciplines within contemporary social sciences. Obtaining a precise 
common definition of the concept has proven to be extremely difficult, however, not 
only because of its interdisciplinary applications but also due to its varied 
approaches. In the social scientific domain, a distinction has been drawn between 
“objective risk” and “subjective risk” as illustrated in the Royal Society’s (1992) 
report. In what was thought to be a bridging of gap between supposedly objective 
risk, derived by scientists from statistics and admittedly subjective risk as perceived 
by the public the Royal Society’s report resulted in two sections written from 
different viewpoints (natural scientists versus social scientists), which completely 
contradict one another. The natural scientists took the view that objective and 
perceived risk are distinct and that the public’s perception of risk is flawed. This 
technico-scientific perspective (Lupton 1999) that has tended to dictate 
governmental and scientific discussions of risk promotes a positivist (or realist) 
theory and rationalistic policy orientation. The social scientists in contrast suggested 
that disparate groups view risk in different ways and react to it differently. This 
social constructionist approach looks upon risk as a “social construct” and argues 
that risks do not directly reflect natural reality but are played out in every society
through lenses shaped by history, politics and culture (Douglas 1992). All 
knowledge about risk (from experts and lay people) from this stance is bound to the 
socio-cultural contexts in which this knowledge is generated. Thus scientific 
knowledge is never value-free but rather is always the product of seeing, not a static 
objective phenomenon, but is constantly constructed and negotiated as part of the 
network of social interaction and the formation of meaning. The lack of conceptual 
coherence in the analyses of risk is reflected in the ambiguity and the language use.
This difficulty of achieving “a single uniformly understood language for the 
risk analysis community” led to the contention for abandoning risk, when after four 
years the Society for Risk Analysis failed to define the concept “risk” “... .saying in 
its final report that maybe its better not to define risk. Let each author define it in his 
own way, only please each should explain clearly what that way is (Kaplan 1997 
p.407). Jardine and Hrudey (1997) note the difficulties of multiple and imprecise 
meanings of words on risk communication and put forward a bundle of 
recommendations to reduce the problems so created; and Caiman and Royston 
(1997) attempt to devise a standard classification of risk levels with a plea for a 
standardisation of “the language of risk” in order to improve “risk communication” 
are all part of the doomed attempts to define the word risk. For Dowie (1999 p.69), 
the solution is to abandon the concept risk in decision making: “In any of these 
situations we need to remove “risk”, not try to understand it better or to treat its 
symptoms by attempts at “clarification”. It is simply not needed. We do not need a 
category of “risk decisions” or “risk management decisions”. They are just
decisions. They are just factors Nothing of importance will be lost with “risk”,
except by those who rely on fudge and confusion as instruments o f political 
persuasion and social lubrication”.
Within the background of the failure of attempts to clarify and standardise 
the language of risk is the increased recognition of the role of risk in organisations 
as the consequences of “risky” decisions have become more evident. The 
concentration of the public, media and regulators spotlight upon the risks associated 
with high technology systems illustrated in the concerns expressed over Three Mile 
Island, the Space Shuttle Challenger, Union carbide in Bhopal, Chernobyl, bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and genetically modified (GM) crops has 
resulted in a need for organisations to deal with a variety of fundamental safety 
decisions. This new phase of attention of the negative aspects of risk departs from 
the old notion of “no progress without risk, no benefits without leaping into the 
unknown (Halfinann 1999 p. 177). In the above cases the public has been outraged 
and attributed the risks to the influence of organisations and possible negligence on 
part of the controlling authorities. In contemporary societies risks are not seen as 
mere externalities or unintended consequences, but a key question around which 
politics and social debates are increasingly organised (Shrivastava 1995).
Disasters such those mentioned above are said to have helped to alert the 
public to the dangers around us. Sociological accounts of risk believe that an 
awareness of the destructive consequences of technology and science provides the 
basis for the widespread concern with safety today. The assertion is that disasters in 
recent years have helped to alert the public to the dangers around us heightening 
public concern for safety in the process (Beck 1992). But if we accept the argument 
that disasters and catastrophes have happened throughout history, what account for 
the public’s anxieties today? The different public reaction to the Clapham Junction 
railway accident in 1988 and of the Hatfield rail crash in 2000 is enlightening in this 
respect. In the former case many people perished, the public was shocked however
rail travel was not put to serious questions. In contrast the response to the Hatfield 
turned into a full-scale panic. For the public this disaster was confirmation that rail 
travel was out of control. In psychiatric care recent reactions to “dangerous” patients 
as compared to past reactions illustrated in Clunis case mentioned in chapter one (of 
which more later) is instructive. The trigger of anxiety and fear from technological 
and scientific developments has extended to an intense response of risk-aversion 
now prevalent in every domain of human activity. Thus disastrous incidents, which 
in the past would have been waved off as bad luck, are now interpreted as 
indications of a major danger. But what counts for the discontinuity between 
premodem and modem risks?
Scholars have attempted to analyse the differences between premodem and 
modem risks. First, Douglas and Aaron (1982) suggest that modem societies are 
confronted with increased awareness of risk because more decisions are now taken 
in an atmosphere of uncertainty. This approach interprets the meaning of risk as a 
“social constm cfrelating to the current subjective consciousness of society, rather 
than a reflection of increased real dangers. Second, it is argued that risks in 
premodem times were personal and not global as they are today - the effects of acid 
rain, global warming and nuclear fallout are borne by those who do not contribute to 
their origins (Jamieson 1992). Third, is the assertion that risks facing late modernity 
are not natural (occurrences such as earthquake and floods) but manufactured (the 
results of human intervention) (Beck 1992; Fredenburg 1996; Giddens 1990; 
Jamieson 1996). Related to this, is the notion that risks in the past were usually 
noticeable, while they are not generally today (e.g. contamination induced by 
radioactivity and toxins in foodstuffs). Fourth, is the crucial role that the media 
plays in late modernity. For instance, Thompson’s (1995) notion of the processes of
discursive elaboration and “extended mediazation” (the ongoing process of 
communication and debate of media messages) has led to the social amplification 
and attenuation of risks in late modem societies Kasperson and Kasperson (1996). 
As will become clear in the next section, disputes over clinical issues normally 
involve references to scientific reports that are summarised by the communication 
media. The media reports then become an object of discussion for commentators 
and experts whose comments are further commented upon by other commentators. 
These media messages could then lead to recipients taking responsive action to 
events. From this stance, the media in late modernity both report and shape what is 
going on; thus news organisations are significant actors involved in the social 
construction of risk (Short 1984). In the words of Stallings (1990 p.80); “By 
selecting events to report, by interviewing and quoting experts who interpret these 
events and by assembling and distributing news products, news organisations create 
an important component of public discourse.”
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section presents three 
organisational events concerning risk issues. It shows risk how risk is no longer 
seen as the probability of harm arising from determinable physical, biological or 
social causes but instead as the embodiment of deeply held cultural values and 
beliefs. The word risk has changed its meanings over the centuries. The next section 
provides an abbreviated review of three major traditions that have emerged from 
social and political analysis and examines how this played out in assessment and 
management of risk in psychiatric settings. The final section reconceptualises the 
determinants of risk behaviour and presents framework in risk management based 
on the arena concept.
Event analysis in organisations
The current MMR debate in the United Kingdom provides a graphic 
illustration of a clash between two kinds of rationality namely instrumental 
reductionist rationality (the head) of the expert and the common-sense rationality 
(the heart) of the lay public. Anxiety over controversial research by Dr Andrew 
Wakefield and colleagues at the Royal Free hospital published in 1998 in one of the 
world’s leading scientific journal the Lancet raising the possibility o f a link between 
the MMR vaccination and bowel disease and autism and media coverage has made 
many parents reluctant to have their children vaccinated. The main plank of the 
thesis is that MMR can trigger a form of bowel disease, which can in turn affect 
development. The Royal Free team found measles virus in the gut, but most 
scientists who tried to replicate the experiment failed. In the first week of February 
2002 a long-awaited paper by a Dublin pathologist Professor John O’Leary 
published on the website of the journal Molecular Pathology found fragments of 
measles virus of the gut and tissue of the autistic children with bowel disease who 
were patients at the Royal Free. But Professor O’Leary and other commentators 
from Warwick University agree that this does not prove a link to MMR. A large 
study involving nearly 500 autistic children in the north Thames region of London 
carried out by community paediatricians at the Royal Free, together with scientists 
from the public health laboratory service and the Open University published in the 
Lancet in 1999 found no increase risk of autism after MMR jab and no difference in 
the age at which children were diagnosed as autistic (between those who were 
vaccinated with MMR at 18 months and those vaccinated later) concluding that the 
rise in autism had began before MMR was introduced in 1988. Papers written on the 
experience of MMR vaccination in Sweden and Finland have found that there was
no connection between the jab and autism. In addition, it is known that MMR has 
been used in the US for nearly 30 years, nearly 20 years in Scandinavia and in 
Britain since 1988 with relatively few side effects.
However it is argued by scientists that there may be a theoretical 
possibility that MMR could trigger problems in a number of children. Also for 
parents, because there is no proven link between MMR and autism or other 
conditions, does not prove there is no link. In the “Defiant parents stand by 
decision” (The Guardian, Thursday February 7 2002 p.3): a parent said, “I think 
people are worried about the situation at the moment but the general impression is 
that although measles can kill, there is more to fear from the MMR vaccine. Since 
thalidomide, the medical establishment and government departments have shown 
they are not wholly reliable on these matters.” Another says, “People have trusted 
the government on thalidomide and BSE. Just because it is the voice of authority, 
that does not mean it is convincing. In light of other scares, it is simply not enough 
for them to say that we have got to believe they are right.” Yet another parent 
added, “My feeling is that there needs to be a lot more research and that Andrew 
Wakefield is not the pariah everyone thinks he is. The government needs to wake up 
and listen to the public because we are in the end the ones who are having to make 
the decisions.” The government would not let children have single measles 
vaccination as requested by parents, doctors and some politicians because its 
scientific advisers say the time lapse between the three jabs leaves children exposed 
to infection, and that some parents might not bring in the child for three separate 
visits. The scientific uncertainty surrounding the MMR debate like the BSE issue 
has made risk issue immensely complex; namely a trade-off of the possibility that 
some children may become autistic against public health benefits (illustrated in the
measles epidemic in south London) in the face of highly uncertain knowledge of 
effects and processes and the parents demands for the elimination of any risk, 
however small.
In health care organisations patient safety, the avoidance, prevention and 
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries from clinical interventions, has now 
become a significant issue at the highest levels. Disasters and accidents in popular 
accounts are often described as human error, which can be rectified by improved 
training, changes in group dynamics and better communication and decision making 
skills to prevent similar decision failures. The emphasis on the individual as a 
rational decision maker has the potential of leading to embracement of a universal 
assumption about risk assessment, irrespective of the specific organisation’s 
political, economic and institutional environment. It is becoming increasingly 
obvious that it is restrictive to regard failures in organisations only in individual 
terms; but rather should be seen as a range of problems of behaviour which might 
have their origins in failure at the level of, for instance, managerial activity, 
institutionalised information systems inter/intra group communication patterns, as 
well as individual blunders (Perrow 1984; Turner 1978). Accidents and disasters are 
therefore the result of complex, human and organisational factors, which may be 
difficult to detect in foresight. Indeed, past organisational research has shown that 
accidents and disasters are due to the action and interaction of human, 
organisational and technological factors (Shrisvasta 1987). For example research 
has highlighted factors that propel organisations toward disasters: the operation of 
micro-level cognitive process (Weick 1988), employee beliefs about risks and 
failures (Starbuck & Milliken 1988), intra-organisational technological failures 
(Morone & Woodhouse 1986; Perrow 1984), the intra and inter-organisational
failures of communication (Turner 1978) and internal organisational characteristics 
(Gephart & Pitter 1993).
The above observation underscores the urgent need for nursing theory, 
research and practice to address the social, political and economic contexts of health 
and healthcare as illustrated in the Bristol inquiry report. Between 30 and 35 
children undergoing heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary died between 1991 and 
1995 who, would have survived if treated elsewhere. The inquiry report revealed 
that the failings and flaws were not just those of the surgeons but also the hospital, 
its organisation and culture, and within the wider NHS as it was at the time. There 
was a mindset of “professional hubris” that as a teaching hospital Bristol had to be 
at the leading edge. But with hindsight, it was doubtful that Bristol should ever have 
been designated as a specialist centre for open-heart surgery on children since the 
hospital never did enough operations on children for the surgeons, trained and 
experienced in adult heart surgery, to become really skilled. Thus although 
clinicians were actively collecting data, there were denial of any adverse inferences 
drawn from the data. There was evidence of under funding which was typical o f the 
whole NHS with the conclusion that the flaws were not caused by lack of resources. 
The report identified poor teamwork and management, inadequate leadership, a 
closed “club culture” (with insiders and outsiders) and absence of systems to listen 
to concerns. The physical set-up was “dangerous” with surgeons on one site at the 
Royal Infirmary and paediatric cardiologists several hundred metres away at the 
children’s hospital. The operating theatre and intensive care unit were on different 
floors, and children had to be transported by lift that could be called at any time by 
others. An expert review of 80 cases carried out for the inquiry showed 
inadequacies at every point from referral to diagnosis, surgery and intensive care.
Another important message from the report is that the NHS has failed to respond 
adequately to the special needs of children, which might equally have been about 
the mentally ill. Among the almost 200 recommendations are calls for a new culture 
of openness, with non-punitive system for reporting serious incidents, abolition of 
clinical negligence litigation, which is part of the culture of blame and secrecy, 
replacing it with administrative scheme for avoiding compensation, a call for a 
council for the quality of healthcare independent of government to include the new 
bodies set up to oversee standards of healthcare that the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, the Commission for Health Improvement and the planned 
National Patient Safety Agency.
These post-disaster activities namely a public investigation, identification of 
flaws and errors leading to the tragedy, a set of recommendations to prevent similar 
incidents was also evident in the Christopher Clunis case. In 1992 Christopher a 
young African/Caribbean stabbed Jonathan Zito to death on an underground station 
with a screwdriver. The investigation of the mental health service response to Clunis 
brought to light features which were similar to the Bristol case. The inquiiy report 
painted a picture of a flawed system of care with poor teamwork between 
professionals, poor communication and evidence of a fragmented and under 
resourced system. Although Clunis has a long history of psychiatric illness there 
was a lack of continuity of care due to poor communication by professionals; notes 
and files were mislaid, messages between different professional groups were lost or 
misunderstood. The inquiry also noted the failure of professionals to assess 
dangerousness with the consequent neglect of exclusion of personal and social 
support for Clunis and his family. No discharge plans were made for his care in the 
community under Section 117 of the Mental Health Act and was often out of touch
with services and relatives. Between 1987 and 1992 Clunis had been admitted to 
four major psychiatric units, but each of them lost contact with him. He was at one 
point transferred from a secure unit to a general psychiatric bed to save money. 
Despite Clunis making threatening and violent attacks on two consecutive days in 
the week before the killing of Jonathan Zito the police failed to make an arrest 
following report from the public. The main lessons from the Clunis case were that 
professional liaison within the NHS and between it and other agencies were 
inadequate, that Section 117 of the 1983 Metal Health Act and other policies, such 
as Care programme Approach were not being put into practice properly and that 
even when services have procedures in place delivery of long-term support after or 
between crises were inadequate.
The significance of the MMR debate, the Bristol and the Clunis cases show the 
importance of other actors within healthcare. The MMR debate is no longer a 
question of calculating risk on all the available evidence, of which there a large 
quantity from more than 90 countries that use MMR; it has become a test for the 
government and experts about how to handle a crises of public confidence. The 
legacy of collapse of confidence in scientists and their relationship to government 
because of the BSE affair means that what is crucial is not presenting scientific 
evidence, but tackling the more complex task of calming the fears of parents. The 
Bristol case led to widespread demands for closer regulation of the medical 
profession which led to the announcement of hospital league tables based on 
surgical survival rates and other indicators of medical performance. The 
introduction of league tables following the new framework of clinical governance, 
involving a National Institute for Clinical Excellence and Commission for Health 
Improvement, is seen as marking the decline of deference to medical mystique and
the advance of patient empowerment leading to breakdown of trust between the 
medical profession and public. In the Clunis case Mrs Zito, knowledgeable and 
experienced in the field of mental healthcare, argued for more funds for community 
care, more emergency beds in hospitals and more effective planning of discharges. 
Doctors used the case to protest the lack of resources. A pressure group SANE 
called for more hospital beds, more incarceration and introduction of tighter 
restrictions on discharge. This led to the introduction of Supervised Discharge 
Orders, compelling patients to take their medication and comply with their aftercare 
plan under sanction of recall to hospital. Analysis of the cases demonstrates that the 
field of healthcare is contested and complex and made up of diverse and 
contradictory logics, that mistakes cannot be accounted for by reductionist 
explanations that direct attention only to individual actors and that mistakes are 
indigenous, systemic, normal by-products of the work processes (Paget 1995; Bosk 
1979). In addition, the possibility of a mistake is intensified by the complexity of 
healthcare (risky work). In a sense the more complex the technology and the 
organisation as it is the case in healthcare, the greater the possibility of the kinds of 
failure which Turner (1976) identifies as “failures of foresight”. Risk management 
therefore does not occur in a vacuum but rather linked to environmental 
contingency, politics and structures of power. As Adams (1995 p.l) observes 
“Everyone is a true risk “expert” in the original sense of the word; we have all been 
trained by practice and experience in the management of risk. Everyone has a valid 
contribution to make to a discussion of the subject.” But what is risk?
What is risk? A concept in search of meaning
Since risk assessment and management have become major themes in 
scientific and public policy one might assume, that the term ‘risk’ would be easy to
define. However, the meaning of ‘risk’ has always been fraught with confusion and 
disagreement. Yates and Stone (1992) observe that risk is the most abused concepts 
in social science. The lack of conceptual coherence in the analyses of risk is 
reflected in the ambiguity and imprecision of terms used in the language of risk. In 
everyday popular usage the term ‘risk’ has many meanings, for example, the terms 
‘threat’, ‘hazard’, ‘danger’, or ‘harm’ are frequently used as synonyms. Researchers 
also differ considerably in their constructs of risk. While risk is now widely studied, 
the concept is highly contested. Beck (1994 p.9) reminds us that “In risk issues, no 
one is an expert, or everyone is an expert, because all the experts presume what they 
are supposed to make possible and produce: cultural acceptance.” The basic idea of 
risk as possible loss has been interpreted differently in different disciplines. 
Psychologists define risk in terms of perceptions people exposed to potential loss by 
using psychometric measures of risk perception to measure risk (Slovic 1987). 
Economists define risk as uncertainty about economic gains and losses by using 
statistical probability models to measure this uncertainty. In strategic management, 
because it is not possible to know all possible decisions consequences and their 
probabilities, scholars use the probability of event times the impact of the event as a 
measure of risk (Lave 1987; Shrivastava 1995) and thus regard risk as uncertainty or 
unpredictable consequences (Baird & Thomas 1983). The concept of risk has 
typically been seen as the probability of a negative event or threat occurring and the 
possible consequences. As a result the objective for policy has been to manage risk 
“rationally” by “experts”. Over the years, organisational sociologists have observed 
the complex ways in which the physical and human elements of technological 
systems interact to produce risky conditions and periodical disasters (Clarke 1989; 
Krimsky & Golding 1992; Perrow 1984; Turner 1978). Slovick (1999) argues that
that risks are multidimensional and that public perceptions are related to among 
other factors, whether the risk is voluntary, controllable, familiar, potentially 
catastrophic and known to science. Differences among experts, individuals and 
groups about varied perception of risk are seen as a result of different worldviews 
(Douglas 1992). It is also argued that public and expert values inevitably influence 
risk assessment, and therefore the notion of separating scientific risk analysis is 
dubious (Jasanoff 1990; Wynne 1991). By focusing on cultural effects such as 
varying goals, assumptions of rationality and motivations and the regulative and 
legislative environment which guide clinical decision-making, the sociological 
perspective enables us to perceive the decision making process as social process in 
which normative and cognitive orientations are involved.
Changing Concepts of Risk
Risk appears to be the prevailing metaphor for describing and analysing 
changes in contemporary societies (e.g. Beck 1997, 1996, 1992; Castel 1991; 
Douglas 1985, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Ewald 1991 Giddens 1991). 
Calas (1999 p.684) sees risk both “as a new epistemological and political space for 
analysing changes in contemporary industrial capitalist societies” and “as metaphor 
of choice for productive life in the coming century, since it allows for both on-going 
construction and deconstruction of possible worlds within the uncertainties that new 
capitalisms might bring about.” Considering risk as a conceptual framework for 
analysing changes in contemporary capitalism can be illustrated in Beck’s (1992) 
concept of the “risk society” the process of modernisation - which deals with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself. In 
describing this trend as ‘risk epidemic’, Skolbekken (1995) argues that it reflects the 
social constructions of a particular time in history. The historical development of
‘risk’ concept is characterised by scientific theorising and experimentation (Gephart 
1996). Various means have been suggested for the proliferation of the concept and 
language of risk in expert discourses over the past decades. These include 
developments in probability statistics, establishment of institutions and regulatory 
agencies to deal with such phenomena conceptualised as highly risky, and an 
increasing value placed on scientific rationality as a basis of certainty (Douglas 
1985; Short 1988). In a sense, the distinguishing feature, of modem risks as opposed 
to traditional ones are noticeable largely through application of scientific models. 
Discourses on, and practices of risk assessment and management reveal a number of 
changes over the centuries. For nurses, there are fundamental transformations, not 
only in risk management techniques, but also in the underlying rationale of nursing 
thought and practice. Douglas (1990) has observed that the connotation of the word 
‘risk’ has changed over the centuries and Lupton (1999) argues that the increase of 
the concept and language of risk has its origin in the changes inherent in the 
transformation of societies from pre-modem to modem and then to late modem 
(postmodern). Each period problematises risk in a different way and therefore 
proposes new technologies for the management of mental health patients. It is worth 
briefly identifying the distinguishing features of pre-modem to late modernity in 
order to understand the current rationalities, techniques and management of 
psychiatric nursing.
I contend that the contemporary forms of risk management theory and practice 
may be better understood by situating them historically. In addition I share the view 
that discourses on risk management are not self-contained entities, but rather, 
correlate with other discourses and therefore should be examined within the context 
of a wider set of discourses. The assumption is that a historical assessment o f the
social cultural conditions and the institutional arenas in which particular forms of 
risk management thought and practice emerge and take shape, may challenge 
current notions of nursing craft and shed different light on the understanding of 
nursing practice today. The historical approach proposed in this analysis draws upon 
the work of Foulcault (1977; 1981) and others to provide a genealogy and 
archaeology of the conditions of possibility for particular conceptualisations and 
practices of psychiatric nursing to emerge. It locates traces of the present in the past, 
not in order to reconstruct the past, but with a deep commitment to understand the 
present. In Foucauldian terms, genealogy is an attempt to outline, how ideas, 
concepts and beliefs have both shifted and continued into the present while 
archaeology provides the systematic and analytical description of particular 
discourses. Thus the analysis is not a linear history of the development of risk 
management ideas over time but an attempt to understand historical periods and 
events in their own terms. It is important to note that Foucault’s work on history of 
madness has both been endorsed and criticised. It has been acknowledged for 
occupying a special and central place in the historiography of psychiatry (Goldstein 
J 1987), for both its empirical content and powerful theoretical perspectives, as the 
most penetrating work ever written on the history of madness (Porter R 1990) and 
as the “new cultural history” (O’Brein P 1989). Here Foucault’s notion of madness 
as a variable social construct and not an ahistorical scientific given is recognised. 
But his work has also been criticised for lack of empirical evidence and for its 
generalisations and oversimplifications (Midelfort H C E 1989; Sedgwick P 1982; 
Hacking I 1986). Foucault’s work has been found wanting in terms of specific 
historical facts and interpretations even by historians who are favourably disposed 
to his work. Thus Scull (1990 p.57) whose work shares much of the general spirit of
Foucault’s says his work rest on the “shakiest of scholarly foundations and riddled 
with errors of fact and interpretation.” Similarly O’Brien (1989 p.31) an enthusiast 
finds Foucault’s work “too general, too unsubstantiated, too mechanistic.” Porter 
(1990) also raises important questions about Foucault’s work. For example, Porter 
challenges Foucault’s claims about the way the Classical Age conceived madness 
(as varieties of unreason) as dubious in light of English experience and questioned 
Confinement (confinement was relatively uncommon in England) as a practice 
definitive of the era’s attitude toward madness.
Whilst some of the critique of Foucault’s central views for example on 
confinement raises an important empirical challenge it does not, in itself, undermine 
the interpretative power of his work. Foucault’s work was not primarily a history of 
events and institutions but the experience of madness in which he strived for a 
comprehensive unifying interpretation that tried to give intelligible order to a 
hotchpotch of individual historical truths. Thus my justification for sharing the 
sentiments of Foucault’s historical construction is his hermeneutic approach -  
making sense of the experience of mental illness -  that is examining the various 
threads and themes that contributed to the shift in thinking rather than its connection 
with empirical “facts”. Facts are not a given with their meaning readily visible, but 
need to be interpreted; there is therefore a close relationship between fact and 
interpretation. We cannot present facts in a way that is free of theoretical baggage; 
facts are social constructs where certain theoretical positions will inevitably prefer 
certain facts. Following Carr (1987 p.23) I likened facts to “fish swimming about in 
a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean;... what the historian catches will depend 
partly on what partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to
fish in and what tackle he chooses to use -  these two factors being, of course, 
determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch.”
Foucault’s work gives an extensive and subtle interpretative framework that 
raises provocative questions. In criticising the dominant ideology of psychiatry -  the 
triumph of reason over witchcraft -  Foucault reveals how psychiatry involved 
various forms of “govemmentality” to regulate individuals whose behaviour was in 
many ways “deviant.” In social construction terms, such an approach points us to 
the function of concepts of disease and illness as components of a larger system of 
social regulation. Foucault’s argument that there is no unity to the concept of 
madness means that madness does not refer to any coherent form of behaviour but 
rather a discourse within the medical profession itself; which creates and constitutes 
unity that are then termed sane or insane. From this stance, scientific concepts are 
not neutral descriptions of patterns of behaviour but are rather produced through 
discursive activity. This supports the argument that it is impossible to separate out 
value judgements from social and scientific accounts of illness behaviour (Turner 
1999). While Foucault’s approach is different in its suppositions and methods, there 
are some similarities with Szasz’s (1961; 1970) questioning of the role of psychiatry 
in eroding individual and human rights. Szasz argues that madness is artificially 
created concept which is used to control those who think differently from the 
majority of the population and that the notion of mental health enables the majority 
to victimise and dehumanise the minority. The value of such critiques in the social 
sciences of medicine raises vital questions about supposed neutrality and reliability 
of scientific methods and concepts in the management of human affairs. It uncovers 
the problems of the positivist views of madness, which underlie the medical model 
of psychiatric deviance. This implies that psychiatric judgements reflect the norms
and expectations of society. In taking the social constructionist ways I am not 
suggesting that mental illness (e.g. depression, schizophrenia) does not exist but to 
recognise that definition of a condition is dependent upon social conventions as well 
as clinical grounds (Campbell 2000).
In advocating a marriage between mental illness and culture, I am following 
scholars who argue for the importance of cultural influences upon health and illness 
(e.g. Dubios 1952; Foucault 1961; Gilman 1988; Kleiman 1988; Lindenbaum & 
Lock 1993; Porter 1995; Waitzkin 1983). In The Origins of Human Disease, 
McKeown (1988) observes that most common causes of sickness in every era are 
determined by conditions that prevail at the time and Gadamer’s (1993) Enigma of 
Health notes that illness involves cultural practices and shared meanings. This new 
understanding of illness is illustrated extremely well in Morris’ (1998 p5) 
contention that “Illness ... is not strictly speaking an object. It is not something we 
can know inside and out, through an inventory of its material properties, like a 
moon rock. Even when caused by a toxin, by a microbe, or by the dysfunction of an 
organ, illness is a fluid process that changes as we change, enigmatic, insubordinate, 
subjective. It captures bodies, minds, and emotions, remains at its deepest level 
inaccessible to language, and alters under the influence o f non-medical events from 
divorce to climate change.” I believe that tracing a historically new way of 
understanding illness (convergence between mental illness and non-medical events) 
questions various viewpoints basic to the mechanistic model and that such an 
exploration may add to our knowledge of mental illness.
Foucault’s conceptualisations of power through the exploration of 
surveillance and control of the body and sexuality (Foucault 1981) and the body’s 
subjugation through the mediation of science and the practice of exclusion both in a
spatial and social sense (as with mental patients, prisoners and slaves); through 
scientific classification namely the categorisation and partitioning of people (e.g. the 
category of the “normal” and sociological classification by race, gender, ethnicity 
and roles) (Rabinow 1984) and finally the concerns of self-control or 
“subjectification” on individuals’ own bodies, souls, thoughts and conduct (Foucault 
1984) have encouraged interest in the body. This is illustrated in recent scholarships 
in organisation theory, sociology, anthropology, philosophy and history of the 
human body (Dale 2001; Douglas 1966; Elias 1978; Good 1994; Grosz 1994; Leder 
1992; Shilling 1993; Turner 1996). From the body being “ontologically” absent -  
not being aware of our bodies - (Leder 1990), “under-research” and “under­
theorised” (McKie & Watson 2000), there is currently an expanding field of 
sociology of the body (Turner 1999). Interpreting the symbolic significance of the 
body as a metaphor (for example phrases such as anatomy of Britain, the health of 
the company, with bodily symptoms and signs of social distress) is one of the areas 
that the social theory of the body is developing. Douglas’ (1966) book Purity and 
Danger, which shows the problems of uncertainty and risk in relation to the orifices 
is an example. Other developments in sociology of the body are debates about: 
patriarchy, sex, gender, sexuality and identity (Butler 1990; Grosz 1996; Haraway 
1989; Lindemann 1997; Martin 1987) the social construction of medical conditions 
(Annandale 1998; Fox 1993; Turner 1993), issues in organisations as illustrated in 
Dale’s (2001) Anatomising Embodiment and Organisation Theory, which explores 
the relationship between the human body and the development of social theory 
about organisations and organising.
Risk and Otherness
Theorisations of the links between ideas of the body and anxieties about risk 
and Otherness (Lupton 1999a; 1999b), is useful in mapping out the epistemologies 
of risk. Foucault’s notion of a clinical “gaze,” that transforms the body into an 
object of scientific scrutiny shows how bodies can be understood as prone to 
disorder and therefore need caring, managing, controlling, excluding and isolating. 
Douglas’ (1961) influential work in Purity and Danger suggests that dirt, filth and 
pollution stand as the image of disorder, anomaly, ambiguity, danger and threats to 
human survival. Douglas describes how taboos - prohibitions that if not observed 
are believed to result in instant or unavoidable harm - act in cultures to protect them 
from behaviours that cause danger to them. The idea of taboo fit in with the belief 
that in addition to ferocious animals and devastating storms, nature was enveloped 
with harmful, threatening, uncontrollable forces and hostile demons ready to attack 
at the slightest provocation. The notions of pollution and taboos however were not 
about hygiene, because concepts about scientific hygiene did not exist; they 
represented images of disorder and indirect sign of social cohesion. Taboo with its 
links to dirt and pollution is here seen as conceptual mechanisms for giving the 
world structure and meaning. Rituals of pollution (e.g. rites and ceremonies) 
represent a strategy of control over a world that appears out of control and deeply 
threatening. According to Douglas pollution rituals and taboos -  coherent belief 
systems provided by culture - are vital means of imposing order on a world that at 
any moment threatens to give way to chaos. Crucial to Douglas’ concepts about the 
symbolic nature of purity and pollution strategies is her observation that the human 
body is a conceptual microcosm for the body politic or society of which it is part. 
This is illustrated in the relation to how the flow of fluid in and out bodies’ openings
is symbolically conceptualised and controlled. Notions of the body and its openings 
and boundaries address a major preoccupation of human societies namely how to 
deal with threats.
Douglas’ insight shows that bodily control is an expression of social control. 
So that ideas about what substances should be incorporated in the body in terms of 
what is pure and therefore safe to ingest, reflects notions about the body politic and 
how the boundaries of societies are maintained, regulating the entry of certain types 
of people “in” and keeping some others “outside” the body politic. Douglas’ 
observations underpin her understanding of cultural role and importance of risk in 
contemporary western societies, particularly the use of risk as a concept for 
marginalizing and blaming an Other who is placed as posing as a threat and thus a 
risk. Risk for Douglas is a strategy for dealing with danger and Otherness. The other 
conceptualised as different from Self is the subject of anxiety and concern, 
particularly if it threatens to blur boundaries. For our purpose mental illness 
(abnormal bodily state) is a source of social pollution that challenges notions about 
bodily margins stirring the meanings of fear, danger and potential contamination 
and therefore societal demands for patients to be managed, supervised and 
controlled.
Douglas’ notion of the Other position as contaminated and polluting have 
echoes in postcolonial theorisations (e.g. Bhabba 1986; Radharrishana 1996; Said 
1989; Spivak 1988) with the claim that Western modem knowledge - that is that the 
Enlightenment notion of knowledge have silenced the voices of the marginal 
Others. The argument is that non-Westem societies and cultures are represented 
only in terms of the categories of Western thought in which Western society acts as 
a standard against which all other societies are judged. This predictably leads to the
silencing of other voices. The result has been the acquisition of an aura of 
superiority for Western cultures and the imposition of the sense of inferiority upon 
non-Westem cultures. In the colonial era, black people were portrayed as savage, 
uncivilised, uncontrolled, irrational, dirty and therefore threatening to white people. 
The black body was regarded as porous, odorous and so as potentially 
contaminating to that of the white body -  clean, contained and controlled (Camaroff 
1993). Depicting social groups such as non-whites, the disabled, women, Gypsies 
the Irish as “dirty” has served to represent them as the dangerous Other (Sibley 
1995). Bauman (1991) reminds us how the Jews represented in Nazi writings as 
dirty, unhygienic, pathological, contaminating and consequently requiring 
extermination in the interests of cleanliness and hygiene gave us the Holocaust.
The above observation is demonstrated in Foucault’s identification of the 
creation of a discourse that defines sanity and thus marginalizes the insane. In his 
Madness and Civilisation, lepers (prime source of contamination) were the Others 
of medieval society, whose exclusion from everyday life helped provide society 
with a sense of its normality. Foucault contends that a new Other (e. g. non­
productive, the criminal, the homeless and especially the mad) was bom, as leprosy 
became less common and thus was less able to play its previous symbolic role. The 
Other, then is that which lies outside a particular culture or society epistemological 
boundaries. Not only does society treats everything beyond its boundary as the 
Other, but it also requires an Other without which there can be no sense of Self. 
Mossman (1997) points out how encounters with homeless people confronts society 
with deeply felt anxieties about rational ordering and Thomson (1997) explains how 
people with disability, because they fail to conform to standards of normality are 
also often treated as sub-human and subjected to fear, anger and abuse. Following
Douglas, social groups who are seen as abnormal and extraordinary can be 
conceptualised as “dirt” lying outside the normative ordering system of society. 
Like dirt, people categorised as mentally ill has been dealt with through policies of 
regulation, exclusion and avoidance in an effort to re-establish sociocultural order.
An additional viewpoint on Otherness is expressed in psychoanalytic theory, 
which centres on the projection of unconsciousness, emotions and fantasises upon 
the Other; as part of individual’s continuing attempts to maintain a coherent 
subjectivity and to construct and maintain conceptual borders. Based on Douglas’ 
notion of defilement, Kristeva (1982) has developed the notion of abjection. The 
abject is viewed as dirty, filthy, contaminating waste, which confounds boundaries. 
Following Douglas, Kristeva maintains that the abject matches the attempt to clearly 
define borders. To delineate borders, a fine must be drawn between the inside and 
outside, between the clean and the proper self and the abject Other. That which 
threatens identity must be discarded from the borders and placed outside. In a 
similar vein Williamson (1989) used psychoanalytic approach to theorise the 
popular response to HIV/AIDS. She argues that the horror expressed on issues 
surrounding HIV/AIDS (regarded as monster) is result of the splitting off and 
projection of repressed anxieties and fascination about “unacceptable” or 
“perverted” sexualities. The monstrous characteristics of HIV/AIDS lie in wait to 
break down the boundaries between Self and Other - dissolving categories between 
the “contaminated” and the “pure”. Accordingly, people believed to be “at risk” of 
HIV infection have been routinely considered as contaminated and polluting, the 
repository of fears and anxieties about death, illness, chaos, lack of control and the 
incipient permeability of the social and fleshy body.
With a particular focus on gender implications, Grosz (1994) in Volatile 
Bodies has build on Douglas and Kristeva’s discussion to analyse the sexual bodily 
fluids. Grosz argues that anxieties about bodies are projected onto female bodies -  
where female bodies leak but male bodies do not. The female body is 
conceptualised as marginal, indeterminate, fluid, borderline and liminal as seeping 
sexual fluids such as menstrual blood that are considered to be particularly “dirty” 
because of the mysterious uterus and hidden female genitals. The female body tends 
therefore to be viewed as more dangerous, defiling than the male body. For 
instance, semen is exempt from the category of dangerous fluids because it is 
suppose to be purified by the heat of the male body. According to Oliver (1998 
p. 142), “The physical purification process corresponds to the male’s cathartic 
purification of passions and lusts from his clean and proper self. The separation of 
the male body from the mess of reproduction, the separation of masculine identity 
from the male body’s role in reproduction, allows masculine identity to be 
constituted by abjecting everything messy about reproduction and associating it 
with the female body. In this way, males maintain their own clean and proper 
selves.”
Conceptually, we have seen how the term ‘body image’ has been used to 
illustrate the ways in which we think about our health namely, our understanding 
and experiencing of health, illness and healthcare. The individual body image which 
is dynamic and continually transforming determines the distinctions between its 
outside or skin and its inside or inner organs. Lupton identifies a variety of bodily 
practices that have been established to deal with risk over historical periods -  pre­
modem, modem and contemporary era -  postmodern or late modernity era. 
Drawing on the work of other scholars, Lupton (1999a; 1999b) argues that over the
centuries, changing concepts o f the body in western societies “have been 
accompanied by changes in ways in which risk has been conceptualised and dealt 
with” (Lupton 1999a p 124). The notion of the ‘open body’ perceived as 
unrestrained, unstable and sumptuous during the middle age was replaced by the 
‘closed body’ (independent, controlled, organized, individuated and closed off from 
other bodies) as the ideal in early modernity and late modernity.
Figure 2a: Epistemological Approaches to Risk
Period Classification of Rationality 
Context
Risk management 
Strategies/Location of 
Services
Pre-Modem Religious Authority Practice based on wisdom/ 
Ships of fools
Modernisms Rational, truth-finding, 
objectivity
Practiced based on scientific 
knowledge/madhouses, 
asylums, 'psychiatric 
hospitals.
Late Modernity Social construction of risk; social 
circumstances
Practice based on openness, 
transparency and trust / 
community care, crisis 
intervention centres
The Pre-modern Era
The periods pre-modem and traditional refer to the types of societies, largely 
rural, agricultural, religious and relatively small in population that preceded 
modernity. The early cultures saw the world as an interrelated whole in which man, 
nature, a diversity of mythological characters and many types of unavoidable forces 
worked together to create the world. During the pre-religious period the gods were 
an essential part of the universe and therefore played an active role in human affairs. 
Nature’s extremes (risk, dangers) were seen as expressions of divine anger toward 
people. Myths represented the earliest cosmologies about how the world works. 
Christianity, which initially faced resistance and contempt from the first century 
A.D. in the Roman Empire, began to be tolerated towards the end of the fourth
century. Although there were a great deal of variety among the early churches 
depending on geographic location and culture, its earliest followers and their pre- 
Christian beliefs about the nature of man, God and the universe, the world was 
ordered according to God’s will. The Church adopted Aristotle’s concept of the 
universe, with the Earth at the centre because it supported the Church’s view of 
itself as the centre of society. Religion and its rituals were an essential part of the 
social system where threats were regarded as acts of God. This categoiy includes 
the type of threats that are generally considered inescapable. Their occurrence was 
beyond the control of humans, though, it did not mean that the consequences cannot 
be minimised or provisions made for recovery when an act of god strikes. Society 
found itself subordinate to the impulse of nature with the belief that all things work 
or change according to their basic natures.
Philosophy of nature, which asked new types of questions designed to help 
thinkers understand the fundamental nature of the universe began to emerge in the 
fourth century. Socrates changed the focus of philosophy away from cosmology 
toward politics and ethics in the fourth century. In the late fifth century BC 
atomists believed that the world was made up of tiny constantly moving particles, 
which came in a variety of shapes and sizes out of which everything in the material 
world was constructed. Their view was that life and all its forms are made up of 
those particles and life itself was a well-constructed machine. For Pythagoreans, 
numbers came first, then matter; their tool of choice for investigating the world was 
mathematics. Plato disagreed with earlier philosophical views which, attributed 
order to the inherent nature of things. In his view, creation was the result o f various 
combinations of triangles. Plato also believed in various non-interfering gods 
whose role was to ensure stability and order support the universe. Aristotle, Plato’s
student disagreed with his teacher’s beliefs and engendered worldviews, which 
would dominate philosophical and scientific thought for almost two thousand years. 
Aristotle developed a formal system of logic and a set o f principles, which he 
applied to a wide range of disciplines, including biology, cosmology, meteorology 
and astrology. Following earlier thinkers, Aristotle believed that natural objects, as 
opposed to man-made objects, behave in certain ways according to their natures. He 
believed that one could understand the basic nature of things through observation 
and experience (empirical knowledge) and also the use of inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Other forms of natural philosophy -  Renaissance Naturalism- emerged in 
the sixteenth century in which nature was believed to possess a living spirit filled 
with mysterious unknowable to man’s intellect. While different in many ways, 
Aristotelian natural philosophy and Renaissance naturalism shared a belief in 
nature’s active participation in the world through interconnectedness of mind, 
matter and spirit.
This period saw European renaissance, with the thriving of 
mercantilism and earliest beginnings of capitalism. The emergence of the word and 
concept risk in the pre-modem period (mid sixteenth century) is linked to early 
maritime ventures (Ewald 1991, 1993; Luhmann 1993). The notion of risk was 
related to maritime insurance and used to designate the perils that could 
compromise a voyage. In this era risk designated an objective danger, an act of God 
that could not be imputed to wrongful conduct. This concept, excluded the idea of 
human fault and responsibility. Risk was perceived to be a natural event such as 
storm, flood or epidemic rather than man-made one. As such humans could do little 
but attempt to estimate roughly, the likelihood of such events happening and taking 
steps to reduce their impact. Risk was a neutral concept taking account o f both gains
and loses. A system of strategies including beliefs and offerings to Gods, avoidance 
of tabooed places, were developed in an attempt to deal with, contain and prevent 
danger. Magic combined with touch of Christianity, served as a belief system by 
which threats and danger were dealt with conceptually allowing people to have a 
sense of control over their world.
The historical development of mental health as identified by Foucault (1971) 
shows evolutionary progress. Madness as the notion of ‘folie’ or foolishness in the 
pre-modem era was associated with divine insight and creativity. Madness was 
valued as a different way of being and knowing, perhaps a privileged way with a 
more direct access to heaven. Thus the patient -  the endangered body - represented 
a number of fantasies, which vaguely veered between fascination and fear, desire 
and danger, attraction and repulsion. The period’s ambivalence towards the 
mentally ill was illustrated in the exorcising madness by sending its ‘loonies’ away. 
The mentally ill were objects of fear and repulsion and were isolated for separation 
from society. In risk management terms, the mentally ill (open body) in the pre­
modem period were managed by expulsion, being cast on the ‘ships of fools’ 
(Foucault 1971). The mad were isolated from society during this period particularly 
when they posed a threat (risk) to others or themselves (Midelfort 1989). The “at 
risk” with the consent of societal preference were seen as externalities to be 
confined and controlled. In terms of psychodynamics of constructing and 
maintaining boundaries of selfhood discussed above, the Other (patient) was 
invested with emotion, both positive and negative and conceptualised as different 
from Self (body politic or community).
Modernism Era
Modernism from the seventeenth century was not an event but rather a period 
of transition in which attempts were made to resolve questions from the past and 
radical new ideas began to take shape. Some ideas were discarded, while others 
were adopted and still adorn the scientific landscape today. The source of modernity 
the Enlightenment codified major developments in early modem European thought 
and provided a milieu for future cultural and political struggles. Although the 
Enlightenment project does not have a distinctive set of principles, it is still possible 
to isolate some of its general characteristics, particularly its rationality, humanism 
and universalism. For philosophers of the period, the key to human nature was its 
intrinsic rationality. Reason enabled us to discover the intricate abstract truths of 
mathematics and to apply these to our understanding of the universe. Reason 
allowed us to ask and answer questions of nature through carefully planned 
observations and experiments. Leading thinkers developed a range of naturalistic 
theories of human nature of man as a machine d’Holback of the mind as a 
microcosm Hume. They believed that the world had become a human world 
determined by human aspirations rather than by nature and that universal rational 
moral principles are binding on all rational beings everywhere. According to David 
Hume, human nature was the same in all nations.
The period featured rationalism, rational planning, totalising views of 
the world, standardisation of knowledge and a belief in linear progress, particularly 
the progress of reason and freedom. The machine metaphor for Descartes and others 
became a powerful tool for understanding nature. The basis of the Cartesian notion 
was the separation of mind from matter. In separating mind from matter, knowledge 
was depersonalised and a chasm was created between one’s experience of reality
and reality as interpreted by science -  the separation of objective reality from 
experience of reality. This dualistic approach wiped out every trace o f intelligence 
and life from nature and was viewed instead as passive lifeless matter to be acted 
upon by outside forces. It was believed that all matter, including the human body 
operate like machine. The world was seen as a huge machine that operates with 
order and precision and whose understanding was accessible only to scientists 
through the power of mathematics. This notion of the world that operates like a 
machine with clockwork precision through a code of rules and consequences created 
a world of sameness, predictable, controlled and known: where acts of nature, 
plagues, social upheaval and other forms of disorder were seen as aberrations in a 
world order. This thinking can be seen in the complex organisational forms and 
processes (modem bureaucracy), which developed during the period. The essential 
characteristics and principles of modem bureaucracy are based on rationality, 
universal standards, division of labour, mle-govemed behaviour and clear 
hierarchical structure (Weber 1947).
Enlightenment rationality acquired greater depth from ideals about truth 
through science. It was assumed that it was possible to control reason through the 
coding and structuring of human thought, and through the regulation of human 
action. Changes in the meanings and use of risk are associated with the emergence 
of modernity with the notion that the key to human progress and social order is 
objective knowledge of the world through scientific exploration and rational 
thinking. It assumes that the social and natural worlds follow laws that may be 
measured, calculated and therefore predicted. The science of probability and 
statistics was developed as a means of calculating the norm and identifying 
deviations from the norm and identifying deviations from the norm, with the belief
that rationality, counting and ordering would bring disorder under control (Hacking 
1990). These themes were to become important to the modernist technical notion of 
risk. During the eighteenth century, the concept of risk had begun to be scientised 
(the development of statistical calculations of risk), drawing upon new ideas in 
mathematics relating to probability. The notion of risk was extended in the 
nineteenth century, as risk was located in the conduct of human beings and their 
interactions in society and not exclusively in nature (Ewald 1993). Thus the 
modernist concept of risk represented a new way of viewing the world and its 
chaotic manifestations, its contingencies and uncertainties. It assumed that 
unanticipated outcomes might be the result of human action rather than the hidden 
meanings of nature or the inevitable intentions of God (Giddens 1990). The notions 
of chance or probability and loss and damage as associated with insurance resulted 
in the idea of risk as a neutral concept; denoting the probability of something 
happening, combined with the magnitude of associated loses or gains. This means 
that modernist notions of risk also included the idea that risk could be both good and 
bad (Douglas 1992). This meaning of risk dominated until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (Ewald 1991).
The discourse of madness during the modem era was based upon the splitting 
of reason from unreason in the quest for order and predictability (Foucault 1965). 
This development can be seen in the organisation of mental health services. The 
period witnessed a dramatic move way from unregulated unplanned local 
arrangements to a system that was increasingly rational, managed, centralised and 
segregative as exemplified in the creation of public asylums. The period also saw 
the development and acceptance of a medical model of insanity, in the construction 
of a theory that defined madness as a medical category with a biological basis. The
beginning of tbe nineteenth century saw an increase of medical categories with 
specified symptoms and aetiology and saw the dawn and spread of asylums in 
Europe and North America. Asylums were seen as schemes for the transformation 
of subjects into citizens who would regulate their own conduct according to norms 
of good sense, order, restraint, continence and responsibility. The mad, in the 
second half of the nineteenth century represented social danger and the asylum, 
whose rationale was the production of citizens who could be free to the extent that 
they had taken the obligations of moral, prudent and self-responsible conduct into 
themselves became the machine of morality. Thus confinement in asylums resolved 
a social demand -  the containment of socially scandalous behaviour that was not yet 
criminal - in spite of a range of legal and constitutional rights, which prohibited 
confinement except for a breach of the law. The mad depicted as disgusting, 
dirty and lacking the most fundamental powers of self-restraint was chained up in 
madhouses where the general public could pay an admission fee to watch and jeer. 
Other strategies such psycho-medical technologies such as bloodletting, immersion 
in water (hydrotherapy) and various mechanical restraints were utilised (Collin
1999).
In the period of early modernity, the mad (grotesque open bodies) were seen to 
lack the capacity for adequate regulation of their bodily boundaries and were 
regarded as ‘at risk’. Madness became a disease and lost the dignity of being seen as 
meaningful unreason. Regarded as objects of fear and repulsion, they were isolated 
in houses designed more for separation from society than cures. The mad person 
represented social danger and their confinement in asylums was the response to 
social demand for mechanism for the containment of socially outrageous behaviour. 
Controversy regarding preferred location for services saw the movement of
institutionalisation from madhouses to asylums, mental hospitals to the community. 
The emergency of the mental hygiene movement in the 1920s and 1930s resulted in 
the setting out of preventative strategies for the population prior to surfacing of 
social danger so as to minimise the likelihood of the danger arising. In this context, 
the remit of intervention, widen .to address not only madness but also social 
inefficiency and unhappiness. Here almost every infringement of institutional and 
social norms of behaviour (e.g. truancy, lying, tantrums, inefficiency at work) was 
given a psychological connotation and thus needful of investigation, assessment, 
prescription and treatment. The main emphasis was the creation and maintenance of 
social normality and competence (Rose 1985). So psychiatry performs a regulatory 
function for society by alleviating the personal distress of the emotional distressed 
and expanding its own spheres of influence vis-a-vis the definition and treatment of 
madness (Handy 1991).
We can draw on Foucault’s insights to argue that during this period attempts 
were made to make invisible and control the presence and spatial distribution of the 
mad in the body politic: because the mad were seen as dangerous and risky to 
society’s progress. Strategies of exclusion that were directed at the mentally ill were 
explicitly concerned with maintaining a body within certain geographical limits 
((Sibley 1995). The mad are constructed as posing a risk to the dominant group 
through behaviour that is deemed to be different or potentially polluting and 
therefore confronting. Simultaneously, the mentally ill are constructed as being 
vulnerable and “at risk” from the greater power of the dominant group and therefore 
requiring regulation or exclusion for their own safety. The dominant ideal notion of 
the body is that of the body as controlled, its boundaries policed and regulated and 
kept separate from other bodies and the outside world.
It is important however to note that the nineteenth centuiy also saw a 
fundamental attack on the legitimacy of the activities of asylums in which the 
standing of mental medicine as knowledge was ridiculed, the integrity of its 
practitioners criticised, and its capacity to cure questioned (Castel 1988). 
Nonetheless, psychiatrists made a general claim as to the significance of their 
science for the administration of the population as a whole in the interests of 
national well-being. A whole series of people (the idiots, imbeciles, criminals, 
gamblers, syphilitics, paupers, mad, drunkards among others) regarded as a threat to 
social order were amenable to prevention and control. Here the pathologies of 
individuals were not solely medical significance but were symptomatic of a wider 
social malaise. The boundary between the “sane” and the “insane” became blurred 
and the confined space of the asylum was no longer seen as the ideal solution. It was 
in this context that the mental hygiene movement arose in an attempt to devise a 
more positive approach in the form of preventive strategies for acting upon the 
population before the appearance of social danger. Psychoanalysis and a range of 
psychologies and therapies provided the mechanisms in addressing a variety of new 
problems (social inefficiency and unhappiness) such as the problem of shell shock 
during after the First World War, the issue of juvenile delinquency, truancy and 
absenteeism. It was here that the new programmes (the maintenance of social 
normality and competence) envisaged a non-custodial project. Inefficiencies of 
conduct of almost any sort were seen as results of minor mental disturbance which 
if not treated would get worse and lead to insanity, with all the consequent danger, 
misery and social cost. To tackle stigma demands were made for the establishment 
of clinics and hospitals where voluntary admission could lead to treatment. This line 
of thinking was embodied in the shift in terminology from lunacy to mental illness
and from asylum to mental hospital. In effect these were attempts to bring mental 
medicine into contact with general medicine and apply the same principles of 
treatment (namely investigation, assessment, prescription and treatment). It was 
against this background that interventions in psychiatric care could be understood in 
late modernity.
Late Modernity
Most observers locate the advent o f late modernity or postmodern era 
sometime after World War Two in the advanced capitalist countries. However, there 
is disagreement about whether this constitutes a decisive break or some sort of 
continuity with the modernist era. For instance, Baudrillard (1983) sees 
postmodernism as an indication of destruction of meaning, therefore depicting all 
previous social theories obsolete, Bell (1976) perceives postmodernism as the 
continuation cultural trends originating in modernism. Lyotard (1984) rejects the 
modernism-postmodemism conceptualisation while Foucault (1973) resists any 
characterisation of his intellectual project as postmodernist. Despite the multiple 
ways in which the term is used there are common threads that ties together the 
diverse elements. In its many guises late modernity is concern with the excesses of 
capitalism, industrialisation and rationalism (Turner 1992), rejects the 
Enlightenment argument that human nature is always and everywhere the same and 
argues for the need for new theoretical and methodological strategies. Seen in this 
light, late modernity perspectives exhibit striking similarities with the work of 
Durkheim, Marx, Weber and others in the classical sociological traditions that made 
great effort to find new ways to understand the dramatic changes in social structure.
The late modernity era which questions established thought (objectivity of 
rational discourse) is characterised by uncertainty and ambivalence related to
constant change, cultural fragmentation and breakdown of norms and traditions 
(Giddens 1990; Lash & Uny 1994). Emotion, intuition, as well as rationality play 
important part in guiding action. Traditions associated with order where individuals 
have few rights and governed by church and nobility in the pre-modem era are 
replaced with individuals’ rights and autonomy. Such changes are perceived as 
causal to a particular way of understanding the world that differs radically from 
earlier eras. For the individual, these changes are linked with an increasing sense of 
uncertainty, complexity, ambivalence and disorder, a growing distrust of social 
institutions and traditional authorities and an escalating awareness of the threats 
intrinsic in everyday life. The firm deterministic view (the linear clockwork view) 
of the world promoted in earlier eras began to shift to the acknowledgment that the 
world is made up nonlinear dynamical systems. In terms of illness this observation 
articulated the fact that much of the practice of medicine is outside the ambit of the 
modernist reductionist model of science.
The late modernity era is identified by its appreciation of the complex linkage 
between biology and social forces in terms of illness termed the “biopsychosocial” 
model (Schaffiier 1992). This approach embraces the social construction of reality -  
a notion that refers to the ways in which the world is structured and in large part 
created by forces of human culture (i.e. language, myth, ideology). This new 
thinking suggests that illnesses while always biological are in addition cultural 
artefacts and therefore rejects the continuing dominant biomedical model that views 
disease as the result of biological and chemical mechanisms in the body; in other 
words a denunciation of a single theory that will explain every illness (Lyotard 
1984). Kleinman and Good (1985) challenged the emergent consensus that the 
contemporary criteria of depression are universal and biologically grounded disease
and reminded us of cultural influences on the experience of depression. Such an 
approach has an intellectual lineage in the premodem and modem eras. In 
advocating a rational, empirical and biological medicine as different from magic 
and religion, environmental forces such as diet and work were seen as causes of 
disease by Hypocrites. Aristotle investigated various non-natural (non-biological) 
causes of illness including climate. There were suggestions by Renaissance theorists 
that personal habits like excessive study could cause illness by distorting bodily 
fluids and eighteen century doctors located specific illnesses to the influence of 
lifestyle (Morris 1998).
What is unique of mental illness today? How does mental illness in the late 
modernity era differ from mental illness as it was understood and experienced? 
Reactions to the traditional approach to psychiatric diagnosis, which set rigid 
standards of behaviour from which it was considered abnormal to deviate, is leading 
to increasingly loose definitions of mental illness. Mental illness is now not only to 
be “cured” or to be contained but also to be managed as patients across diverse 
specialist institutions and professionals (hospitals, clinics, homes, mental health 
centres, crisis centres, psychiatrists, general practitioners, clinical psychologists etc) 
(Rose 1996). In the late modernity era the centrality of risk discourse in relation to 
patient care can be linked methods of to “biopolitics” (Foucault 1984); that is, 
attempts on the part of the society to discipline and normalise citizens. Such 
normalisation involves gathering information about populations and subjecting it to 
statistical analysis. As observed in chapter one, individuals are compared to others 
by assessing their attributes to ascertain whether they fall within the norm or outside 
it. If found to fall outside the norm, people are encouraged or sometimes coerced to 
engage in practices that bring them closer to the norm as illustrated in introduction
of the supervision register. The risk to the public might be negligible, but there is 
still a consensus that patients, nonetheless, need to be controlled.
The contemporary preoccupation with playing safe and avoiding risks has been 
accompanied by increase in new psychological conditions or syndromes. A search 
for a representative mental illness quickly turns up a number of interesting 
candidates. For example, a growing number of children are diagnosed as suffering 
from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia, adults suffering from 
eating disorder, adjustment disorder (difficulties negotiating relationships), post- 
traumatic stress, social phobia, sexual addiction and food addiction. At the time of 
writing the chief medical office of the United Kingdom, Professor Sir Liam 
Donaldson announced that Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME) also known as chronic 
fatigue syndrome (CFS) must be recognised as a genuine illness and insisted that 
doctors must provide prompt, authoritative diagnosis, appropriate advice and early 
access to treatment. The endorsement of the biomedical model extends the advance 
in the medicalisation of the problems of individuals in society and retreats from any 
attempt to confront such problems in social terms. It upholds dualism of mind and 
body, which was prevalent during the Enlightenment and implicitly, supports the 
stigmatisation of mental illness, by dogmatically repudiating any recognition of the 
role of psychological factors in the origins of physical symptoms.
Campaigners concerned with challenging oppressive and discriminating 
practices have drawn attention to the extent to which mainstream psychiatry has 
been affected by political social and cultural factors. Attitudes within this mental 
health project are that there is no clear boundary between reason and unreason, 
health and illness; abnormal behaviour becomes normal variance and equally valid 
aspect of life’s rich tapestry. Thus conditions like CFS, Gulf War Syndrome and
other conditions that defy diagnoses and amplified by popular media debates have 
caused campaigners to demand treatment. For Showalter (1997), these disputed 
conditions are contemporary “hysterias.” At the extreme end, a conflation of 
insanity with oppression has caused some activists to emphasise the positive 
elements of madness where psychotic symptoms are seen as a source of enrichment 
rather than disabling; an organising Mad Pride along similar lines to Gay Pride. 
There are similarities in the activities of Disability Movement and Grey Power, the 
former celebrating and valuing disability by challenging the idea of the able-bodied 
and the later organising against a traditional definition of biological age.
It is important not to exaggerate the significance of social forces or to ignore 
relevant distinctions. There are dangers that the rigid conceptions of “normal” and 
“abnormal” behaviour (which may lead to a closure of any standard of “normal” or 
“mentally well” behaviour) and the portraying increasing numbers of people as 
pathologically or psychologically impaired (which may lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecy) may relativise away those aspects of the traditional approach that were 
positive and progressive. This perspective parallel the premodem era that relied on 
divine theoiy where God’s will was beyond dispute and in sense rejects the rational 
view of unreason of the Enlightenment period. A biopsychosocial view of mental 
illness however does not require abandoning all views based on the biomedical 
model. The Enlightenment views of mental illness, based on biomedical model were 
at least open to challenge unlike the divine theories that went before. The value of 
the rational, scientific approach to psychiatry was that as a minimum it saw insanity 
as a problem to be “cured”, rather than a divine intervention about which nothing 
could be done. Furthermore even within the biomedical model the practice of
psychiatry is not monolithic. Various disciplines within the multidisciplinary team 
have distinctive outlooks and conflicts about dimensions of mental illness.
The new terrain of psychiatry, the presentation of mental illness as just 
another normal part of life, has turned madness into inability to cope with everyday 
life. Professionals are therefore required not so much to cure as to teach skills of 
coping; namely encouraging the responsibility to cope, isolating failures of coping 
and reinstating to the individual the capacity to cope. These developments can be 
perceived in what Rose (1996 p. 12) following Foucault describes as “advanced 
liberal strategies of government” that involves “extending market rationalities -  
contracts, consumers, competition -  to domains where previously social, 
bureaucratic or professional logic reigned; governing ‘at a distance’ by formally 
separating activities of welfare professionals from apparatuses of central and local 
state, and governing them by budgets, laws, audits, targets, standards, code of 
practice and the logic of consumer demands; making individuals and ‘communities’ 
themselves ‘interested’ in their own government in the sense that they should take 
responsibility for their own present and future welfare and for the relations which 
they have with experts and institutions.” A vital feature of such logic is the 
idealised body of the independent, self-regulated patient who seeks to maximise 
his/her life opportunities and minimise the risk to which he/she is exposed. In 
addition, the patient is deemed to need guidance and advice from expert knowledge 
to minimise risk. Risk management is thus becomes the responsibilities of patients 
and professionals.
The above observation allows us to bring to light some of the related 
characteristics of the contemporary profession of psychiatry. The first points to the 
way in which psychiatric patients are defined - the “new prudentialism” (O’Malley
1996): that is a way patients are increasingly held responsible for the management 
of their own fate through calculation about the future consequences of present 
actions - bringing of the future into the present and making it calculable. Failures of 
management of the self, for instance, lack of skills of coping with work, money and 
family are now criteria for qualification as a psychiatric patient. These 
responsibilities of self-management also provide new divisions within patients; the 
divide between the “ideal bodies,” those who take their medication, keep 
appointments, able to cope in a way that parallel the assessment of the professionals 
and “porous bodies” who are not able to cope. Another feature is the way risk 
management and risk reduction as logics for professional action have to a certain 
extent reshape professional judgements. Such a shift is illustrated in the Clunis case 
(mentioned above) where the questions asked of professionals were where he should 
have been sent, decisions made in terms of his likely future conduct, his riskiness to 
the community and the necessary steps taken to manage his conduct. The demand 
on professionals was to predict rather than to diagnose (Rose 1996). Here, human 
action is motivated not so much by the desire to achieve positive changes but rather 
by the pressure to prevent certain events happening (Beck 1992; Giddens 1994). In 
the words of Beck (1992 p.34) “we became active today in order to prevent, 
alleviate or take precautions against the problems and crisis of tomorrow and the 
day after tomorrow -  ”. Another aspect of this development is the reflexive 
monitoring of action (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990; Lash & Uny 1994) in which 
organisations are under increasing pressure to explain their policies and be 
accountable to society. Thus risks in late modernity stem not so much from nature 
but from human interventions.
Our brief sociological look at the historical look of the concept of risk reveals 
the emergence of plurality of risk definition definitions. The idea of technological 
progress, central to the Enlightenment commitment to constant human improvement 
(public benefits and the common good), suffered erosion in the wake of several 
catastrophic technological accidents. The notion of progress as it is developed 
during the seventeenth century was based on trust in human reason to improve 
constantly the state of human affairs in the future. Thus in terms of modem decision 
theory there was a belief in the human capacity to guarantee positive outcomes with 
the expectation that an increasing body of scientific knowledge could provide the 
necessary insights about future developments that would finally render unnecessary 
past dependence on religion. Progress has however, been viewed much more 
ambivalently since the nineteenth century because the growth of knowledge through 
science did not prevent unwanted outcomes of technological innovations. The 
notion of contemporary risk originated from this development. The uncertainty of 
outcomes of decisions brought a link between risk and decisions -  risk being a 
manifestation of possible future unwanted outcomes of present decisions. Here 
decision makers become involved in the negotiation of possible harmful future 
states against known and accepted present ones (Luhmann 1993). This prompted 
modification in the different meanings of the treatment of progress -  progress is no 
longer certain but becomes a probabilistic outcome of application of instrumental 
rationality to political, economical and technological problems. As observed by 
Perrow (1984) risk is no longer associated mainly with the enhancement of 
humanity, but is now often connected to fear and disasters. The lost of a positive 
risk image has brought about conflicting views of risk assessment and risk 
management.
Risk and Sociocultural Theory
The ways in which western societies gave meaning and dealt with risk can be 
located in specific socio-cultural and historical contexts. The rationale that has 
tended to dominate debates on risk adopts a positivist or realist theory of knowledge 
and a rationalistic policy orientation. Risk, from this stance is a tangible spin-off of 
actually occurring natural processes. It is assumed that, risk can be measured by 
well-informed experts, and within limits controlled. People’s judgements on risk are 
typically depicted as ‘biased’ or ill-informed compared with ‘experts’ more accurate 
and scientific assessments. However, research on risk perception argues that lay 
people have a rich conception of risk and that their views should be integrated in 
risk decision-making (Slovic 1992). The notion that risk, as a phenomenon can be 
isolated from social, cultural and historical contexts as advocated by exponents of 
the traditional approach has been challenged. Risk research has shown that 
contextual factors shape individual risk estimations and evaluations (Renn 1990; 
Slovic 1987). Three major critical approaches -  cultural/symbolic, risk society, and 
governmental perspectives (Lupton 1999) have identified important factors such as, 
how risks are conceptualised, the position played by experts, and dominance of risk 
in contemporary society. It will be useful to present an abbreviated overview o f the 
three perspectives.
The cultural theory claims that risk perception, is a social construct and 
suggest a pluralistic solution to the problem of interlocking knowledge with action 
(Douglas 1985; 1990; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). Society, according this view, is 
composed of groups of people with different views of risks shaped by history, 
politics and culture. This affect how risks are perceived and what is considered as 
legitimate risk management solutions. Douglas and Wildavsky (1990) suggest four
different cultural archetypes: individualists, hierarchists, egalitarians, fatalists, and 
autonomy. Individualists appreciate decisions that come from personal judgement 
(self-regulation) rather than collective control and favour deregulation as a rational 
risk management strategy. Hierarchists favour a social organisation where the 
preservation of authority within a structure is paramount. In this worldview, there is 
trust in information from sources that are seen to support authority structures. 
Egalitarians prefer approaches to risk policies that foster equality of outcomes and 
therefore critical of the procedural rationality associated with hierarchy. They 
perceived dangers associated with most technologies as great, and their attendant 
benefits as small. Fatalists perceive societal and technological changes to be 
independent of any socially derived perspectives. The assumption is that individuals 
who are high in fatalism are excluded, or see themselves, excluded from any formal 
organisation of social life.
The implication of groups having different world views, means that they will 
differ in their definitions of what risks are worthy of society’s attention and also 
over how these are to be resolved. It may be argued that unless there is societal 
consensus of one world-view over risk, distrust and conflict is inevitable. The 
cultural theory emphasis on a socio-cultural context in which individuals are located 
and through which they make judgements about risk, shows the importance of the 
individual’s psychological and cognitive response to risk. However the models of 
risk responses have been criticised for their rigidity. For example, individuals’ 
social groups or institutions can have more than one bias, and therefore making 
predictions concerning risk perception derived from membership of one group 
problematic (Lofstedt & Frewer 1998).
The ‘risk society’ theorists focus their analysis on macro-structural factors 
influencing what they see as to be intensification of concern in late modernity 
societies about risks. They argue that the risks produced under the conditions of late 
modernity have increased in magnitude and become globalized, and therefore more 
difficult than in the past eras to calculate and therefore difficult than in past eras to 
calculate and therefore manage or avoid. Central to the writings on risk society is 
the concept of reflexive modernity (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991). This concept 
incorporates the reflexive monitoring of action in an ongoing process implicated in 
every act o f human behaviour. The risk concept has therefore become fundamental 
to the way people organise their world. As a result of our growing ability to collate 
and to reflect upon larger bodies of knowledge about risk, changing pattern o f risk 
assessments and judgements develop. In the kind o f ‘colonisation’ of the future, risk 
calculation turns the essentially unknowable into a new terrain of possibility 
(Gidden 1991). While the ‘risk society’ theories have contributed considerably to 
the development of a new paradigm for sociological research it has been seen to 
have limitations, in relation to their adherence to conventional modernist views on 
self, science and society. The models have been criticised for their lack of attention 
to a cognitive bias in their idea of reflexivity whereby the body is an object to be 
monitored by the ego or subject. The theorists are also criticised for espousing to 
positivist ego psychology, which is hostile to any notion that the self is complexly 
structured and differentiated (Lash & Uny 1994).
The third, ‘govemmentality’, which I have drawn upon extensively, focuses its 
analysis on the ways in which the concept of risk mediates between knowledge and 
power. Risk analysis according to this approach, is primarily a specialised language 
and a set of practices -  in formal terms a discourse (Foucault 1980). For example,
Foucault identifies the stages of the creation of a discourse that defines sanity and 
thus marginalizes the insane. Discourses embody divisions in language, defining 
marginality and making those defined as marginal, or outside o f discursive norms 
(e.g. the mad), as specimens for those who control the discourse (e.g. professionals). 
The decision to frame mental health interventions in terms of the concept of risk, for 
instance, rules out other possible ways of talking about harms to patients. Risk 
discourse implicitly empowers some people as experts and excludes others as 
irrelevant or incompetent. A central feature of govemmentality is normalisation: the 
method by which norms of behaviour are identified in populations and by which 
individuals are then compared to determine how best they fit the norm. Individuals 
determined to deviate from the norm considerably are usually identified as being “at 
risk”. To be categorised “at risk” compared with others meant being single out as 
requiring expert advice, surveillance and self-regulation. As noted above, writers 
espousing the govemmentality approach have argued that within psychiatry, we are 
witnessing a shift from dangerousness to risk (e.g. Castell 1991; Kendall & 
Wickham 1992). Thus while “risk” in the past meant danger embodied in the 
mentally ill person capable of unpredictable action and violent, it is now based on 
abstract factors.
All the three theoretical perspectives highlight the social, cultural and political 
nature of risk, but they each offer a fine distinction in their approach to risk. Lupton 
(1999) (provides a detailed model of risk continuum) categorises the approaches at 
different points along a continuum, at which the realist approach of the kind offered 
in the traditional approaches is at one end of the pole and highly relativist 
constructionist approach at the other. The ‘risk society’ approach veers between a 
realist and a weak social constructionist position on risk. The ‘cultural’ perspective
is more towards the relativist position. The ‘govemmentality’ perspective, which 
offers the most relativist position on risk, concentrates on the forms of knowledge, 
the dominant discourses and expert techniques and institutions that serve to make 
risk calculable and knowable. Better understanding is needed of how risk logics are 
produced and operated at the level of situated experience. What sorts of 
information then, do professionals trust and draw upon in developing their logic of 
risk?
From the realist stance, solving bureaucratic failures have, been met with 
bringing uniformity and rationality to decision making. Here, risk assessment 
depends for its success on the traditional bureaucratic virtues of rationality, 
expertise, insulation and authority. Studies of risk as a social construct give a 
different view of why risk management fails. Risk in the modem world, does not 
flow deterministically from conditions fixed by nature. How does the preceding 
discussion bear on the risks issues that are now confronting psychiatric nurses? We 
have tried to show thus far that risk concepts are not simply neutral descriptions of 
nature, but are culturally and politically conditioned ways of interpreting both our 
relationship to the world around us, and our obligations to others. What conclusion 
can we draw from what we have learned about socially embedded character o f the 
risk concepts that are currently being developed to deal with the care of the mentally 
ill? How can we gain a continuous understanding of these complex changes in 
understanding psychiatric nurses in organisational context?
The intriguing debate within the three traditions has been anticipated in 
Turner’s (Turner 1978)) model, the Man made Disasters (MMD). The model, which 
is descriptive and analytic, seeks to understand the causes of disasters by focusing 
on the dynamic and complex nature on the organisational dimension of disasters
(man-made as well as organisation-made disasters). A proposal of the model is 
based upon a better understanding of the ways that knowledge and information were 
distributed before a disaster struck: “many disasters arise solely from administrative 
causes, or from a combination of technical and administrative causes. Those in 
positions of power, those concerned with management and decision-making and 
those who control administrative machinery may well find that some of their actions 
contribute inadvertently to the causes of a disaster” (1978 p.3-4). In his 
investigation of accidents and social disasters, Turner found that many disasters had 
long incubation periods characterised by a number of discrepant events indicating 
danger which were ignored or misinterpreted during the incubation period, and 
hence accumulate unnoticed. The implication for risk management is that long 
incubation periods can include dormant and exist unnoticed in organisations for 
long periods of time. The longer they go unnoticed, the more difficult it becomes to 
rectify. Such “failures of foresight” (Turner 1978 p. 31): which encompass 
complacency, poor communications, inadequate information handling in complex 
situations, failures to comply with existing regulations set up to ensure safety and 
incoherent norms and culturally accepted beliefs about hazards were evident in most 
major disasters in healthcare organisations.
Turner’s qualitative analysis of 84 official reports into accidents reveals a 
pattern of similarities in healthcare organisations noted above. We saw rigidities in 
perception and beliefs in organisational settings that prevented accurate insight of 
the likelihood of the disaster. There was evidence of what has been termed “the 
decoy problem”, namely that when some hazard was perceived, the action taken to 
deal with the problem, distracted attention from that which ultimately caused the 
disaster. There was an organisational tendency to deny remote dangers that enabled
administrators to dismiss as cranks those who disagreed with the organisation’s 
policy. The organisations had information difficulties, where there were completely 
unknown prior information, prior information noted but not fully appreciated, prior 
information noted but not combined with other information appropriate at the time 
and prior information available but ignored, because there was no place for it within 
existing ways of understanding. In addition we observed the involvement of people 
without the proper training, the minimising of emergent danger that took the form of 
an underestimation of possible hazards. Finally, recommendations were designed 
to deal with the well-structured problem defined and revealed by the disaster, rather 
than with the ill-structured problem that existed before it.
In sum, Turner reminds us that disasters rarely come about for any singular 
reason rather it is typical to find that a number of undesirable events contribute to an 
“incubation period” often measured in years. The MMD model directs us, 
particularly to informational difficulties associated with attempts of individuals and 
organisations to deal with uncertain and ill-defined safety problems. The complex 
and multiple interactive nature of the model, presents the issue of the potential 
incompleteness of risk assessment models. His insights are clearly relevant to those 
who manage and operate in healthcare organisations. Health care institutions are 
complex organisations with multiple personnel, departments and technologies that 
are bought to bear on patients; interfaces which have been identified as the source of 
key gaps in patient care, corresponding to holes in defensive barriers (Cook et al
2000). Like most organisations in the hazard industry, health care organisations are 
organised centrally around the issue of safety arising from the rationale; to bring no 
harm. Risk is an inescapable part of the issue of health care. When patients 
encounter the health care system clinicians intervene to tackle those diseases, using
technologies, which carry with them their own inherent dangers. For instance, 
diagnostic tests, surgical procedures and drugs all have potential complications and 
side effects as well as benefits. Thus both the clinical products (diagnostic and 
interventions procedures) and professionals, the providers of care are sometimes 
potential sources of hazards for patients. The organisation of work tasks, must 
always take safety work -assessing, monitoring, preventing and rectifying potential 
hazards.
Another source of complexity is the therapeutic technologies (e. g. drugs) 
involved in modem health care. In psychiatric settings, part of the complexity arises 
from the unfeasibility of working with madness, “a phenomenon that defies clear 
definition” (Willshire 1999 p.775). Efforts to define madness have resulted in 
debates between a “disease of the brain” approach to madness typified by organic 
psychiatrists, and a “disordered mind” approach typified by psychotherapists” 
(Willshire 1999 p.779). Indeed, Gaba (2000 p.87) reminds us of one important 
source of complexity arising from health care “One is the human body itself. 
Human beings do not design or build human bodies (nor do we get an “instruction 
manual”). Clinicians and scientists face a “black box” whose functions are (even 
now) poorly understood relative to what we understand about airplanes or unclear 
reactors. This relative impenetrability produces an intrinsic “uncertainty 
complexity” that is greater than in systems that are designed and built by human 
beings.
The basic premise of the approach of the study is that humans are fallible and 
that errors are to be expected even in the best of organisations. Errors or mistakes 
are seen as consequences rather than causes that have their source in systems factors 
rather than the perversity of human nature. The assumption is that the various
performance aspects of a system are based on a complex interaction of man, 
technology and organisation. Following Reason’s (2000) concept of system 
defences, I argue that psychiatric nursing systems, like high technology systems, 
have barriers and safeguards (e.g. procedures and administrative controls) that 
protect potential harm to patients. Such defences have been compared to slices of 
Swiss cheese with many holes that continually open, shut and shift their location. 
According to Reason (2000) the existence of holes in any one slice does not usually 
cause a bad outcome but happen only when the holes in many layers temporarily 
line up to permit a path of accident opportunity. Accidents (the holes in the 
defences) happen as a result o f active and latent errors. Active errors, which take a 
variety of forms, procedures violations, lapses, slips mistakes are the unsafe acts 
committed in our case by nurses in direct contact with patients. Latent errors may 
arise from social policy, decisions made by management, procedures and as the 
term implies may lie inactive within the system for many years before they combine 
with active failures and local triggers to create an accident opportunity. Latent 
conditions, unlike active failures can be recognised and resolved before adverse 
events occur. Understanding latent conditions therefore may lead to proactive rather 
than reactive risk management.
Framework for Analysing Risk in Psychiatric Nursing
Risk Dimensions and Definitions
Our analysis shows the changing forms of contemporary capitalist industrial 
society which signal the constant loitering of dangers that are both volatile and 
unmanageable. We are also reminded of the impossibilities that come into view 
when attempts to control and calculate the dangers become caught up in bringing 
about the opposite. The changing semantic field of risk demonstrates how little we
still know about the social construction of safety and about reliability. The social 
dimensions of risk illustrates that risk is not something out there in an organisation’s 
environment, but that it is repeatedly being constructed and negotiated by people 
when they make decisions in relation to external situation and events. Vaughan 
(1996 quoted in Gaba 2000 p.88) encapsulates this in her remark that “Risk is not a 
fixed attribute of some object, but constructed by individuals from past experience 
and present circumstance and conferred upon the object on situation. Individuals 
assess risk as they assess everything else -  through the filtering lens o f individual 
worldview.” If we accept that perceptions and attitude towards risk are socially 
constructed, then what constitutes risk may be socially selected with both the 
process of calculation and the decision based on being context-dependent and 
therefore socially variable.
Risk in the clinical sense is defined here as the degree to which there is doubt 
about whether potentially significant and/or unsatisfactory outcomes of decisions 
will be achieved. The definition encapsulates three key dimensions in outcomes of 
decisions, which are essential for understanding of ‘risk’. First, the doubt in 
outcomes explains what options are included in the set of potential outcomes and 
how likely it is that various outcomes will be realised. Without such knowledge, 
expectancies cannot be calculated and preferences may be unclear. Second, 
expectancies represent the conceptualisation of risk to include a fiill range of 
outcomes, both positive and negative. This is because it is not the expected outcome 
itself that constitutes a risk but the degree to which that outcome would be 
disappointing to the decision maker or other key stakeholders. Third, is the potential 
outcome, this dimension of risk deals with the potential consequences of choice
perceived to be of sufficient magnitude for decision makers to attend to and the 
potential threat or opportunity inherent in a given situation.
Factors that Influence clinical Practice
There are three main factors that may influence a decision maker in risk 
situations: characteristics of the professional and the patient, characteristics of the 
organisational context (internal and external) and the characteristics of the problem. 
Figure 2b shows the basic framework.
Figure 2b: Factors that Influence Clinical Practice
Individual Characteristics
Patients Characteristics -  Condition (complexity and seriousness); Language and
communication; Personality and social factors.
Professional Characteristics -  Knowledge and skills; Risk preferences; Risk
perceptions; Risk propensity.
Organisational Characteristics
Inner Context -  Organisational structures; Decision-making; Organisational culture;
Power relations; Control systems.
Outer Context -  Government policy and legislation; Regulatory enforcement; 
Courts; Professional regulation; Standards.
Problem Characteristics -  Decision maker’s experience.
Individual Characteristics (professional and patient)
The condition from which the patient suffers is the most powerful predictor of 
clinical outcome. Such an observation has added significance with the psychiatric 
patient who has a severe disturbance of emotional and cognitive functioning, which 
may influence communication with staff, and thus the likelihood of an adverse 
event. A number of staff factors, such as personality, experience and training may 
be influential. Risk preferences (Brokhaus 1980) have been suggested as one 
individual characteristic that influences individual actions. Professionals who enjoy
the challenge that risk entail may be more likely to undertake risky actions than 
those individuals who do not. Risk perceptions, define, as a decision maker’s 
assessment of the risk inherent in a situation, is another determinant; namely, the 
decision maker’s labelling of situations (Douglas 1985), denying uncertainty, 
overestimating or underestimating risk, and to exhibiting unwarranted confidence in 
his/her judgement (Bazennan 1986; Slovic 1972). Risk propensity conceptualised, 
as an individual’s risk taking tendencies is another feature that influence behaviour. 
Here risk propensity is defined as the tendency of a decision maker’s either to take 
or to avoid risks
Organisation Characteristics
The composition of the group, within which risk-related decisions may occur, 
may be an important influence on risk behaviour. Each staff member is part of a 
team, both within their hospital and the environment. The way individuals practice 
and their impact on the patient may be constrained and influenced by other members 
of the team and the way the team members communicate with, support, and 
supervise each other. The team may be affected in turn by management actions and 
decisions made at higher level in the organisation. The team’s environment is partly 
controlled by factors such as staffing structures, and education and training. The 
organisation is affected by external environment, namely commercial environment, 
financial constraints, external regulatoiy bodies and the broader economic and 
political climate. In addition group contexts tend to influence individuals to take 
positions with regard to risk. The culture of an organisation may reflect the 
tendency to prefer certain values instead of others. Organisational tendencies to 
prefer certainty against uncertainty and risk avoidance as opposed to risk seeking
may be defined as an organisation’s cultural risk values (Dougalas &Wildavsky 
1982). These values and management’s risk orientation represent additional 
organisational characteristics that impact on individual risk behaviour. The 
organisation’s control systems may influence decision maker’s behaviour (March & 
Shapira 1987). When the outcomes of risky decisions are punished, or the 
willingness to take risks is encouraged or discouraged as part of an effective 
decision making process, the organisation is seen as channelling the decision 
maker’s risk behaviour by monitoring, evaluating, and rewarding the outcomes 
achieved and process used when risks are involved.
Problem CharacteristicsThQ experience of the decision maker’s experience or 
familiarity with the situation is an important determinate of risk behaviour. When 
decision makers are more experienced, they may begin to focus selectively on the 
evidence of their past ability to overcome obstacles (March & Shapira 1987) and, 
therefore, may be willing to undertake risks that less experienced individuals would 
avoid.
The Social Arena Concept of Risk Management
Contexts play an important part of risk management decisions in that 
consequences are always mediated through social interpretation that is linked with 
group values and interests. Thus responsive risk management needs to incorporate 
societal values into the decision making process. The incorporation of value 
judgements in risk management decisions can be identified on three levels. The first 
set of value judgements are concerned with the criteria on which acceptability or 
tolerability of risks should be judged. The second deals with the trade-offs between 
criteria and the third help risk managers in designing resilient strategies for coping 
with remaining uncertainties (Fischhoff 1996; Keeney 1996). For nurses this means
that as much as the best available expertise is needed in care practices, societal input 
is equally important because it offers a basis for shaping the objectives of risk 
strategies and for assessing the numerous criteria that have to be applied when 
evaluating different options of care. How do nurses integrate clinical expertise, 
regulatory considerations and societal values in risk management decisions? Clearly 
risk management decisions involve social-psychological, organisational, political, 
cultural process. Knowledge of risk by professionals and social groups, the social 
and cultural meanings of risk, as well as structural and organisational factors shape 
the social experience of risk.
Following interactionist writers I argue that risk management issues cannot be 
understood in terms of objective social factors; rather such issues are rooted in the 
“processes of collective definition” (Blummer 1971 p.298). As noted in chapter 
one, the social construction perspective suggests that risk should be regarded as 
lodged in the process of definition, rather than some objective characteristic of a 
patient or an act. This view guides us to look at the process of which society 
constructs definitions of risk and applies them to specific groups. Such a model 
recognise that professional responses to risk management issues are shaped and 
reshaped as a result of ongoing activity by different social groups, competing for 
space in the public arena (Hilgarthner & Bosk 1988). An interactionist approach 
implies seeing most aspects of risk assessment and management as problematic. 
Policies of risk management have emerged out of a set of negotiations among 
relevant actors and are always subject to further negotiations. Indeed, in their study 
of two mental hospitals, Strauss et al (1964) conceptualised a dynamic model of 
intricate social arrangements and relationships in complex organisations where work 
is accomplished through negotiation. In what is known as negotiated order, their
findings showed how members of various occupational groups (e.g. doctors, nurses, 
patients, lay workers) negotiate the meanings, routines and tacit agreements of work 
against the background of beliefs about the ‘appropriate’ nature, goals and methods 
of psychiatry. Interaction and negotiation depended on the types of employees, 
professional ideology -  particularly the intersection and contradictions between 
competing ideologies-, and the organisation’s relationship with the wider 
environment. The heterogeneous mix of professional and non-professional means 
they may be an endless cycle of negotiation over intervention. Therefore risk 
management techniques could never explain about how risk is managed and likely 
to be tacit expectations of behaviour than explicit formulas for decision-making. 
The concept of negotiation, counters the view of rational decision-making.
The relevance of the arena model is that a psychiatric setting cannot avoid the 
resistances in its attempt to achieve integrated therapeutic purpose. Using the arena 
metaphor model as a starting point (Figure 2b) allows us to see particular facets of 
risk management in a richer way. It deepens our understanding of the internal life of 
organisations. Here the symbolic interaction tradition encourages us to examine the 
face to face encounters between relevant actors in the organisations and offers a 
framework with which to make sense of these observations. The view of 
professional/client relationships as conflicting is in my opinion one of the most 
important contributions of interactionists: a view that differs sharply from views in 
which professionals and clients are seen to exist harmoniously in a system of 
unambiguous roles and expectations. A static view does not do present the adequate 
picture to the various events now transpiring within mental health services: the 
extraordinary rise in client “consumerism” in which not only professional 
autonomy, but also professional expertise is profoundly challenged. The
interactionist position does offer a meaningful explanatory framework for risk 
management events. Apparently disparate events can be seen as part of a larger 
pattern and we can start to move toward a unified conception of contemporary 
service institutions. Finally, in a more macro-sociological sense, the interactionist 
emphasis on meaning and the negotiation of meaning can enrich our understanding 
of society’s role in risk management decision making.
In terms of professional expertise for example, recent sociological studies 
have suggested that trust or rather lack of it is often a key factor in explaining why a 
non-expert may inclined to disbelieve in an expert (Earle & Cvetkovich 1995; 
Gidens 1990; Kasperson et al 1998; Leiss 1996; Renn & Levine 1991; Slovic 1993). 
Kasperson et al (1992) described trust as an individual’s expectation that other 
individuals in a social relationship can be relied upon to act in ways that are 
competent, predictable and caring. Faced with a public which appears sceptical of 
expert reassurances, many scientists have been inclined to look to public ignorance 
as the most likely explanation (Leiss 1996). This has resulted in further distrust of 
experts by the public. An explanation as observed above is that experts and the 
public work from different value systems. Experts are used to uncertain world 
where knowledge is always flawed. They can handle risk judgements more easily 
and seem inpatient of those who cannot. The public see this as arrogance resulting 
in further distrust. Ruckelshaus (1996 p.2) caution us that: “mistrust engenders a 
vicious descending spiral. This interpretation is supported by studies such as nuclear 
waste dump (Rosa et al 1993), the attempted decommissioning of Brent Spar 
(Lofstedt & Renn 1998) and difficulties to site and build installations -  hazards 
waste-disposal facilities and waste incinerators (Lofstedt 1997; Petts 1995) and 
organised public lobbies against mental health centres (Sheffield Star 1993) which
show that in areas of potential risk consumer and environmental organisations may 
command higher levels of public confidence than scientific organisations.
The acknowledgment that public concerns about risk are legitimate has led 
scholars to urge their incorporation in risk-related decision making (Pildes & 
Sunstein 1995; Slovic 1992). It has been argued that recurrent failures in risk 
management stem from a failure to recognise the more general requirements of the 
need for social trust (Kasperson et al 1999). Risk management from this position 
has gone wrong due to lack of openness and transparency, the failure to consult or 
involve actors and lack of responsiveness to public concerns. Accordingly 
commitment to democratic procedures and attention to issues of trust have become 
essential elements of any successful management of risk. To deal with democratic 
issues demands that we ask how fair and accountable our risk management 
strategies are. Questions such as these take us to the political stage. This 
demonstrates why the sequence of reasoning about risk is really a cycle namely 
beginning with a scientific risk analysis and returning to it via the public domain. 
Taking the public dimensions of risk management seriously means that there is a 
need to change the character of the scientific risk analysis and management 
processes. If the scientific evidence itself is uncertain or contested as is often is in 
psychiatry, then professional action alone may not be sufficient. Following such a 
perspective (the embracement of both expert and lay contributions for effective risk 
management strategies) suggests that risk management is more than merely 
technical.
The institutionalisation of risk management emerges from the resolution of the 
many problematic aspects of risk management strategies such as those mentioned 
above. A strategy for making sense of these resolutions, suggested by interactionist
theory, would be first to note the relevant actors in risk management situations and 
determine what meaning risk management has for them. For example, in risk 
management intervention, we would identify such actors as doctors, nurses, social 
workers, government agencies, potential patients and particular interest groups 
(Mental Health Right Groups). In assessing the meaning that risk management has 
to each group or individual within it, we would probably find that in some cases the 
meaning may be precise, but in some cases the meanings held will be ambiguous. A 
nurse may be personally opposed to risk management strategies but feels an 
obligation as an employee to perform them. Professionals may approve risk 
management strategies, but worry about the consequences to patient care; a patient 
may be “at risk” yet feeling unable or unwilling to comply with intervention.
These ambiguities support the usefulness of distinguishing among different 
kinds of “meaning” in the risk management context. We can differentiate between 
legal, ethical and experiential aspects of risk management. The legal meanings 
would include both the rights and formal constraints facing each actor: the 
obligation of organisations for safe care, the procedures to be followed in risk 
management interventions, the rights of patients among others. Legal meanings 
offer a framework that at least partly limits the movements and perceptions of 
relevant actors. An ethical meaning shows us how various participants conceptually 
feel about risk management. Here the range of meanings might be expected to range 
from those who think risk management is synonymous with control, to those who 
see it as infringement to patient’s rights, to those who think it unfortunate but 
necessary. The various positions taken toward risk management will not only vary 
from group to group, but within each group as well. Therefore negotiation of 
meaning has to be explored both internally and across various groups. Experiential
meaning refers to the consequences for several of different of intervention choices 
being made. The choice of particular method for interventions has different 
consequences for professionals and clients. This suggests that complete “meaning” 
of risk management cannot be understood without taking into account the activities 
that various actors called upon to perform.
From our discussion so far, an important way of conceptualising and 
understanding the social experience of risk is the concept o f the arena metaphor 
(Haligartner 1988; Lowi 1964; Renn 1998). According to the theory, social groups 
in a political arena attempt to exploit their prospects to affect the result o f the group 
decision process by organising social resources (e.g. power, social influence, value 
commitment). To be successful in the social arena, it is essential to mobilise social 
resources. Such social resources can be used to gain attention and support of the 
general public to influence the arena rules, and to score in the arena in competition 
with other actors. Actors will enter risk arenas if they expect this would provide 
them with a chance to gain more resources (Renn 1998). The more resources a 
group can mobilise in an arena, the more likely it is that it controls the conflict 
resolution process by getting its opinion included in the final decision. Risk 
management decisions by psychiatric nurses function under similar structural rules 
and constraints as presented by the model. Risk management decisions focus on two 
issues: what is an acceptable level of risk and how are risks distributed in society. 
All social groups that believe their interests and values are affected by a specific 
risk might be compelled to enter the arena, where success in the risk arena relies on 
the social actors ability to mobilise resources. The arena metaphor attempts to 
include social factors that are influential for the social experience of risk. Among 
them are the symbolic and moral content of issues, the possibility of using risk as a
substitute for other issues, the influence of media and social network, importance of 
values, the structure and design of political regulatory system and the dynamics of 
social interactions among major actors. The concept proceeds from the thesis that 
risk conflicts may not be about risks but rather about symbolic issues associated 
with risk debates where various negotiate their understandings of risk.
The notion of the arena metaphor model presents us with the main shapers of 
risk management decision-making. These range from societal influences through to 
individual professionals of an organisation. Within Figure 2c, societal arena is taken 
to refer to norms, beliefs, values, contemporary lifestyles and social expectation of 
members of society at large. This arena is a dynamic process of competition among 
the population with claims on risk decisions. This shapes elements of cultural 
knowledge available to organisational members to employ in organising their 
relations with each other and with outsiders. The institutional arena is the 
organisational environment (market environment) where risk decisions compete for 
attention. It is influenced by policy, shared cultural preoccupations, political biases 
and problem definitions.
Figure 2c: Conceptual Framework for Understanding Social Experience 
of Risk
SOCIETAL ARENA Norms; Beliefs; Contemporary lifestyles; Claims 
on risk definitions; Opinion leaders; News media.
INSTITUTIONAL ARENA Organisational environment; Policy (e.g. 
Legislation); Political and social action; Problem 
definitions; Regulatory actions; Legislation.
SERVICE ARENA Organisational characteristics (structure, 
technology; individual risk behaviour; etc); 
Cultural system; Influence of multidisciplinary 
teams.
The service arena refers to organisational characteristics which include the 
organisation’s structure, technology, with a cultural system in the formation of 
beliefs, perceived values, ceremonies, stories, practices shared by members of the 
organisation. The composition of a group within which risk related decisions are 
made influence professionals risk behaviour. Risk behaviour which may be 
characterised by the degree of risk associated with decision-making, has three 
determinants. First, risk preferences a characteristic that influences individual 
professional actions. Here, the suggestion is that professionals who enjoy the 
challenge that risks give rise to will be more likely to undertake risky decisions than 
professionals who do not. Second, are risk perceptions that is, a professional’s 
assessment of the risk inherent in a situation. This is defined in terms of his/her 
labelling of the situation (Douglas 1985), probabilistic estimates of the extent and 
controllability of risks and confidence in those estimates. Risk perceptions may also 
impact on professionals’ behaviour leading them to deny uncertainty, to 
overestimate risks and to exhibit unwarranted confidence in their judgements 
(Slovic 1972), knowledge and ability to perform under risky conditions. The third 
individual characteristic suggested to influence risk behaviour is risk propensity, 
namely the tendency of a professional either to take or to avoid risks.
The societal arena refers to the constructions of risk management meaning that 
involve influential individuals and groups (interest groups) drawing on their 
resources to influence how risk management strategies shape up. Actors use their 
energy and resources to change social definitions and create norms and rules 
through a multistage process. Such actors engender awareness of a problem through 
a process of making claims in which they point to the dangerousness of a given 
issue. They then use these messages to create an impression that certain conditions
are problematic and pose a present or future danger to society by drawing on experts 
to disseminate their message through the media. An example in an individual case is 
Mrs Clunis’ influence in shifting the boundaries community care described above. 
Another example is the activities of the media. In each of the three health scandals 
noted above and many others, the mass media emerged as a major interest group by 
evoking and sustaining intense emotional responses, eliciting feelings that 
something must be done. Once a powerful and vocal group has influenced the 
public viewpoint, participants in the institutional arena respond to demands by 
enforcing norms and rules through policies, legislation, and political, social, and 
regulatory actions. In each health scandals and the subsequent inquiry that follows, 
various actors -  including law enforcing agencies, scientists, health professionals, 
patients, former patients, voluntary organisations - have contented over the 
ownership of the solutions to the issues; the ability to create and influence the public 
definition of a problem and thus to define what should be done about it. By virtue of 
their specialist knowledge, such groups claim legitimacy and authority to identify 
what is wrong and to recommend solutions acquiring resources in the process.
Therefore risk decision-making is the result of a complex and intricate work by 
the various actors constituting an arena. One very salient problem resulting from the 
different loci of power and perceptions and definitions of risk represented by 
different arenas is the disparate and sometimes competing goals. Multidisciplinary 
teams provide a good example of this in the service arena. People from different 
professionals disciplines bring different views of mental illness, its cause and most 
effective treatments. The institutional goals of mental health organisations are 
contradictory because they are supported by conflicting societal preferences and 
ideologies in terms of whether to provide therapy psychiatric or medical perspective
control (control or social reaction models) of the mentally ill (Horwitz 1982; Perruci 
1974). These types of conflicts, for the most part, are not addressed by traditional 
risk decision-making. It is important from this stance to suggest that risk decision­
making should be oriented toward helping professionals confront conflicts, and 
recognise that they are inherent in the system and that uniform goals are unlikely.
Another problem related to that mentioned is the sheer complexity of mental 
health service organisations which is that they are characterised by an almost 
incomprehensible mix of clients, programmes and state guidelines and constraints. 
In mental health organisations therefore the problem is not so much eliminating or 
resolving conflict, but rather developing strategies that enable actors to function 
within these conflict-producing situations.
From the above discussion, it would seem that risk decisions are the outcome 
of the complex processes of social construction comprising societal, cultural and 
political elements in which both the influence of institutions and individual 
professionals can be discerned (Douglas 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). Thus 
the idea of the existence of single and shared technologies for risk decision-making 
may be a misleading way to address the issue given that everyday activity within the 
arena concept is constituted by plurality and conflict rather than by consensus and 
sharing of ideas and values (Martin 1992). From this perspective, attitudes to risk 
are jointly determined by processes of perception relating to individual 
professionals cognition and by the cultural dynamics typical of social contexts 
(Gherardi & Nicolini 2000). Each arena develops its own definition and culture of 
risk decision-making, definition on which choices concerning risks are made rather 
than on a set of probability calculations or rational judgements. It would seem that 
basic criterion for effectiveness of risk decision-making of an organisation within
the context of the arena model is the extent to which the overall functioning o f the 
system (characterised by a set of norms, beliefs, attitudes and practices) can be 
mobilised.
Furthermore, a basic proposition within the arena concept is that the various 
subsystems exist with conflicting goals and orientations. So, the distinguishing 
features of “successful” or “unsuccessful” risk decision are the integration and 
coordination of these arenas to the role and quality o f expert knowledge; how 
probabilities o f uncertain events ensure that conflicts are identified and power 
transferred to solve problems and implement solutions. Central to the arena concept 
is the notion of conflict in which risk decisions are the result of complex and 
intricate work by the various actors. Since each arena is defined by a specific set of 
ideology, which must be identified locally, each may present technological artefacts 
of varying degree of safety, have unique risk assessment and management 
discourses and specific interpretations of reports, policy statements among others. 
This has a potential for what has been termed “social amplification of risk” 
(Kasperson et al 1998), which can lead to increased distrust between the various 
actors: conflict, cultural differences, ongoing tensions may generate widespread 
media coverage, societal attention, public concern and protests. Using the social 
amplification of risk notion, I share the observation that risk cannot be viewed as a 
single problem or challenge but rather that it comes in different forms and levels of 
complexity.
It is important to note that the limitations on negotiations that are imposed by 
social structure is real, and the point of an interactionist analysis is not to 
indiscriminately see every risk issue as subject to negotiation (Maines 1977). 
Rather, the strength of the approach taken is to show that certain features of
institutional life apparently obligated by hierarchy and rules are in fact more flexible 
than conventional organisational analysis would suggest. Internal sources of power 
within institutions and the problematic nature of rules governing them are two of the 
creative contributions of interactionists studying institutions. From the interactionist 
viewpoint, a vital feature of rule is whether or not they can be broken, without 
sanction by various actors. Nurses, for instance, are subject to a vast number of rules 
and guidelines. Some of these rules, for example, that patients risk management 
must be performed within days of admission are never deliberately broken - i f  they 
were the individual professional will be in trouble. Other rules, such as the policy 
that junior staff must be supervised when assessing risk are more laxly monitored 
and enforced. The insights presented above, has been developed to stimulate an 
enhanced understanding of the relationships between factors internal and external to 
the settings. The discussion represents an attempt to formulate a structure that will 
serve as basis for the examination of risk decision-making in the settings. The next 
chapter reflects on the evolution of my research interests and methods of inquiiy.
CHAPTER THREE
THE PATHWAYS OF MY RESEARCH
The reason often put forward fo r  the habit o f ethnographic o f effacement -  the 
removal o f the ethnographer o f the scene o f writing -  is that without it ethnographer 
will descend into subjectivity and autobiography. This is indeed a danger; but the 
alternative, the denial o f  ethnographic presence and the specificity o f ethnographic 
experience, is equally dangerous: it substitutes an unchallengeable subjectivity fo r a 
challengeable subjectivity. (Spencer 1989p. 154)
For the most part, we are led to believe that given appropriate training and 
sufficient diligence, one should be able to produce a competent ethnography that 
authentically represents the subjective everyday worlds of the people we study 
(Meyers 1988). Within this tradition, the task of the researcher is viewed as 
relatively unproblematic: being the description of a self-evident reality (Denzin & 
Lincoln 1994). Ethnography in this approach often assumes a close correspondence 
between what the ethnographer observes and reports and the culture of the 
community studied: in other words, the style of reporting is that of an impersonal 
observer. Here, Van Maanen’s (1988 p. 46), observation that: “Ironically, by taking 
the “I” (the observer) out of the ethnographic report, the narrator’s authority is 
apparently enhanced, and audience worries over personal subjectivity become 
moot.” is apposite. Personal accounts and influences, from this stance, seems to 
threaten legitimacy that encourages the explanation to be framed in positivist 
language so as to create and maintain the commonly accepted pretence of accuracy, 
precision, relevance, and rigor. In fieldwork, this involves ignoring the relationship 
aspects of data collection phase when it comes to the time to write in which: “The 
good feelings that we expect to have toward our participants during data collection 
must now turn to stone as we write our analysis. We think our physical distance
from the field will foster analytic distance and thus help us to produce an “objective 
analysis.” (Kleimman & Copp, 1993 p.26) Others have warned about the dangers of 
“going native” and the need to not only maintain distance but to “manufacture 
distance” (McCracken 1988) in the relationship with participants. The self of the 
social researcher is treated as a “contaminant” that should be separated out, 
neutralised, minimised, standardised, and controlled (Krieger 1991). Within this 
approach, theories that include personal experience are suspect: reflexivity or 
autobiography is regarded as navel gazing and has been labelled as “narcissism” 
(Llobera 1987) with researchers who write about their own emotions being termed 
as “emotional exhibitionists” (Ellis & Flaherty 1992).
Contemporary trends in anthropology have questioned these assumptions, 
suggesting that the act of ethnography itself is entrenched in a complex institutional 
web of power. The focal point of such critiques, are located in ethnographic 
dilemmas, particularly the act of ethnographic translation. Accordingly, translation 
itself can never be pure or without an element of the author/researcher’s voice in it. 
Clifford and Marcus (1986) have helped us to understand that ethnography has 
never been the detached objective description of cultures, or societies, or the 
explanation of human behaviour purely in terms of self-sufficient theories. Rather 
the roles of context, of social experience, of interest have been shown to shape 
ethnographic style and content. Personal values, social positions, and political 
interests are part of all aspects of the research process including theory. What is 
needed therefore is the unpacking of the many dimensions of the “self’ -  cultural 
baggage, personality traits, values, and psychological defences among others. 
Ethnography from this angle is located in time and space, and reflects ideas, 
interests, and organisation of the ethnographer. The research product is in the end
that of the researcher who tells or authors a text, and so doing, offers a document 
that is structured by the researcher’s purposes, offering the researcher’s 
interpretations (Stacey 1988). Such an observation supports the positionality or 
standpoint epistemology, which argues that texts are always partial, incomplete, and 
socially located, and require the author to “come clean” about stance and position 
(Lincoln 1995). It is also consistent with the issue of power as reflected in feminist 
theory and epistemology. Here, power is evident in three interconnected 
dimensions, namely the power differences stemming from different positionalities 
of the researcher and the researched (e.g. class, race, nationality, life chances), 
power wielded during the research process, such as defining the research 
relationship and power exerted in writing and representing (Wolf 1996).
Thus the ethnographer, as a positioned subject, constructs interpretations of 
experiences rather than simply reporting on the “facts” discovered during fieldwork 
(Rabinow 1986). Bruner (1986 p.5) comments that ethnographic stories represent 
the “imposition of meaning on the flow of memory, in that we highlight some 
causes and discount others; that is, every telling is interpretive.” Charmaz (2002 
p318) reminds us that “As social scientists, we start with research participants’ 
stories but we tell them in another way. Which stories we tell, how we tell them, and 
how our audiences, including research participants, receive them all differ from the 
stories we heard. Sometimes we relate facts; often we provide fragments of stories, 
and, frequently, analytic stories.” The ethnographer from a reflexive perspective 
becomes active in the writing of ethnography. This awareness that all ethnographies 
are interpretations of experience means that ethnographers have to monitor how 
their biographies intersect with their interpretation of the field experiences. 
Reflexivity, in this sense, constitutes continuous internal dialogue about how
biography influences the assignment of meaning to the words and actions of the 
informants. This observation challenges the splitting of the researcher and the 
researched and encourages the researcher to put him/herself into the research and 
writing as part of the experience. Reinharz (1979) characterises this relationship 
between researcher and research as a continual process of socialisation in which 
researchers are engaged in a search for their own identities and project their 
conflicts into their professional work.
The issues raised in our discussion is illustrated in recent years by some major 
changes in ethnographic style, namely ethnographic memoir and narrative 
ethnography (Tedlock 1991) and confessional tales (Van Maanem 1988), in which 
relationships and dynamics between researcher and subjects, as well as the 
emotional dilemmas faced by the researcher are documented in the ethnographic 
text itself (Rabinow 1986). Narrative ethnographies purposefully locate the 
ethnographic account within a complex web of epistemological reflections, personal 
experiences and cultural hegemonies that shape the production of knowledge. 
Where does all this lead us in relation to the place of the “self’ in social science? 
For me it raises some vital issues. If research is indeed a process of self­
engagement, then who am I as a researcher? Why do I study the phenomena I 
study? How have my experiences as person shaped my research questions? 
Following Crick (1996 p.175) I would argue that “....we need to understand our 
ethnographic products in terms of the producers and the production process, that is 
to say in terms of ourselves, our informants and the specific contexts in which
encounters have taken place If much that we call ‘method’ has characteristics of
a ‘reaction formation’ designed to protect the investigator from anxiety in the face 
of social phenomena, then clearly a most important kind of ethnographic data is
what is going on inside the researcher We require that our ‘selves’ become
objects for scrutiny in the same way our research has rendered ‘objects’ those other 
selves with whom we have interacted in the field.”
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section provides a theoretical and 
methodological framework for understanding autobiographies and argues that 
autobiographies of researchers are useful research tools, particularly for clarifying 
the presuppositions underlying research. I shall provide a short account of how my 
research was developed. This biographical and intellectual account, the story of 
who, I am and how I came to do the research, is intended to supplement the 
methodological analysis in this chapter. The section is organised historically. I begin 
with a brief description of some early experiences that have shaped my professional 
life. I then explore my introduction to organisational behaviour and applied 
behavioural science and some of my early experiences of research and consultation 
as a graduate student. I then describe the theoretical background to my research 
methodology.
The Background to the Research: My Intellectual Autobiography
It is my contention that social scientists must be challenged to reveal and 
explain how their personas influence their scientific work since such a journey can 
help us gain better insight and understanding into their lives and work. To 
traditional methodologists what follows may seem irrelevant and self-indulgent as 
well as narcissistic and solipsistic. Indeed, such accounts of autobiographies are 
seen to have methodological flaws, to serve as basis of scientifically valid 
knowledge. Autobiographical data is subject to incompleteness, personal bias, and 
selective recall in the process by which the narrative is constructed. The fallibility of 
memory, repression, the shaping of stories according to dispositions, internal
idealisation, and nostalgia all present the possibility of biased data. Looking back at 
a particular moment in time might provide a view that is coloured by our current 
context, mood, or interest. There might also be our predisposition to construct 
masks through which we not only wish to see ourselves but also masks through 
which we wish others to see us. There is a possibility that what we can disclose to 
others is incomplete and thus open to the portrayal of being “crafty tellers” of
stories (Grumet 1987; Handel 1987; Ross et al 1981). Revealing our intimate selves 
to unknown audience make us vulnerable and may evoke unanticipated reactions. 
For example, it is difficult to avoid expedient descriptions and interpretations and to, 
refrain from exercises in “image management” and positive self-presentation. 
Indeed, those who assume that an objective reality exists apart from the world as 
defined by human agents might argue that the accounts of autobiographies are mere 
rationalisations (self-justification) we use to create meaning for our lives.
Despite the implied limitations of autobiographies I contend that we cannot 
dismiss their potential contributions to social science inquiry. Following C Wright 
Mills (1959) suggestion that sociologist’s primary subject matter is the study of the 
intersection of biography and history, I argue that the autobiography is a powerful 
vehicle for theoretical usefulness and methodological value. Autobiographical 
accounts provide us with insights into the nature of research that cannot be covered 
with any other methodological tools. Clearly, social scientists as observed above 
play important roles in the research process. Autobiographies reveal basic links 
between subjects’ personal lives and how they have chosen to carry out research 
activities. Bruner’s (1983) work illustrates how an autobiography can reveal the role 
of the researcher in structuring the overall research design. Examples that bring 
theoretical implications of autobiographies into sharper focus is Bettelhein’s (1960)
and Frankl’s (1962) reference to their personal experiences in Nazi concentration 
camps to address theoretical issues regarding human personality. Thus our 
theoretical concerns are interwoven with our analysis of the methodological issues - 
the nexus between theory and research procedures including data collection and 
analysis.
From this stance, research is seen as a social process with the researcher a 
variable in the research design (Sjoberg & Nett 1968). The researcher’s position in 
the social structure affects the selection of the problem under investigation. In 
addition, the researcher actively shapes the manner in which data are collected, 
analysed and constructed for publication. Autobiographies of researchers are useful 
in revealing how researchers’ assumptions have been shaped by their life histories - 
including their education experiences. The researcher’s assumptions regarding 
analysis, the nature of reality, the nature of rationality or otherwise in human action 
as well as the researcher’s fundamental moral commitment, are directly and 
indirectly shaped by his/her social experiences and integration into the complex web 
of power relationships in modem society. Consequently, autobiographical accounts 
enable us to acquire a deeper understanding of important theoretical and 
methodological issues, which in turn provide us with fuller appreciation of the 
nature of research. The accounts draw attention to what it means be to a researcher 
by pointing out the variety and significance of such a venture. Autobiographies 
define the shape and the content of the field endeavour and in the process show the 
liveliness of research in a complex and diverse social order. I believe that the 
contributions of autobiographies lend a special legitimacy to the research process.
This means that my social change orientations are the result of a powerful 
interplay between my psychosocial development and critical life events. These have
shaped my scientific socialisation and professional development. Such 
developments are illustrated in the life cycle process (Levinson et al 1978; 
Schlossberg 1981) in which through one’s interaction with significant others (e.g. 
parents, spouse, friends, mentors), one develops one’s sense of personal 
competence, ability to engage in relationship among others. The process also 
influences one’s scientific socialisation with respect to values and norms and 
influences the professional choices one makes. Throughout the life cycle people 
experience critical life events that compel them to re-evaluate and perhaps 
reconstruct their identities, values and roles: this requires a major reassessment of 
one’s inner self and relations to others, and thus alter one’s life cycle trajectory. In 
the words of Schlossberg (1981 p.5) it is “an event or non-event that results in 
change in assumptions about oneself and the world, and thus requires a 
corresponding change in one’s behaviour and relationship.” For me, the interaction 
between my psychosocial development and critical life events have, greatly 
influenced my continuing socialisation and professional development. This model is 
interactive and suggests that my orientations themselves are subject to change. My 
scientific orientations and my stance to research are products o f these processes. 
Through a personal and intellectual journey, I have tried to understand the forces 
that have shaped the ways that I have conducted the research. The very development 
of social science knowledge intertwines latent values, assumptions, and personal 
experiences that, if made explicit, can enhance significantly my ability to appreciate 
and comprehend theory and research. This required me to conduct self-analysis and 
insightful introspection. A vital part of this is the writing of a semi intellectual 
autobiography, which lays out my pre-existing values and experience in relation to 
the research.
Most social science in its quest for generality imposes order and rationality 
upon experiences and worlds that are more ambiguous, more problematic and more 
chaotic in reality. The reality of life however involves experiencing contrast, 
managing discontent and disinterest. If we check our own experiences, for example, 
we know that our lives are often flooded with amounts of indecision, turning points, 
confusions, contradictions and ironies. A lot of social science glosses over this 
essential but central arena of life. Researchers seek consistency in subjects’ 
responses when subjects’ lives are often inconsistent. Autobiographies are suited to 
discovering the confusions and ambiguities that are played in everyday experiences. 
It threads through personal definitions of the situation, and historical change both in 
one’s own life and in the world outside. I would argue that it is mistaken to see 
autobiographical account as thoroughly individualistic because lives move 
persistently through history and structure. As such as a method it allows us to grasp 
a sense of the totality of life. As Bogdan (1974 p. 4) says: “The autobiography is 
unique in allowing us to view an individual in the context of his whole life, from 
birth to the point of which we encounter him. Because of this it can lead us to 
further understanding of the stages and critical periods in the processes of his 
development. It enables us to look at subjects as they have a past with successes as 
well as failures, and a future with hopes and fears”
In taking this stance I am integrating my body into the process and production 
of knowledge in following Conquergood (1991 p.180) who “privileges the body as a 
site of knowing”. The body in social science generally has been an “absence 
presence” (Davis 1997). “When the body is erased in the processing of scholarship, 
knowledge situated within the body is unavailable. Enfleshed knowledge is 
restricted by linguistic patterns of positivism dualism -  mind/body,
objective/subjective -  that fix the body as an entity incapable of literacy” (Spiy 
2001 p.725). For that reason, there is a need for an embodied research because: 
“Ideologies and experiences are made manifest through performance by replacing 
the rigor mortis of the written with fully embodied social critique. Such flesh to 
flesh scholarship motivates the labour of critical self-reflexivity and invigorates the 
concept and process(ing) of knowledge” (Spiy 2001 p.726). In the words of 
Madison (1999 p.107), this is a “felt-sensing meeting between theory, writing, and 
performing”.
Realism versus idealism
It is important to note that I am not arguing that scientific practice is arbitrary 
or inappropriate, and that interpretation alone is possible - as captured by the 
subjectivity and objectivity continuum. I am not advocating methodological 
anarchism (Feyerabend 1975) but rather to argue that scientific knowledge has 
legitimate claim to truth, in a way that relates to external reality, recognising as 
argued above, that reality is subject to a multitude of social, pragmatic and 
sometimes irrational influences, and that scientific truth is not something separate 
from human concerns. I see scientific knowledge as the product of the activities of 
scientists acting as social beings working within disciplinary framework into which 
they are socialised. Scientific knowledge plays an important part in politics and 
other matters and is not independent of them. Scientific experiments are more 
ambiguous than most people imagine and no longer has unquestioned authority as 
illustrated in the BSE saga and the row over MMR vaccine (see chapter 2). In 
defending my position it will useful to briefly discuss the debate between realism 
and idealism. This debate which is an ancient one, has seen the struggle between the 
assumptions that objectivity is desirable as the goal of science inquiry rather than
subjectivist assumptions asserting that understanding lived experience, the 
researcher’s and those he/she studies is the legitimate project of inquiry. A version 
of the objective-subjective debate is the recent argument in the UK, over biology 
curricula in schools, between those who support creationism (a literal interpretation 
of the Bible’s seven-day creation story) and those who accept the theory of 
evolution.
Realism (the view of truth and science that has been held by great 
scholars such as Darwin, Einstein Harvey, and Newton) argues that knowledge 
corresponds to reality. It assumes that reality consists of facts, which are reflected, 
in observation statements, in addition to logical connections between them. That is 
reality exists independent of human cognition and that the work of science is to 
discover important facts and processes that constitute that reality. In other words, 
the processes are out there, waiting to be discovered. Thus for the objectivists, there 
are truths about particular circumstances that can be determined (Popper 1972). 
Essential for the realism project is the design of a new unambiguous language to 
which facts can be stated in a purely observational fashion. Ordinary language is too 
messy, imprecise and ambiguous to indicate observations. Language reflects reality 
in mirror-like fashion like a picture. The common view of truth in realism is 
correspondence; theories are true if they correspond with nature. The 
correspondence theory states that truth consists of the degree of correspondence 
between an object and its description. It assumes that under normal conditions the 
human mind is able to gain knowledge of objects by means of observation and its 
experimental refinement. This observational knowledge can then be used to test 
beliefs and theories. The epistemological premise is that objects are able to cause 
our senses to form more or less correct observations of them as they actually are.
These observations can be sufficiently independent of theories held by observers 
concerning their objects that theories can be objectively tested. Ontologically it 
assumes that minds are part of nature.
From our discussion so far there are some problems with realism. Namely that 
there are no neutral data, which we reproduce, neither will it do to suggest that we 
receive neutral data from the world, after which we switch to the interpretation 
mode. Our judgements about what there is and what we see are theory laden from 
the outset and are coloured by experiences, beliefs and practices. In addition there 
are no unquestionable foundations for knowledge. In other words we are not 
presented with free-floating truths to take hold of, nor knowledge we have to pull 
from the air. What we think and say, as well as what we know about the world, is 
known by us. Such knowledge is not part of the objective world, of itself, but is the 
set of beliefs about the world shaped by participants in cultures, sharing 
worldviews, theories, and expectations and reflecting a rich template of 
intersubjective relations. This leads us to the observation that no theory is immune 
to alteration and even complete rejection in the course of time. Scientific theories 
are not absolute truths; they are just descriptions of the world, some o f which fit 
better than others. The history of science is littered with distinguished names who 
made mistakes. Einstein’s theory of relativity that the speed of light in a vacuum is 
an absolute constant is currently being challenged. Historically the study of light 
alone reveals a rich catalogue of misconception: Kepler’s notion that light travelled 
with infinite velocity was a mistake and Newton’s claims that light speeded up 
when it passed through a denser medium was found to be the exact opposite.
The alternative, idealism, (adherents Feyerabend, Habermas, Kuhn and 
Putnam) assumes that the world as we know it is somehow a creation of the mind.
Our knowledge is a subjective product and does not necessarily correspond to an 
outside world. We construct understandings of reality through our perceptual and 
interpretative faculties. Idealism sees knowledge as subjective construction and 
therefore there is no different rational, objective way to choose between different 
points of view. Social processes from this angle are created by human interpretation 
-  they do not constitute reality as such but are concepts that describe it. For 
subjectivists, the very notion of “truth” is problematic; their argument is that except 
from certain principles about the physical world, there are few truths that constitute 
universal knowledge; rather there are multiple perspectives about the world. There 
is no reality other than that seen through and created by the paradigm (Kuhn 1962). 
Truth is seen as some sort of ideal coherence of beliefs with each other and with our 
experiences (Putnam 1981). Thus there may be more than one true description of 
the world. Epistemologically, it assumes that our ways o f thinking and perceiving 
inevitably condition what we observe. Facts are theory-bound, never theory- 
independent. The ontological idea is that mind constitutes nature.
This thinking leads to relativism, which sees all knowledge as subjective; 
there is no rational, objective ways to choose between different points of view. The 
knowing subject is not the passive observer. On the contraiy, the things we see and 
come to know are incorporated in a theory, or even more, they are part of worldview 
or of a long-established lifeworld with roots in history and culture. Theory is 
considered as part of a whole structure of methods, frameworks, concepts, 
professional habits and tradition. This structure determines the general approach to 
research. The social nature of science and the contextual nature of knowledge 
claims (that knowledge depends on prejudices and pre-reflexive practices) introduce 
more human and conceptual elements in philosophy of science. This development in
the philosophy of science seems to converge with hermeneutics -  an important 
element in hermeneutics is the sensitivity to history. Gadamer (1975) develops this 
thesis and explains the essence of understanding and interpretation in the human 
sciences by analysing how we should understand text. He argues that any attempt to 
understand meaning requires an orientation to the subject matter and therefore rest 
on certain assumptions. We pre-judge a text, for example, even before we read it. If 
we know a text is by Shakespeare, we bring certain expectations to our reading of it. 
If we suspect another text to be a science fiction, we anticipate a certain plot 
structure. The book may not sustain our assumptions, in which case we may have to 
revise our expectations and reinterpret the chapters we have already read and 
substitute a new expectation of the book and rely on this in our subsequent reading.
This process is one, which is conceived as “hermeneutic circle”. We approach 
a text with a vague anticipation of its meaning and go on revising this expectation 
until a self-consistent meaning has emerged. Gadamer claims that any attempt to 
understand meaning involves a similar process and points out that the literal 
meaning of prejudice is simply prejudgement. In other words, an initial idea about a 
book or subject matter can be retained or dismissed on further experience. 
Prejudices then are not assumptions that blind one to real meaning of what one is 
studying; rather they offer an initial direction for further investigation. For example, 
before reading Shakespeare, we already assume high level of brilliance, we expect 
that it will deal with certain human problems and that Shakespeare will use the 
English language beautifully. Where a work attributed to Shakespeare does not meet 
these expectations, we often doubt that it is really Shakespeare’s work. Thus we 
understand a text not by objectifying it, ourselves being detached and disinterested 
spectators. On the contrary, in understanding it we are involved in and participate in
the work of art, starting from our own situation and prejudices. In this way 
interpretation brings with it sensitivity to history. To understand the meaning of a 
text in general, we should become conscious of our own situatedness and resist the 
naive temptation of objectivism and the belief that there is a stable pre-given object 
as a secure truth on its own. Between subject and object there is that historical 
hermeneutic interactivity. Therefore in understanding a text we cannot possibly 
remain neutral or “objective observers” on the contrary we should search for our 
own prejudices.
Like realism, idealism presents us with some problems. The relativist claim 
that individuals provide the criteria for what is true or false, what is rational or 
irrational is problematic. For how do we define the relevant subject who is 
responsible for a particular viewpoint? To assert that no statement can be true 
because it is a product of the one who utters it is self-defeating. If what I think is 
true, is true for me, and what you think is true, is true for you, where do we end in 
terms of communication? Newton-Smith (1982) reminds us that the idea that what 
is true for one group might not be true for another is incoherent. In a sense the 
notion of “anything goes” undermine science. We seem therefore to have two 
equally unattractive options. The mind makes up the world maybe totally 
confabulates it, or we must assume that the world as it is in itself, independent of 
human exploration and theorising is accessible to us. Are risks factual statements or 
are they not factual statements? The extreme points -  the objective-subjective 
dimension - form fundamentally different conceptions of what risk is. From the 
objectivity viewpoint risk is an objective hazard, threat or danger that exists and can 
be measured independently of social and cultural processes. In contrast the
subjectivity perspective assumes that nothing is risk in itself that is that what we 
understand to be risk depends on psychosocial processes.
Following Dryfiis (1980) and Rorty (1980), my stance in the realism-idealism 
dichotomy is that knowledge is interactive, because we can never escape the 
hermeneutic circle. Our communication and actions develop against a shared 
cultural background of social practices of know-how and skills, which cannot be 
made entirely explicit because it is presupposed. My position embraces the idea that 
knowledge is a kind of interaction of subject and object. In other words, it is an 
intermediate position between realism and idealism, between subjectivism and 
objectivism. Therefore risk statements are neither purely factual claim nor 
exclusively value claims; instead, they are both at the same time or something in 
between (Adam B et al 2000). Going along with Beck (2000 p211 emphasis in 
original), “I consider realism and constructivism to be neither and either-or option 
nor a mere matter of belief. We should not have to swear allegiance to any 
particular view or theoretical perspective. The decision whether to take a realist or a 
constructivist approach is for me a rather pragmatic one, a matter of choosing the 
appropriate means for a desired goal”.
My argument is that “subjective” and “objective” are relative terms. All our 
perceptions, thoughts, verbal and physical expressions are filtered through and 
formed by our senses, knowledge culturally formed tropes and a host private 
perversions. Objectivity in the study of human affairs is limited because we cannot, 
for instance, directly observe our family’s thoughts, motives or emotions; but we 
can deduce what their private thoughts are from their public words and deeds (the 
data of an empirical social science). We can use these empirical data to construct 
and then check our inferences about subjective or otherwise unobservable aspects of
human affairs. Checking and making these deductions is parallel to the logical 
method of hypothesis formation and testing that physical scientists use to infer, for 
example the existence of gravity and other unobservable aspects of the physical 
world. We build blocks of secondary inferences once we are satisfied that our 
primary inferences are correct. For example, using knowledge gain from past 
experience, we might infer from a patient’s facial expressions, utterances and other 
actions that the patient is angry (risk of aggression) and then use the emotion anger 
as part of our explanation for the patient’s subsequent behaviour. The limits of 
objectivity (when we search for knowledge) are characteristic of human beings as 
observers, rather than the things we observe; and therefore the recognised limits to 
objectivity do not require separate methods of inquiry into physical and social 
phenomena as some critics conclude. The scientific method is a two-part process 
alternating continually between the formations and testing of hypotheses, it is thus 
similar to the hermeneutic circle.
In essence all research methods were primarily developed to answer specific 
types of questioning a specific research context. Even when a method is used and 
interpreted in the context for which it was designed; they all have limitations. 
Consequently, a method is not intrinsically valid or good; instead, it is relatively 
valid for a specific purpose, to answer a specific question in a specific research 
context. Bearing this caveat in mind, I argue that an objective or subjective 
approach is not better intrinsically than the other: they have different purposes and 
are ideally suited for tackling different questions in different contexts. Each 
approach from this stance should not be preferred over another because the two 
approaches may address different questions. What is required is to obtain the best
available data about a phenomenon and interpret it in the context of the limitations 
of its methodological categories.
So how do we resolve the argument that an objective world exists that can 
be known through the methods of science and science as a subjective construction? 
Our discussion shows that there is subjective element in both physical and social 
sciences (requirement in every case the informed judgement of individuals) it 
follows that all science is practised within a social, historical, and psychological 
matrix. What is needed therefore is a marriage between the logical approach and 
non-logical intuition. As noted in the last chapter, all facts are “theory driven”, thus 
following Wilson (1998) I argue for what he terms “consilience” -  the interlocking 
of perspectives -  between the domains of knowledge. Therefore in my attempt to 
advocate for interpretivism I am not taking the “romantic rebellion” stance 
(Shweder 1986) namely rejecting the empirical basis, logical methods and 
explanatory goals of the natural sciences as being inappropriate for the study of 
human affairs, and therefore a swing too far to the direction of subjectivity but to 
nudge the pendulum to a focal point. Here risk is seen as an objective hazard; 
threat or danger that is inevitably mediated through social and cultural processes 
and can never be known in isolation from these processes (Lupton 1999a).
Socialisation, Life Events and professional Development
I was bom in Ghana, and came along as the fourth of six children. My parents 
cared a great deal for us and had our welfare almost constantly in mind. I grasped as 
soon as I could understand such matters that my father was very successful in his 
profession as an accountant, and also that his abilities were reinforced by self- 
discipline. My mother had a successful small business and combined this with 
looking after children of her brothers and sisters. My parents supported social
justice, particularly with respect to improving the lot of those with less. I learned 
quite early that fairness, justice and companionship are important. In our family 
completing school and attending college was assumed, and highly valued. Some of 
my greatest joys were presents from my father when I did well in my examinations. 
I had a set back when my father died suddenly during my first year in secondary 
school. My mother pledged to see me through university education, to achieve my 
ambition as an accountant. But by this time it was highly important to me that I 
obtained a job to help support the family. I got a job as a teacher in a primary 
school. Looking back it was this experience that initiated my interest in working 
with people. I got the opportunity to train as an Aeronautical Communication officer 
but found that un-stimulating. I was to have a second blow when my mother died 
after a short illness.
I wanted to do something different and useful, to see the world. Luckily, I got 
opportunity to train as a psychiatric nurse in England. Coming to England was a 
change for me. I became attuned to some additional facts regarding my identity. 
Heightened cultural awareness ensued and I became more realistically keyed into 
the fact that different cultures were going on at the same time my Ghanaian culture 
was happening. This was a new type of feeling for me because; up until then I have 
always been within the shores of Ghana. The concept of individualism that 
enveloped me seemed blessed with something novel and stimulating while at the 
same time it was cursed with loneliness and isolation, stemming from longing for 
community spirit. I became conscious of my experience as a minority group 
member and felt excluded. This was a period of an intense debate not just in the 
United Kingdom, but also throughout the western world about the impact of 
immigration on western cultures. Plurality was seen as the cause o f national decline
and disintegration with calls for a coherent national identity and culture. The riots 
mainly by black youths in Brixton, Bradford, and Hansworth, Toxteth among others 
were defined by the mass media as a threat about which “something must be done”. 
They also serve as the media’s and some politicians’ primary source of sound bites 
on the dangers of blacks in the UK. Scapegoating was abundant in each of the riots 
and to listen to commentators, one might have believed that without blacks, the UK 
would be a land of infinite economic progress, with no crime and poverty. What 
struck me was the adoption of a generalised attitude toward natives of “third world” 
origins. This generalisation strategy according to JanMohamed (1985 p.64) is a 
“commodifi(cation)” of the native, “so that he is now perceived as generic being 
that can be exchanged for any other native (they all look alike, act alike, and so 
on)”. Such a strategy of generalisation that eradicates cultural differences between 
peoples of various non-white cultures lead into a monolithic image of the third 
world as passive, inferior, backward and uncivilised -  categories that are 
interchangeable for a generic Other. Here the West is presented as superior and the 
third world as inferior.
For instance, the claim of natural superiority was evident in the September the
it-11 terrorists attack in New York. Muslims and different cultures were depicted as 
uncivilised, immoral and always inclined toward barbaric activities. The problems 
of Moslems were portrayed as specific products of their culture. Similar discussions 
ensued during the Rwandan tragedy -the war between the majority Hutu and the 
majority Tutsi populations- where Rwanda became a symbol of bestiality, terror and 
evil. Blacks were seen as lacking the “white moral capacities” and described as 
beasts with the tendency to violence. There was, then, a division between white and 
non-white and a tendency to treat non-white not simply as different but as less than
folly human. My point here is not necessarily to condone the activities of any of 
these groups but rather to point out the notion of identity as recognition of Self 
through abjection of Other as noted in chapter two. I saw as simplistic the “anti -  
white” sentiments following any criticism of non-white and felt that we do 
ourselves disservice if we ciy “racism” with the same stridency of those who 
criticise blacks. Thus identity is possible only by the abjection of the other. But as 
we saw earlier the notion of abjection is complex in that it describes both 
fascination and repulsion with another.
Abjection theory helped me to understand why I experienced both inclusion 
(the fascination of my cultural coding as different from white bodies and more 
primitive and closer to nature) and exclusion because of being inferior and 
uncivilised. Drawing on the theorisations of bodies, risk and danger, blacks were 
seen as an issue that has brought the nation to brink. For example the quest for 
multiculturalism and minority rights were perceived as a threat to the social 
cohesion of British society; here, minority rights were seen a as risk to the nation 
(the body politic). Notions of risk danger as we have noted above, implicitly 
construct an imagined “normal” state of affairs that should be defended from the 
perceived danger in this case a healthy nation endangered by outsiders. 
Pursuing questions about my own identity as black, I soon came to identify with 
“vulnerable” groups and became increasingly aware of their plight. My marginality 
enabled me to examine society in ways that cannot be conceived of by those who 
are centrally located in social structures and my desire to help rectify social 
injustice. This sense of marginality is necessary forerunner, for one must question 
the social order if one wants to study it. Thus I internalised the concern with social
development and social justice, particularly with respect to improving the plight of 
vulnerable people.
I trained as a psychiatric nurse at St. Crispin Hospital, Northampton. Early 
experiences helped me understand more fully the concept of context, namely that no 
illness ever happens in isolation. That there is a bigger picture, like a family, a 
community and a set of circumstances that force a person to seek medical attention. 
On reflection, it was the relationship between patients’ experiences, emotionally and 
physically, and the larger environment around their experience that interested me. 
This underlying theme drew my attention to the importance of a multiple level of 
analysis for understanding complex systems. I was trained to understand group 
dynamics and interpersonal relations, but I needed to understand organisational and 
wider social forces to explain the problems I encountered. I began to read 
everything I could find about organisation behaviour and change. I found a lot of 
interesting material that pushed my thinking forward, but something was always 
missing. I never felt satisfied that the picture I had was adequate or the depth of 
knowledge deep enough to answer my questions. I considered my only logical 
option was to return to college. I began to pursue a course in business studies, which 
offered interdisciplinary programme. Studying business studies gave me 
appreciation of the importance of economic and sociological factors in shaping 
social systems. The disciplines inculcated in me a strong appreciation of theory 
building and the importance of rigorous empirical research. It also gave me insight 
into the social scientific venture as a process of model building and created in me an 
inner intellectual tension between action and science.
I carried out a project examining the factors that make task group decision­
making possible. I wanted to know the range of freedom available to professionals’
decision-making and the options available to them. In other words how does the 
professional environment frame the professionals’ work? My earlier initiation in the 
social sciences and my search for a coherent theory to guide my professional 
activities proved unsatisfactory. I could not accept the profession’s idealised form of 
clinical decision-making. It contradicted my psychosocial development and 
scientific socialisation. I was of the opinion that clinical judgement does not operate 
in idealised form: rather it is drastically limited by the influence of other non- 
clinical such as social, economic, political factors. I saw the healthcare system as 
consisting of pluralistic political processes, where risk decisions are being 
contested, renegotiated and redefined on a regular basis. I was of the opinion that 
the risk decision making environment was complicated both by the variety of 
players involved and by the seriousness of the consequences of poor decisions. Thus 
the solution to the problem of clinical judgement is to address issues that are both 
political and professional.
During this period, I learned that feeling hurt is being a “crybaby”, that what 
you think is right or wrong doesn’t count, and that one must always show a good 
face, never show them what I feel, in a sense I learned to be a “good nurse”. I 
learned that what I thought was good and right was too personal. These in my 
opinion contributed to the trivialisation of human experience. Emotions and feelings 
were reduced to numbers and I felt we lost a feel for people in that much of what we 
do was narrow and method driven -  humanity was forsaken for method. I was 
enveloped with double messages, dammed if you do dammed if you don’t. 
Messages that generally considered, to represent positive values in an organisational 
and managerial context (espoused theories) are confronted with what counts. So the 
messages to take initiative meant do not break the rules; and give immediate notice
when mistakes occur (e.g. giving the wrong drug) is met with punishment if you 
make mistakes. The message of integration between science and nursing in reality 
was confronted with clinical practice that was essentially ritualistic. Agyris and 
Schon (1978) explain these phenomena through the model of how organisational 
learning systems develop and are sustained through derived and connected 
inhibiting circles: the lack of agreement between organisations’ theories in use and 
their prevailing espoused theories. So that causes and intentions are given other than 
that which actually is the basis for organisational practices. Bateson’s (1971) theory 
about double bind contributes an even more illuminating explanation to these 
phenomena. Members of organisations are exposed to conflicting management 
signals and caught in double bind situations; double bind connotes a situation where 
conflicting messages occur, but where the individual is unable to comment upon the 
ambiguity.
The Search for “Meaning” in Practice
My need to explore and theorise the ambiguity and frustration resulted in a 
return once more to formal education, Organisation Development (OD) programme, 
at Sheffield Business School, a highly experiential programme that stresses personal 
as well as group development and organisational change. Thus like bell Hooks 
(1991 p. 59), “I come to theory because I was hurting - the pain within me was so 
intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to 
comprehend to grasp what was happening around me. Most importantly, I wanted to 
make the hurt go away. I saw in theory then a location for healing.” Sheffield 
Business School provided an exciting and challenging learning environment and my 
apprenticeship as OD practitioner took on a deeper, and complex dimensions for 
me. The OD programme was intensely stimulating and liberating. It was
commitment to systematic questioning of one’s own practice as a basis for self- 
development and the concern to question and test theory in practice. Research was 
self-critical enquiry, centred on curiosity and a desire to understand and require the 
researcher to become involved in the organisational context he/she is studying. The 
underlying theme was the hermeneutic approach to understanding organisational 
life. McAuley (1985 p.295) puts it thus “ ...to undertake the hermeneutic process 
requires an ability, in the research situation, to strip away the accretions of the self s 
form of life in exposing the self to the other. Thus it requires a high degree of 
development of self-knowledge, an ability to identify in the self and momentarily 
hold still personal judgements and cultural signposts.”
The hermeneutic tradition sees social inquiiy in a dialogical form, always 
incomplete and uncertain, responding to new questions and problems in the quest 
for subjective understanding. This process of continual critique and counter-critique 
makes us aware that in interpreting a text or social group we can only plea to 
interpretations that refer to other interpretations usually referred to as the 
“hermeneutic circle.” The understanding of a researcher, approaching a particular 
social issue will inevitably and unavoidably be conditioned by the social, historical, 
political, cultural tradition of which he/she is a part and by individual particularity -  
personal and intellectual history. And the way it functions is easy to understand. If 
all observations are necessarily impregnated with certain symbols and point of view, 
it might seems as though a researcher is in the grip of a theory in the sense in which 
an individual wearing coloured glasses is in the grip of the colour of those glasses. 
If the glasses are blue then everything will get a blue nuance. The world’s perceived 
colour does not depend on the world but on the individual’s glasses. In the same 
way, what a researcher says about the world seems to be determined by his/her
theoretical presuppositions. Thus in a hermeneutic approach, the researcher’s bias, 
existing pre-understandings and interpretative framework are necessary ingredient 
in evolving and understanding of the phenomenon under study. By being conscious 
of his/her “prejudice” then, the researcher can place his/herself outside it, analyse 
the subjective realities, the webs of meanings and common understanding of others.
Many philosophers, Berstein (1983) and Rorty (1979) among them take the 
hermeneutics insight to be the most effective weapon against epistemological 
objectivism. The hermeneutic circle takes the form of attempting an initial holistic 
understanding as a basis for interpreting the parts of the system. Knowledge is 
gained dialectically by proceeding from the whole to the parts and then back again. 
Each time an incongruence occurs between parts and whole, a re-conceptualisation 
takes place. The frequency of re-conceptualisation decreases as the match improves 
between the researcher’s conception of the social system and that held by its 
members. Ellen (1984 p. 30) notes “It is a methodology where the notion of success 
replaces truth as criterion of validity and where the participation of the researcher 
becomes the main means of verifying his account. If able to interact successfully 
with and towards subjects, i.e. if  able to pass for a member, the anthropologist’s 
understanding of their culture is right. And it is, of course, the group which defines 
the terms of acceptance and rejection of new members.” The hermeneutic tradition 
strengthens the researcher’s methodological position by forewarning his/her that 
his/her interpretation will never be exactly the same as participants. This tells us of 
the uncertain nature of our interpretations due to their inevitably provisional nature. 
There is then, no set of laws to ensure a correct interpretation but a reminder that we 
may as researchers change our minds or participants may find our conclusions 
absurd.
Sheffield Business School provided an exciting and challenging learning 
environment. The notion that during inquiiy the observer is not independent and 
distinct from the object being observed proved much more satisfying to me. 
Following the existential-phenomenology trend that knowledge is perspectival - 
what is called knowledge is relative to the perspectives of those making knowledge 
claims (Rorty 1998; Wittgenstein 1953) became for me both the evidence and the 
affirmation of my existence. As part of the OD programme I undertook a project in 
a Mental Health Centre. Individuals involved with the Centre were criticised both 
from within and without. It was felt that the Centre was not establishing the 
appropriate and effective treatments to meet the community’s needs. The formation 
of a hostile and suspicious cliques and factions resulted in tendency to personalise 
issues and scapegoat individuals as the cause of the problems. Centre employees in 
many respects turned inward, forever criticising their actions and reactions. There 
was a high staff turnover, a constant crisis orientation and a feeling of hostility and 
suspicion surrounding group interactions and a considerable amount of 
psychological labelling. My initial assessment from participants’ seemingly endless 
concern over what the goals of the Centre represented fundamentally different and 
incompatible views about the nature of what the organisation was about.
While undertaking the project the organisational client seemed to assume that I 
have the knowledge and skills in prescribing a course of action rather than to help 
the client system learn to better solve its own problems. Ability, expertise and 
effectiveness were assumed. But I have not been a professional with all the rights, 
responsibilities and obligations implicit by that status. In my first few days at the 
Centre, I felt completely out of touch with my inner voice and was in search of my 
professional identity. It was a time of great insecurity and confusion and suffered
from inexperience in coping with the challenges presented (Wax 1957). This pattern 
of reality shock enveloped me with feelings of guilt, embarrassment and inability to 
meet other’s expectations. I encountered the problem of what Hughes (1958) called 
“marginal man” having to play the role before one feels completely identified with 
it or competent to carry it out. Berg (1980) maintains that the apprenticeship period 
is the time, which provokes identity questions for the student as he/she learns to 
negotiate his or her role in the field. The questions “Who am I?” and “What am I 
doing here?” were ever present within me. According to Van Gannep (1965 p. 11) 
an apprentice who has not mastered fully the control of his power, or has developed 
the correct style is still in the state of “liminality” which is that a student finds 
him/herself in a limbo between the state of ordinary man and sorcerer yet properly 
neither. My situation exemplified the comments of Bailey’s (1977 p. 184) that 
“People or objects which will not fit into a known category are likely to be regarded 
with fear, with contempt or even with loathing”.
Finding myself placed in new and uncertain conditions, I underwent a period 
of concern about what my role is to be within the context of the situation. This role 
ambiguity was compounded by information overload creating even deeper internal 
chaos. This situational uncertainty was mirrored by emotional insecurity. The 
identity confusion coupled with the dilemmas of performance anxiety increased the 
stress. Expectations about my performance were perceived as being artificially high 
and of colossal significance. As a result, each incident relating to my performance 
became greatly magnified in retrospect, assuming a level of importance of the most 
critical proportions. As the project progressed, the issues that surface shifted from 
concerns about my performance to concerns about the viability of the field of OD 
and my anger with the client organisation. According to Berg (1980) questions,
concerning the field in which one is involved is a common theme for many 
apprentices learning their craft. My disillusionment lies in the fact that the 
romanticism, which comes from learning on the course, provided me with 
unrealistic standards, which were dashed. My high standards and expectations were 
brought in sharp focus with the reality of the experience itself. I expressed concerns 
about the adequacy of theory to explain organisational life and wondered whether 
OD as field has began to capture the essence of what goes on in organisations. My 
personal fears of professional incompetence and lack of faith in what I had to 
contribute were mirrored by similar concerns about participants in the project. I felt 
they were incapable of applying the techniques that OD had to offer. The shift from 
and anxiety to frustration about my performance, resentment and anger of 
participants were due to my naive and idealistic expectations. What I learned on the 
OD course did not prepare me for the dilemmas that arose in the field.
Feedback from my supervisor about my concerns enabled me to realise that 
OD techniques have much in common with psychiatric nursing (psychodynamic 
therapies). The OD practitioner or psychiatric nurse is a co-learner who helps by 
facilitating the client’s learning rather than by dictating changes through the 
collection of data, testing hypotheses and developing solutions. The long-term 
collaborative relationship needed to explore sensitive issues, in both fields, are 
likely to be emotionally intense. The similarities between research relationships and 
psychotherapeutic relationships suggest that transference and counter-transference 
are likely to occur in both situations. The former refers to displacement of emotions 
from earlier situations, usually childhood experiences with the parents to the 
therapist. For example, superior-subordinate relationships, which entail the 
subordinate’s dependence on an authority figure, often trigger unresolved feelings
about one’s parents. During my project I had the feeling on a number occasions in 
which members of the organisation’s anger and fear of senior managers were 
displaced onto me who represented an easier and more understanding target. The 
latter is the mirror image of the former. The therapist may respond on the basis of 
his/her own unresolved emotional conflicts to the client’s feelings o f helplessness, 
rage or fear. For example, I was critical about the ability of members of the 
organisation’s ability to apply OD techniques, in order to defend against 
unconscious feelings aroused by my relationship with them.
This observation exemplifies the awareness of the researcher as a variable in 
the research process. As a researcher becomes immersed in the field, he/she 
develops different kinds of relationships with research subjects. The close bonds 
that emerge in the relationship between the researcher and the informant are 
particularly favourable to the mobilisation of transference. Dervereux (1967 p.xix) 
observes that the data of behavioural science are derived not only from “the 
behaviour of the subject,” but also from “the behaviour o f the observer,” including 
“his attribution of a meaning to his observations.” He suggests that the observer’s 
reactions to his/her subjects may arouse anxieties that can distort the data being 
elicited and interpreted. When the observer is aware of these anxieties, rather than 
taking a refuge in “pseudo-objective” methodology, the research-subject relations, 
the role the researcher plays in the field and the effect on data gathering would be 
recognised. The acknowledgement of affective dimensions of the researcher-subject 
relationship (Hunt 1989; Rabinow 1977; Reinharz 1984) regards the assumption of 
a dichotomy between researcher and subjects as problematic and recognises that the 
research process is far less orderly. Proceedings in the field are frequently
unexpected, irrational and spontaneous. Researchers as well as subjects act on basis 
of situated feelings and moods (Adler & Alder 1987; Van Maanen 1988).
If we translate the stages of the research field experience to the process that 
occurs for the newly emerging OD practitioner on his or her first assignment, 
several parallels surface in psychiatric nursing, OD and ethnography. All the 
disciplines are based on humanitarian democratic philosophy regarding human 
nature and the helping relationship and believe in the inherent value and dignity of 
the individual right to personal development. Both disciplines jointly value the right 
of individuals to purposeful expressions o f feelings, to unconditional acceptance 
from others, to genuine emphatic, non-judgemental response by the practitioner, and 
to a guaranteed confidentiality in the practitioner-client relationship (Beer 1980; 
Cummings & Worley 1997; French & Bell 1999; Ornery et al 1995; Reed & Ground 
1997; Rogers 1980; Spradley & McCurdy 1972). In all the disciplines, use of 
oneself as a tool is basic: where understanding the informant and client’s 
interpretation of the world is the defining characteristics. To perform effectively, 
professionals in all disciplines must demonstrate personal awareness and self- 
understanding vis-a-vis their relationships with their clients. They must have the 
sensitivity and empathy necessary to take the position of the other (Geertz 1975). 
Through an interpretive mode of inquiry, practitioners seek to decipher what events 
mean to the client and significant others. By drawing the parallels in at three 
disciplines some key issues are identified. Namely that they all have theoretical 
interest in human interpretational process and concerned with the study of socially 
situated human action. In addition they all use human investigators as the primary 
research instruments and all involve the application of reflexive analysis.
The OD programme required deep self-disclosure and emotional vulnerability 
and gave me a sense of meaning, by providing an opportunity to disclose my “true” 
feelings and the permission to reflect on those feelings and how they were affecting 
my decisions. The programme requires the OD practitioner look briefly inward and 
become aware of his/her feelings as they relate to his/her experience of organisation. 
In doing this, the practitioner recognises the emotional impact on him/herself and 
can began to question the emotional impact on others. Schutz (1994) proposes that 
being in touch with one’s feelings is important to effective problem solving and 
decision -making. Related to this is the importance of reflection -  the feeding back 
of feelings by the practitioner to the client in order for the client to be aware o f the 
practitioner’s feelings, thus creating a climate of recognition and validation. This is 
similar to the therapeutic process termed “focusing” where the therapist encourages 
a client to perceive and experience the feeling and then asks questions that allow the 
client to form images from the feeling (Gendin 1969). Going back and forth 
between experience and images helps the client create meaning related to the 
feeling. Through this path, I learned to value qualitative research methods, which 
very much fit who I am and how I relate to others. Being with people, spending long 
periods of hearing others’ stories, immersing myself in the richness of a situation 
was the kind of research that made sense to me and wanted to do.
My search for meaning in practice revealed that in many ways psychodynamic 
and psychotherapeutic perspectives have been represented in the organisational 
literature. For example, approaches to planned organisational changes were 
influenced by clinical research and practice. The group dynamics approach was 
influence by psychoanalytic thinking as well as the work such clinicians as Carl 
Rogers, Fritz Pearls and Eric Berne (Benne 1976). The socio-technical systems
perspective was influenced in part by the work of W Bion on group dynamics and 
Melanie Klein on object relations. Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) based their 
descriptions of neurotic organisational cultures on psychotherapeutic literature. 
Zaleznick and Kets de Vries (1975) have borrowed from the psychoanalytic 
literature in investigating the exercise of organisational power. Clinical perspective 
has paid attention from the different stages by which individual change takes place, 
by drawing parallels between individual and organisational change processes (Kets 
de Vries 1991, 1996; Levinson 1972; Zaleznik 1989). Thus organisational 
behaviour and research methodology took on deeper and more complex dimension 
for me in paying attention to sociological and psychoanalytical phenomena. 
Experience taught me that change interventions based on oversimplified models of 
human behaviour usually failed because they do not pay attention to deep-seated 
underlying processes. Taking account, for example, of the rich underlying of 
individual change by accepting that conscious and unconscious resistances are 
unavoidable responses can turn the change process into a more realistic venture 
(Kets de Vries & Balazs 1999). I am therefore attracted by values that call for the 
interpretations about an individual’s or group of individuals’ inner dynamics in the 
light of structures and processes within subsystems, organisations and their 
environments and vice versa (Menzies 1975; Trist & Murray 1993).
Social Science as a Transformative Process
I recognise that in doing social science within organisations, my experience 
has shaped the nature of my work in several ways. First, critical life events (social 
background, political orientation and professional socialisation) have determined 
which issues interest me. My concern with social justice has shaped much of my 
work. This concern was laid by my parents’ emphasis on the values of fairness and
equality of opportunity. My professional socialisation has had considerable impact 
on the social science theories I have adopted. My introduction to action research 
(Agyris et al 1985) which recognises the importance of the subjective nature of 
one’s observations and one’s participation in the research experience fitted with my 
democratic orientation developed in early life. Action research offers me 
opportunities for theory building, chances to make a practical difference with 
respect to problems and a potential for a creative exchanges between the worlds of 
research and action. This evolution in my perspective has been driven by my 
concern with practice outcomes and need to understand multiple levels and multiple 
aspects of social problems to solve them successfully. I am interested in both 
interpersonal, group dynamics and inter-group and organisational issues in a way 
that integrates psychodynamic and organisation theory (Neumann & Hirschhom 
1999). The former provides social scientific depth by reminding us of sources of 
energy and motivational forces experienced within individuals, small groups and 
leaders and the linkages between them and the latter offers scientific breath by 
bringing into focus the structures and processes within organisations, their 
environments and the linkages among them. Such a stance enhances the 
hermeneutic methodologies by its view that fieldwork is an inter-subjective process; 
which in turn adds an additional dimension to the sociological understanding of 
fieldwork thus providing richness and depth (Hunt 1989).
Second, my experience has influenced my choice of theoretical perspectives. I 
have been strongly attracted by the phenomenological view of reality, which 
highlights that we understand social reality only through subjective interpretation 
(Schutz 1967). The work Berger and Luckmann (1967) and of others on the social 
construction of reality has also greatly influenced me. This orientation is
underpinned by a set of values that include a commitment to self-scrutiny as part of 
the research process and a dialogue between theory and method during the research 
process (Berg & Smith 1985). It is simply impossible for the researcher to 
understand the “subject” unless he/she enters into a dialogue with the “subject” 
aimed at mutual understanding. In a sense, this is the locating of the researcher on 
the same critical plane as the researched. Based on an epistemology that considers 
all knowledge to be socially constructed, it begins with the acknowledgement that 
the identity of the researcher matters. The researcher is unavoidably present in the 
research process, and his/her work is shaped by his/her social location and personal 
experiences. According to Stanley and Wise (1983 p. 162) “Because the basis of all 
research is a relationship, this necessarily involves the presence of the researcher as 
a person. Personhood cannot be left behind, cannot be left out of the research 
process. And so we insist it must be capitalised upon, it must be made full use of.” 
To this end researchers are encouraged to explore their intellectual autobiographies 
and the role of emotions and feelings in the research process (Reinharz 1997; 
Stanley 1984). I am attracted by the guidelines set for clinical research described by 
Berg and Smith (1985 p.25):
• direct involvement with people in social systems
• researcher commitment to a process of self-scrutiny
• willingness to change theory or method during the research, in response to the 
research experience
• description of the system favouring depth over breath
• participation of system members in the research.
Third, concerns the specific questions I select to study. My inner world 
structured my choice of setting, experience the stages of the fieldwork and the
research roles I assumed. The reactions I encountered from research subjects have 
implications for the questions I asked, the feedback they got, and the materials I 
observed. My motivation for the research arose from aspects of my training and 
education as a psychiatric nurse, educator and a researcher, and from issues 
encountered during practice in a number of differing organisations. My move from 
the position of ‘actor’ to ‘investigator’ was the result of unease at the context and 
boundaries of the role of a psychiatric nurse within a complex organisation in 
contemporary society. My interest in developing the research was the ways in which 
managerial discourses impact on what nurses can do and say in their clinical 
practice. These discourses produce new questions for me to grapple with, as I work 
with nurses in the professional development contexts and do research in psychiatric 
settings. How does the new urgency and anxiety about safety, as a matter for 
government concern, intersect with professional nursing discourses about care? 
What effects do the implementation of risk management initiatives have on 
professionals? I was interested in these questions not only as a researcher, but also 
because as a nurse and as a writer of educational materials for nurses, I was 
concerned about the effects of my own discursive practices and in particular how 
such practices in particular how such professional knowledge effects impact on 
patients from contemporary nursing practices. I was curious to see if other nurses 
had similar experiences and was keen to examine the numerous political, social, 
legal, health, and nursing practice issues surrounding risk management. It seemed a 
natural progression is to undertake a PhD.
Fourth, I recognise that my experience also influences the way I interpret my 
finding. The development of a research interest is a personal experience and the 
description of a focus of concern, is affected by both the practical and theoretical
aspects of one’s research. The researcher’s relationship to the phenomenon under 
study is neither static nor given and continues throughout the research process. In 
the course o f interpreting data, the transcripts of the participants in the study may be 
said to set a range of possible interpretations to which the researcher brings 
collection of intentions and meanings. As a result there will be conflict between the 
meaning structures brought to the research process by the researcher and the 
meaning structures that exist as part of the common sense world that they are 
seeking to understand when researchers develop theories. In a hermeneutic or 
interpretative approach then researchers observe and interpret the experiences of 
participants who are themselves interpreting the worlds they experience -  double 
hermeneutic. This tension is described as “first- and second-order constructs that we 
encounter the irreducible dilemma of reconciling two spheres of meanings. When 
we focus on this nexus, we can gain insight into the way that persons generate 
theory. As part of this, the inevitable question arises about “Whose theory is it? 
(Schutz 1971 p.6). In the course of interpreting the data for the present study, I 
would have to bring my own thoughts and experience to bear on the data and to use 
inference to arrive at an understanding of the experiences of participants.
I conceptualise the research process as self-engagement and change for the 
researcher as well as for the subjects (Morgan 1983), in which any theoretical 
account involves “understanding the other through self-reflection” (Kleinman & 
Copp 1993 p.55), thus accounting for the self as thinking, imposing, reflecting and 
participating member of the social reality being presented. Such an observation is an 
acknowledgement of the importance the “self’ plays in the research process, namely 
that the individual characteristics -  personal history, biography, gender, social class 
and ethnicity - of the researcher shapes the way theoretical meaning is imposed on
everyday experience (Denzin & Lincoln 1994). The researcher cannot detach 
him/herself from his/her own participation in this experiential world: social science 
entails studying value-laden phenomena of which the researcher is a part. The way 
we conceptualise and write about issues do not simply mirror external reality, 
existing independent of our conceptions and writings about it. In everyday life, as in 
social research, people use culturally dominant meanings as a point of departure as 
well as the resources for thinking, getting data and writing. From this stance, theory 
is a way of seeing and thinking about the world rather than an abstract 
representation of it. Theory then is seen as the “lens” a researcher uses in 
observation than a “mirror” of nature. The “lens” metaphor helps us to think 
productively about theory choice. The researcher is able to carry out his/her research 
only in the context of his/her interests, world-view, preconceptions and values. In a 
word, all observations are theory-driven, with every theory carrying the values of 
the researcher.
In addition, it is accepted that values are omnipresent in inquiry. In the 
decisions, of what to study and how to study it, in the paradigms used, in the belief 
systems of those participating in the research, and in the theory which frames the 
work. Here, the trick is for researchers to acknowledge values openly and make sure 
that their research problems, paradigms, methods and context are value-resonant 
(Guba & Lincoln 1982). Values and thus various ideals and criteria of how social 
life should be formed, must guide research. Social science involves studying value­
laden phenomena of which the researcher is part. The way we conceptualise and 
write about issues such as risk management do not simply mirror external reality 
existing independent of our conceptions and writing about it. This means that value- 
free interpretive research is impossible. This is the case because every researcher
brings preconceptions and interpretations to the problem being studied (Gadamer 
1975). Hermeneutical circle, a concept noted above, refers to this basic fact of 
research, that all researchers are caught in the circle of interpretation. The 
researcher is not separated from his/her prejudgements and/or prejudices. There is 
no difference between understanding and interpretation as all understanding 
involves interpretation and all interpretation involves understanding; thus 
understanding will vary in relation to a person’s self-understanding and the different 
questions that are asked (Bernstein 1983; Gadamer 1972).
In this chapter, we have seen that the personal biography of the researcher and 
the roles he/she takes influence the research in two ways, the sense the researcher 
makes of the setting and how participants make sense of the researcher. As a 
researcher observes or interviews, he/she reacts to the participant’s words and 
actions these reactions prompt judgments, feelings, working hypotheses, 
understandings of the setting and participants. According to Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1983 p. 15) “There is no way in which we can escape the social world in 
order to study it” Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000 p.39) observe that “There is no 
one-way street between the researcher and the object of study; rather, the two affect 
each other mutually and continually in the course of the research process.” This 
relationship and the researcher’s reflections on it, a phenomenon termed reflexivity, 
is central to this piece of work. The next chapter details how the project was 
designed.
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGCAL APPROACH
Methods are mere instruments designed to identify and analyse the obdurate 
character o f the empirical world, and as such, their value exists only in their 
suitability in enabling this task to be done. [The choices made] in each part o f  the 
act o f  scientific inquiry should and must be assessed in terms o f whether they 
respect the nature and empirical world under study. (Blumer 1969p.27-58)
As we observed in the previous chapter social researcher’s choice of methods 
is related not only to the type of problem studied but also to his/her overall approach 
to social science research. All social research takes place from a set of ontological 
and epistemological assumptions that provide taken-for granted understandings of 
the nature of the world and preferred methods for discovering what is worth 
knowing. The philosophical commitments guiding the project, is centred on 
interpretivism that holds subjectivist assumptions about the world. Here, 
interpretation “implies that there are no self-evident, simple or unambiguous rules 
or procedures, and that crucial ingredients are the researcher’s judgement, intuition, 
ability to ‘see and point something out,’ as well as the consideration of a more or 
less explicit dialogue -  with the research subject, with aspects of the research 
herself that are not entrenched behind a research position, and with the reader 
(Maranhao 1991 quoted in Alvesson & Skoldberg 2000 p.248). This viewpoint 
presupposes the researcher’s reflection as a essential component of his/her role. In 
terms of reflexivity this is an interactive and cyclical phenomenon rather than a 
linear one. The researcher is open to the interaction of what is considered fact and 
opinion. So the researcher both asks what sense he/she makes of what is going on 
(etic perspective) and the sense participants make about what they are doing (emic 
perspective). While the researcher cannot actually get into participants’ mind,
he/she can search for evidence of their worldviews. Superimposed on these ongoing 
processes is the set of questions about what I am doing, my actions and how I 
perceived them.
Objectivists see reflexivity as something that can be controlled -  that is 
the quest for objectivity by the researcher. The researcher from this angle is 
supposed to eliminate all bias and to remain disinterested. Acknowledging that 
reflexivity is present in social interactions, I argue that objectivity is elusive. I share 
Delamont (1992 p.8) recommendation that that qualitative researcher to be 
“constantly self-conscious about ...role, interactions, and theoretical and empirical 
material as it accumulates. As long as qualitative researchers are reflexive, making 
all their purposes explicit, then issues of reliability and validity are served.” I do not 
therefore find the quantitative/qualitative distinction useful (Alvesson & Deetz 
2000; Silverman 2000), but am rather attracted to Hammersley (1992 p. 163) 
assertion that “We are not faced, then, with a stark choice between words and
numbers, or even between precise and imprecise data; ....... Furthermore, our
decisions about what level of precision is appropriate in relation to any particular 
claim should depend on the nature of what we are trying to describe, on the likely 
accuracy of our descriptions, on our purposes, and on the resources available to us; 
not on ideological commitment to one methodological paradigm or another.”
Introduction of risk management strategy implies the creation of meanings 
about patient care, organisational arrangements and interaction processes. These 
new meanings are being negotiated and agreed upon among actors in a continuous 
course of events. In a sense the application of risk management strategy is produced 
out of everyday interpretations and negotiations for local organisational actors 
(Strauss et al 1963). From these insights, it is useful to look at how risk management
is constituted in the local workplace situations instead of being considered as a pre­
specified set of actions. This means that risk management is likely to be enacted in 
very different ways in different work context. In taking this stance, the suggestion is 
that risk management application emerges out of a complex interplay between 
individual and collective action and interpretation on the wards. There are different 
discourses between for example, care of the elderly, acute care, forensic care and so 
on. Here discourse refers to the use of language that places actors own positions and 
relationships within it (Fairclough 1995; Foucault 1972). The approach taken here 
sees knowledge or knowing as a process going on among people. By interacting, 
people make meaning for each other and the relationship is the carrier of meaning in 
the making (Austin 1962). Thus language is no longer considered as a practice 
mirroring reality; language is regarded as a practice of making meaning in ongoing 
relationships (Gergen 1994). Risk management is therefore best understood as local 
social production involving the discursive participation of different organisation 
members. My interest is to understand this process by looking at both the kinds of 
action that are discursively constituted as risk management, and ways in which this 
constitution takes place.
The discursive focus is theoretically compatible with a symbolic interactionist 
position; which provide a general theoretical backdrop of this study (Blummerl969; 
Fine 1996; Prassad 1993). Symbolic interaction is primarily concerned with the 
study of meaning with the belief that objects and events have no intrinsic meaning 
separate from the meanings people assign to them in the course of everyday social 
interaction. As a framework it offers both a way of conceptualising the social world 
and methodology for conducting research. Emerging elements of symbolic 
intearctionism is the growing interest in language as a primary shaper of meaning
itself (Cossette 1999; Fine 1992). Following this trend language can only be 
understood in the context of interactive situation in which it is produced. 
Accordingly, language is the carrier of ongoing co-ordination in which meaning 
emerges during interaction and always evolving. Making meaning is a very dynamic 
and open process, thus language in organisations must be analysed on the basis of 
the experience of the actors in the interactive situation. Cossette notes that (1999 
p. 1363 author’s emphasis), “from the symbolic interactionist stance, the object of 
interest is not really the word or phrase, nor even the subject, but the interactive 
situation as it is constructed subjectively by the actors concerned. ”
Symbolic interaction is a particularly appropriate way to gain understanding of 
the kinds of actions that are discursively constituted as assessment and management 
of risk, and the ways in which this constitution takes place. Adopting a symbolic 
view of risk management may accomplish several ends. It may help researchers 
enter the cognitive worlds of organisational participants,’ help explain what risk 
management represents to people and how those representations can influence their 
interactions. The interactionist approach, go beyond explaining risk management in 
solely rational and economic terms and help reveal the expressive world of 
organisation members (Sims & Gioia 1986). It also rests on the assumption that 
every organisational situation may be enveloped in multiple and often conflicting 
interpretations and meanings. The perspective therefore emphases the need to 
present a many-sided picture of organisational life and encourages the use of more 
than one research method to capture complexity and problematical data. In addition, 
symbolic interaction reminds us that the relationship between meaning and action is 
dialectical and dynamic. Symbols from this view, are not static artefacts but are 
constantly produced and reproduced through meaningful social interaction. The key
to the symbolic interactionist position is the concept of “enactment” the process 
whereby symbolism in organisations shapes and influences everyday organisational 
practices. In studying the discourse of risk management, my interest is in how the 
symbolism of the concept influences the process of implementation and related 
areas of organisation-level action. In sum, symbolic interaction presents a 
methodological framework for understanding the symbolic process involved in risk 
management technology and offers an angle from which the researcher can look for 
various local meanings and to understand how those meanings become crystallised 
and influence action.
Contemporary strands of symbolic interaction have shown a growing interest 
in the affective dimension of the researcher namely that researchers experience 
emotional reactions such as feelings of insecurity, anxiety, loneliness, frustrations 
and confusions during fieldwork (Hunt 1989). Such an observation shares the 
psychoanalytic viewpoint of the interpretative nature, the intra-physic dimensions 
and inter-subjectivity of the fieldwork process. The researcher in attempting to 
decipher what is happening in the world needs to interpret the way that stories 
unfold, to find out hidden meanings, consequences and motives behind acts and 
social behaviour in order to assemble them into a coherent whole. In his concept of 
“thick description” Geertz (1973) encourages us to search for deep underlying 
structures while remaining firmly in touch with reality. Such an interpretive 
approach according to Geertz’s (1973 p.20) involves “guessing at meanings, 
assessing the guesses and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses”. 
As suggested by scholars like Geertz (1973; 1983), Levi Strauss (1969), and 
proponents of hermeneutic, such an approach suggests that much surface 
complexity can be explained by an underlying organising theme that serves to
organise the surface phenomena. There is also a need to search for elements that 
have not only logical centrality, but also deep, perhaps unconscious, emotional 
significance (Freud 1920; Greenson 1967). In using psychoanalytical perspective, 
Gabriel (1999 p. 251-252) suggests that the “researcher looks for clues. The odd, 
out of place, the significant exception provide far more insight than large volumes
of uniform and unidirectional data researchers must be aware of instant
conclusions. They must be especially suspicious of ‘innocent’, straightforward 
explanations, of undisturbed terrains, of dogs that do not bark. At times, an off-the- 
cuff remark at the end of a long interview may be of greater value...” There must 
therefore be a focus on discovery rather than a single stab at explanation. Initial 
interpretation must be tested against reality as perceived by others. Here, 
interpretation is a dynamic iterative and interactive phenomenon that may bring 
insights but rarely provides any final solution.
The researcher must focus on a specific group or question that is manageable. 
Given the time resources and desired output of the study, the area selected usually 
reflects the interest and expertise of the researcher. The project required an 
approach, which focused on the processes involved in assessing and managing risk. 
It was important to consider the use and development of risk management strategies, 
not only in context of managerial support for them, but more important, in the 
context of individual units within which they were developed. To provide the 
required level of detail and look at risk assessment and its management holistically 
within the organisation, a case-study approach was adopted, which enabled me to 
spend time on units, working with nurses and patients, observing and where 
possible, participating in activities relating to the process of risk assessment and risk 
management. In this study the question of how sites should be identified and on
what criteria they should be selected narrowed from looking at a range of hospitals 
to one organisation, a psychiatric hospital in the NHS where four units were 
selected. The criteria for the selection were based on the degree to which the units 
have been exposed to, and developed risk management strategies prior to the start of 
the project. In order to provide a comparative vantage point from which I could 
assess the generality of my observations, I conducted one year of research in an Old 
People’s Home in the independent sector. The selection of more than one setting 
was designed to enable me to distinguish aspects of risk management activities 
which are unique to each unit from those which are common to both (Eisenhardt 
1999).
Criteria of Selection
The project required an approach that focused on the processes involved in 
assessing and managing risk. To this end, it was important to view the use and 
development of risk management techniques, not only in the general support for 
them but more important, in the context of the individual units, within which they 
are being developed. In order to provide the required level of detail and to look at 
risk assessment and management technologies holistically within a unit, a case 
study approach was adopted, which enabled me to spend time on each unit, working 
with nurses, patients, observing and where possible, participating in activities 
relating to risk assessment and risk management processes. The problem of 
selection had two related aspects. First, there was the question of how to identify the 
sites and second, on what criteria should they be selected. I decided to choose my 
research sites from the health and independent sectors, both because of the degree to 
which they have been exposed to, or had developed risk assessment and 
management technologies. In addition, the organisations in these two sectors, as
illustrated in the four units ultimately examined, often manifest important 
differences in organisational structures, cultures, and management practices. For 
example, an argument has been advanced that suggest there is basic difference 
between public and private sector with regard to risk taking (Bozeman & Kingsley 
1998). This variation may permit the development of assumptions regarding the 
effects of organisational forms and belief systems on nurses’ judgements on risk 
decision-making.
Two conditions governed the selection of the sectors to be investigated to 
enhance the possibility that generalisations about the nature of sector-based cultural 
assumptions and comparisons and contrasts of sector-specific findings could be 
made at the study conclusion. Of primary importance were that the sectors exhibit 
some degree of between-sector heterogeneity by seeking organisations from 
contrasting environments in this case the public sector/independent sector. This 
would ensure that comparisons, contrasts and generalisations might be made from 
and sector-specific findings that did emerge. In addition the sectors display a strong 
degree of within-sector homogeneity namely high rate of interaction with regulatory 
agencies, high degree of uncertainty and social ambiguity and high degree of 
professionalisation. This would increase the likelihood that commonalities in 
organisational culture might be more observable. Other criteria were accessibility 
plus the fact that the sites were interesting to me, a criterion necessary to sustain the 
long-term intensive investigation required.
Following Pettigrew’s (1988) caution of “death by data asphyxiation” I 
adopted within-case analysis, which involves detailed case study write-ups for each 
site; which were central to generation of insight (Gersick 1988; Pettigrew 1988). 
This helped me cope early in the analysis process with enormous volume of data. I
became intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity and allowed the 
unique patterns of each case to emerge before I moved to generalise patterns across 
cases. To minimise the danger of premature and false conclusions as a result of 
information processing biases, within-case analysis was coupled with cross-case 
search for patterns (Nisbett & Ross 1980). I selected categories/dimensions and then 
look for within-group similarities coupled with inter-group differences. This 
approach compelled me to look for the subtle similarities and differences between 
cases. In the words of Eisenhardt (1999 p.541): “The juxtaposition of seemingly 
similar cases by a researcher looking for differences can break simplistic frames. In 
the same way, the search for similarity in a seemingly different pair also can lead to 
more sophisticated understanding. The result of these forced comparisons can be 
new categories and concepts which the investigators did not anticipate.” This 
enabled me to go beyond initial impressions, through the use of structured and 
diverse lenses on the data; and improved the likelihood of accurate and reliable 
theory. Additionally cross-case searching methods enhance the probability that I 
will capture the novel findings, which may exist in the data.
Gaining Entry
My efforts at researching and team development programmes in a variety of 
healthcare organisations have demonstrated that getting in has been difficult. 
Research is seen as an extra burden with reservations about ability to incorporate the 
researcher’s presence in an already busy environment. Access has been difficult 
because of nurses’ prior unpleasant experience with researchers. Although, the need 
for research was seen as important by many professionals in the health systems with 
which I have worked, difficulty in gaining entry seemed to revolve around the 
particular task that health systems perform, and their internal resources. Let us take
this in turn. First, within a healthcare organisation there is a set of forces directly 
connected to the characteristics of its primary task that acts as a potential barrier to 
the successful initiation of a research effort. The task (the delivery of healthcare) is 
inherently vague and ambiguous, making it difficult to set meaningful and 
measurable goals. In view of such uncertainty, a healthcare organisation often 
demands tangible proof that research will be useful. Second, are the attitudes of 
those who work in healthcare organisations, the attitudes and values of professionals 
dominate and often pose problems for the researcher. One such attitude follows 
from a principle “first do no harm” thus any act, which implies “judgement” on their 
standards is frowned upon.
I have learned to anticipate that there are several entry dilemmas in the entry 
stage that demand generating support within an organisation and obtaining 
individuals (daily gatekeepers) agreements to participate. Due to the complexity of 
the system, my entry was forced upon participants without regard to their views. 
The research was approved by senior management who were often viewed by 
“front-line” staff as out of touch with reality on the units. Following the 
organisation development tradition (Alderfer 1980; Beer 1980), I developed a 
number of liaison relationships with groups early on in the fieldwork in all sites. In 
my initial presentations to the groups I sketched out my research objectives and the 
primary issue areas I would cover. There was a lively exchange of views about the 
research proposals and anxiety was expressed about my being present in the sites for 
such a long time. Fear was also expressed that I might take on an evaluator’s role. 
The fate of data collected and confidentially and anonymity were of concern. By 
virtue of the research contracts, I had the right, - although limited - to enter and 
move about each unit and to talk to participants. Different sites established different
rules and protocols regarding mobility of access. In some units I was able to enter 
and move about virtually at will, to contact participants, to set up interviews 
appointments and participate in activities. In other sites mobility were greatly 
restricted. Some days I did not get in at all due to activities on some of the units. 
Some of the sites were dominated by concerns for security. Patients must be 
prevented from escaping or breaking the units’ rules and patients and staff must be 
protected from harm. Visitors and other outsiders on two sites were carefully 
screened before being allowed to enter. The ability to engage in observation and to 
undertake interviews was affected by these concerns. I became anxious o f getting in 
the way as an observer because of the concerns expressed. This obstacle reduced as 
time progressed and my presence on the sites became more commonplace. A further 
concern is related to participant’s perceptions of my role as an evaluator. I needed to 
spend considerable time reassuring participants that I was not there to judge their 
standards of practice. Again this obstacle did reduce with time.
The study of healthcare settings needs establishment of an appropriate balance 
between social science and research paradigms in addition to building and managing 
relations with research participants. Gaining access is one thing but maintaining it 
requires continual attention. It is easy to lose sight of the particular design decisions 
when one is immersed in the field; for example changes views about how much 
organisational time one is tying up, changes in perceived value of the research 
means that access has to be worked for. The challenge concerning entry is the 
establishment of a negotiating relationship that is sensitive to the feelings, 
worldviews and the interests of participants and ethical given the fluidity of the 
research process.
Research Methods
The research methods were intended to capture the rich array of subjective 
experiences of organisation members during a process of risk management 
interventions. Following the growing acceptance of using multiple methods in 
organisational research (Alvesson & Deetz 2000; Alderfer & Brown 1975; Martin 
1984), I use a triangulation of research methods - participation observation, 
unstructured interviews (informal conversation), unstructured observation (hanging 
out), semi-structured interviews and collection of relevant documentation 
(information brochures, policy and procedure document, memos, information 
booklets, and print based media). A development model of relationships was used to 
increase the validity of the data (Alderfer 1980) at all four sites. Data collection 
began with less-structured and less-structured methods and then moved toward 
more structured techniques as organisation members grew to trust me. There was 
enough structure to insure that data would be comparable across the three sites that 
is open to rigorous analysis, and at the same time, enough flexibility to cater for the 
special situation presented by each site.
Participant Observation. Participant observation which lay emphasis on 
the importance of human meanings, interpretations and interactions (Jorgensen 
1989), provided insight into the everyday realities in the study. In the words of 
Cunningham (1993 p. 132), “participant observation allows the observer to take 
on, to some extent, the role of a member of the group and participate in its 
functioning. The observer is asked to experience the problem practically and 
personally. This is an opportunity to see the conflicts and miscommunication 
which might never have been recognised by asking questions in an interview.” 
In this study, I used the approach in which the researcher maintains an identity
close to the group being observed but separate from it. Here participation 
involves sharing assumptions, expectations, and emotions of the groups being 
studied (Ashworth 1995; Gabriel 1999). Indeed, in rejecting the duality of 
participation and observation Adler and Adler (1987 p.35) advise us to think of 
the researcher’s involvements in terms of “committed membership” so that 
“researchers participate in the core activities in much the same way as members, 
yet hold back from committing themselves to the goals and values of members.” 
The conception of research roles often developed into typologies, for example, 
Gold’s (1958) topology of the four roles complete participant, participant-as- 
observer, observer-as-participant, and complete observer suggests the idea of a 
research role. However, I had many roles depending on the situation; there was a 
constant interplay between observer and participant because of the combination 
o f the roles of field researcher, psychiatric nurse and as an “insider.” For 
example, my clinical experience as a psychiatric nurse meant that on occasions, 
patients approached me for support and I helped staff in certain emerging 
situations which exemplifies how as a researcher, with no intention o f affecting 
patient-nurse intervention I did so. My obligations then, in those situations, were 
not those of a researcher with control on how my presence affected the 
interactions, but rather my responsibilities were clinical ones with the outcome 
of a therapeutic situation.
Thus my role varied over time. Initially I might be “complete” observer 
(Silverman 1993) not verbally engaging in for instance, team meetings. 
However it was not possible for me to maintain this stance because the members 
wanted me to participant more actively. I changed my behaviour slightly 
engaging with comments when asked. The study offered the researcher’s partial
enmeshment within the sites studied. The distance provided by the partial 
involvement contributed to balancing the postures of the observer and observed. 
I made systematic records of several matters on the sites over a period of time. 
Throughout the study, I made extensive notes from each meeting of what and 
how things were said and verbal reports at the change of shifts. My research 
activities in the four settings proceeded along similar lines. I observed and took 
part in clinical events at different times of the day and night. Clinical events 
included occurrences of unexpected systems state with negative and positive 
consequences. As soon as possible after an event has occurred, I noted what 
happened and why it happened. I spent time on units with nurses, doctors, and 
social workers when doing their work, and attended case conferences, unit 
rounds, and multidisciplinary team meetings. Participant observation provided 
data concerning a range of formal and informal activities that constituted risk 
decision-making process. Under optimal circumstances it was possible to follow 
a particular risk management decisions as they were discussed. This gave me 
opportunity to listen to talk about patients and the practical solutions suggested. 
I took notes during such meetings and wrote those notes into fuller account later 
on the same day.
Unstructured techniques. The early time in the field, the discovery phase, can 
be regarded as collection of stories about major relationships, key events and 
organisational complaints. Scholars including Bruner (1990) and Tenkasi & Boland 
(1993) suggest that stories are a fundamental way through which we understand the 
world. By understanding the stories of organisations we can claim partial 
understanding of the reasoning behind the visible behaviour of organisations (Boje 
1995; Gephart 1991). This provides a valuable viewpoint to the study of
organisations in offering us ways of developing meaning from what is said or left 
unsaid, adding to our understanding of organisational behaviour. However, since 
members in organisations can tell different stories on the same story, including 
statements about past, present, or future events (Boje 1991), multiple interpretations 
are inevitable. In this study, a story is described as explanations offered by 
respondents to explain organisation behaviours, processes, or relationships; which 
are not necessarily consistent across, up, or down hierarchical levels because any 
given organisational behaviour can have more than one explanation. Stories reflect 
individual sense making (Weick 1995), and similar stories may coexist or compete 
for domination (Boje 1991).
Unstructured techniques involved listening and comparing different 
accounts; that is investigating how narratives are constructed around specific events 
and examining their importance. This included such things as sitting at lunch 
listening to various conversations, talking informally with members on specific 
problems, listening to complaints about various things and people, sitting around the 
sites observing interaction among staff and patients. I was able to gain glimpses and 
insights that were not often repeated in the course of routine interaction (e.g. 
collegial criticism). The collections of “off the cuff” remarks and observation 
involved a degree of “betrayal.” As Loland notes (1971 p. 108) “it happens that 
participants everywhere do and say things they would prefer to forget or prefer not 
to have known. In the process of writing up his notes, the observer necessarily 
violates these participants’ preferences.” Schatzman and Strauss (1973 p.95) make 
the same point in their discussion of fieldwork technique that: “a single word, even 
one merely descriptive of the dress of a person, or a particular word uttered by
someone usually is enough to ‘trip o ff a string of images that afford substantial 
reconstruction of the observed scene.”
I used unstructured observation throughout the fieldwork to gather data and 
test interpretations of behaviours. It was unstructured in the sense that I did not 
initiate the topic for discussion nor did I try to structure it by placing research 
subjects under cross-examination. But rather acted like a travel companion on the 
“narrative, engaging with it emotionally, displaying interest, empathy and pleasure 
in the stoiytelling process (Gabriel 1999 p.271).” For example, individual and 
organisational critical incidents lead to discussions about emotions generated by the 
crisis and its aftermath. The stories revealed how wider organisational issues were 
viewed, commented and worked upon by organisation members and enabled me to 
gain insights to organisational politics, culture, change and other organisational 
phenomena in uniquely illuminating ways. Generally I did not record the 
conservation at the time but recorded afterwards. In the spirit o f the clinical model, I 
used my own experience as data about the sites’ culture (Berg & Smith 1985). This 
approach recognises that a researcher is acted on by the system he/she enters. 
Understanding this influence through self-scrutiny gives access to the system’s 
meanings as well as that of the researcher’s. Devereux (1967) views the effect of the 
researcher’s presence in the system as an opportunity to gather formal valid 
information rather than a source of distortion in the data.
In this project, self-scrutiny was aided by the use of a journal, a tool 
increasingly adopted by other researchers; Lincoln and Guba (1985) make a strong 
case for a “reflexive journal” to record a diversity of information about self and 
method. Reinharz (1984) found that her journal-like field notes were powerful tool 
for understanding a situation through what she calls “experiential analysis.”
According to Sanjek (1990 p. 108) “journals provide a key to the information in field 
notes and records: diaries record the ethnographer’s personal reactions, frustrations, 
and assessments of life and work in the field.” Journal writing is a channel for 
turbulent emotions, doubts, private prejudices and other mediations. It can be a 
powerful means to explore practice, to document fieldwork as it unfolds and in the 
words of Ferucci (1982 p. 41) “stimulates the interchange [between the conscious 
and unconscious] and allows us to observe, direct and understand it.” Writing also 
taps tacit knowledge, it brings into awareness that which we sensed but could not 
explain. What researchers implicitly grasp is much more than they can say, or know. 
This element of the study offered me the opportunity to delve into my personal 
interaction with participants and the research, and flesh out opinions and reactions 
that might affect the findings. Keeping the journal enabled me to develop an archive 
for gaining understanding and insights and to explore the multiple realities that only 
time and different perspectives made possible. In addition it enables us to come to 
know ourselves through the multiple voices our experiences take.
Semi-structured Interviews. The participant observation was supplemented by 
interviews. A basic principle of qualitative research is to try and move beyond the 
taken-for-granted and uncover the varied and often contradictory meanings that 
people use to interpret the area of life under study. This is both an individual and a 
social process as such interpretations are continuously tested out and reformulated 
in everyday interactions. Interviews are well suited to helping the researcher 
understand a research subject’s own perspective. I was guided by Lindolf s (1995 p. 
166) suggestion of qualitative interviewing:
• learning about things that cannot be observed directly by other means
• understanding a social actor’s perspective
• inferring the communicative properties and processes of interpersonal
relationships
• verifying, validating, or commenting on data obtained from other sources
• testing hypotheses the researcher has developed
• eliciting the distinctive language -  vocabularies, idioms, jargon, forms of 
speech - used by social actors in their natural settings
• achieving efficiency in collecting data
I interviewed 100 respondents representing a diverse array of professions 
and organisational positions. The interviews lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to 
60 minutes and were semi-structured. Table 4 provides details regarding the 
positions of the interviewees. While there was no set of questions administered 
to all interviewees and no specific sequencing of issues raised, the interviews 
focused on understanding organisation members’ meaningful experiences with 
risk management activities. I tried to understand some of the diverse personal
meanings posed by the experience of risk management activity in the 
organisation.
Table 4: Positions of Interviewees
Position Number
Senior Nurses (Grade H) 3
Unit Managers (Grade G) 4
Staff Nurses (Grades D & E) 60
Support Workers/Care Assistants (Grade A-C) 16
Consultant Psychiatrists 4
Clinical Psychologists 3
Senior House Officers 3
Registrars 2
Social Workers 3
Occupational Therapists 2
The idea of “grand tour” and “mini tour” questions (Spradley & McCurdy 1972), 
informed the formulation of interview questions. Broad and exploratory grand tour 
questions gave the interviews focus and were developed keeping my research 
interests in mind. For the most part, grand tour questions got interviewees talking 
about aspects of risk management and related issues. I sought to understand their 
perceptions about risk management, how well they thought it was used, and how 
useful they found it. Within these questions, I sought to go beyond the informants’ 
claims and ascertain the basis for those claims through the use of more specific and 
detailed mini tour questions. For example, in discussions of risk management 
activities, I asked for specific examples of what the risk management process looked 
like and I looked for examples of the products of those efforts. Such questions
allowed me to probe more deeply into the reality of risk management programme. 
Thus, grand tour questions set the context within which specific mini tour questions 
were developed. Questions were open-ended, followed by probes and framed to 
encourage respondents to formulate their concerns in their own words. Three 
principal questions were put to interviewees: What does risk management decisions 
means to you? What is an effective risk decision to you? If you were to describe the 
values that people share about risk decisions, what would they be? These questions 
were elaborated and substantiated with follow up questions. For example: What do 
you mean by that? Can you please explain that further? Can you please give an 
example? This enabled interviewees to elaborate and demonstrate what their 
statements meant during risk decision making process. The questions were designed 
to help explained organisational processing and actions on risk decisions, the 
perceived effectiveness of risk decisions, the organisational context for risk 
decision, shared values of the organisations and the connection between symbolism 
and organisation level action.
I took extensive notes and wrote comprehensive summaries of interview 
within 24 hours. After each interview, I also wrote extensive field notes. In 
selecting subjects to interview, I wanted to obtain a slice through the 
organisational structure. I sought informants from as close as possible to the top 
level of each site all the way down to the operating level, to obtain a broad range 
of rhetoric and experience with risk management. In my efforts to decipher 
“deep” structure (Geertz 1973; 1983; Horowitz 1991; Kets de Vries 1991), I had 
to be alert to underlying themes, hidden agendas, meanings behind metaphors 
used reasons for selection of words and activities of the individuals in questions.
This role required a certain level of emotional intelligence, that is, awareness 
about ones own feelings and appreciation o f emotions in other people.
Documents. Documents played an important part to understanding the 
relationship between settings, individuals and the construction of meaning. 
During the study, documents were seen to be important resources in 
participants’ speech performances (Hawes 1976), and helped me to reconstruct 
past events and ongoing processes that were not available for direct observation. 
Documents reflected certain kinds of organisational rationality such as decision 
rules. Policy manuals and procedures, audits, information booklets, memos, 
newsletters, and training materials provided further indications of specific 
elements of risk management activities in the settings. My participation in 
training sessions provided experiential evidence of the grounding organisational 
members received in risk management process and gave me a better sense of 
how organisational, members used and valued training. I observed the ways 
documents affect the settings and the roles they played in communicating ideas 
and developing decision-making. Using the documents as a point of discussion 
in interviews helped me to understand how individuals interpret the meaning of 
such materials in the settings. The study also relied on public inquiry of disasters 
and accidents and media representations of risk management. I studied these 
accounts because they have significant impacts on organisations and societies 
(Shrivasta 1987; Weick 1988). Inquiry reports are seen as rhetorical constructs 
designed to bring out acknowledgment from their target audiences (Brown 
2000; Van Maneen 1988) that represent organisational response to crises 
through which organisational learning and sense making occur (Turner 1978; 
Weick 1995). The way in which disease and illness are constructed or
represented in texts is symptomatic of wider knowledge, belief, and value 
systems. Discourses on health, illness and accounts of crises construct realities 
in ways that are often taken for granted (Lupton 1994). From this angle, 
understanding of health, illness, risk and its management cannot be viewed 
independently from the social context in which there are situated. An 
exploration of the way in which health and health care issues are represented in 
inquiry reports and the media gives important insights into how they influence 
and shape attitudes towards for example, people with mental illness and care 
practices. Detail focus with such texts assisted me in theorising multiple levels 
of understandings.
Data Analysis
The study generated an enormous amount of text that have to be reduced to 
what is of most importance and interest (Miles & Huberman 1984; Wolcott 1999). 
The method of data analysis that I used was borrowed from Glasser and Strauss’s 
(1967) grounded theory, although I did not follow their techniques to the letter. I 
shared with their commitment of refining and testing ideas and theory throughout 
the process of data collection, so that the collection of data could be guided by 
emerging theoretical ideas (Miles & Huberman 1984; Hammersley & Atkinson 
1983). The data was analysed to uncover the meanings of nurses’ and to extract 
values embedded in nursing practice as experienced by nurses. The research 
questions guided data analysis. I wanted to see how nurses think about their 
activities by adopting rationalities of risk and how risk rationalities became basis for 
patient care. I also sought to examine the conditions under which risk discourse 
exists, the ways it is constructed institutionally and which it is deployed. How are 
local practices shaped by interaction between situated knowledge and formalised
knowledge and how is knowing constructed and sustained in practice? 
Consequently the data were exposed to several different stages of hermeneutic 
analysis in order to arrive at comprehensive understanding of meanings of practice 
and underlying values. This meant that the data were treated as whole and analysed 
in three steps in order to establish the general meanings from namely self- 
understanding, commonsense understanding and theoretical understanding (Kvale 
1983). These analyses resulted in conceptual categories (Glasser & Strauss 1976).
I started the analysis by first reading through the transcript of field-notes, 
interviews and documents organised in original chronological order. These readings 
reacquainted me with events of the study and alerted me to changes in perspective, 
social actors and level of detail over the duration of the fieldwork; and helped me to 
absorb the fieldwork in its totality as well as renewing my contact with individual 
situations. The starting point was acquiring a general grasp by reading the 
transcripts several times. The following readings were more purposeful. I began to 
look for indicators of concepts which I identified as relevant to the study by jotting 
down notes about compelling incidents, sequences of action, repetitive acts and 
critical details that informed my understanding of the field. These readings were 
repeated for content and meaning until patterns emerged (Agar 1986; Spradley 
1980).
Second, I developed codes from the readings, which “serve as a shorthand 
device to label, separate, compile, and organise data” Charmaz (1983 p.111).” I 
recorded the main beliefs, themes, cultural practices, or relationships by looking at 
topics that are dramatised by the participants, or that are glossed over, puzzling or 
conflicted situations, elements that are recurring, conditions that evoke actions, 
rituals that that seem to exemplify processes of culture among others. I used the
constant comparative method (Glasser & Strauss1967) by continually comparing 
new incidents with ones that have already been grouped in the same category in 
order to determine its goodness of fit. I built and clarified categories by going back 
through the evidence more than once and on occasions reassigning problematic 
incidents to different categories or split them off to form new categories. The 
process of this integration changes the nature of categories from mere collections of 
more or less vaguely coded incidents into constructs, which moves the researcher 
closer to the construction at hand (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Third, I analysed all the 
transcripts again with a focus on how participants delimited and organised what 
they conceived as risk management. After I had analysed each transcript, I 
compared participants with each other, first within and then between sites. Again 
this process led to some regrouping. Finally, I analysed all the transcripts once 
again, simultaneously focusing on what participants conceived as risk management 
strategy. I then cross-checked until I believed I had found the most dependable 
interpretation of participants’ way of conceiving of risk management strategy. This 
cross-checking also led to clearer and more precise formulations of the conceptions. 
I then conducted a first categorisation of the data by categorising key words to 
search for patterns and important underlying concepts. At the same time it also 
reduced even further into a manageable set by clustering key words with similar 
meaning into categories.
I then tried to shape the different categories into inter-connected, cohesive 
unit; in other words looking for the possibility of recognising and identifying the 
underlying themes into a number of risk contexts as perceived by respondents. In a 
sense I was engaged in “pattern matching” (Kets De Vries & Miller 1987 p.245) 
“searching for structural parallels, looking for a “fit” in a quest for revealing
repetition (Geertz 1973). There were paradoxes such as risk management both 
undermining and enhancing quality of care, keeping patients safe from being 
proactive but also generating potential aggression due inability to take part in the 
decision making process among others. One likely explanation of these paradoxes is 
that there is more than one dominant implicit model of risk management. Here, risk 
management was not tied to a formal position or defined as a fixed quality but seen 
more openly in relationship to that which goes on in the work organisation context 
and the relations being formed and reformed in process of sense making, attribution 
and negotiation. This is in line with the constructionist approach, which sees all 
knowledge about risk as bound to the socio-cultural contexts in which this 
knowledge is engendered. Lupton (1999 p. 29) observes, that, “scientific 
knowledge, or any other knowledge, is never value-free but rather is always the 
product of a way of seeing. A risk, therefore, is not static, objective phenomenon, 
but is constantly constructed and negotiated as part of a network of social 
interaction and the formation of meaning.”
Taking an open attitude to the concept of risk management including 
consideration of alternative lines of interpretation before, during and after the 
research process benefited the intellectual inquiry (Rorty 1989).
Methodological Issues
My method of “insider-outsider” research is certainly open to criticism from 
traditional methodologists as it eschews the “bracketing” of personal experience 
(Schutz 1967) and also based on what ethnographers have been warned against of 
“going native” (Biyman 1988). As a psychiatric nurse researching psychiatric 
nurses, I was already a “native” given that I am emotionally involved with the 
subject of my study which undoubtedly shaped the questions I asked and the nature
of my sociological interest in the topic. How then, do we evaluate my 
interpretation in terms of subjectivity, replicability, generalisability, validity and 
reliability? Our earlier assertion that the researcher and fieldwork are inextricably 
related, means that apparent givens such as understandings of reliability and validity 
is opened to scrutiny. Operating reflexively means that any representation of reality 
in a research undertaking will only ever represent partial aspects of the reality being 
studied. Further as noted above, how these aspects are represented will be shaped 
and influenced by the assumptions and frames that researchers bring with them and 
impose on the research process (Hertz 1996). Besides the interpretative paradigm 
recognises the constantly changing cultures, perceptions and forms of action; 
because what can be observed in a site is profoundly contingent on time and on the 
individual human-as-research-instrument. A world consisting of multiple and 
constructed realities does not permit the researcher to identify any single 
representation as the criterion for accurate measurement. In my attempts to seek 
credible and dependable data (Lincoln & Guba 1985), several techniques have been 
useful.
Personal discipline has assisted me in avoiding excessive subjectivity. In 
recognising myself as a research instrument I adopted a “disciplined subjectivity” 
(Erickson 1973) that required self-conscious and rigorous examination for bias in 
decision of the research process (in each question asked, each relationship and every 
interaction). Following the psychotherapeutic approach it required a constant 
dialogue with self and the keeping of a diary. I also embraced and made explicit the 
subjective aspects of interaction with participants, building it into the research 
design. This produced a search for deeper understandings and more authentic 
depictions. In this way I constantly monitored self and participants perspectives on
conceptual as well concrete phenomena. Following Wax (1971), I undertook the 
insider-outsider role in setting aside periods for detachment, by steeping outside my 
involvement with subjects while still in the field and taking a vacation from the field 
to regain perspective. These facilitated both maintenance of perspective so that I did 
not go completely “native” and the capacity for seeing things as if they once again 
were new and different. I also sought comments from participants, mentors and 
colleagues in clarifying concepts, developing and refining questions gaining insight 
into phenomena with which I have grown too familiar. Such inter-subjective 
understandings means that the information gained and conclusion reached must be 
considered tentative until it has been confirmed by information collected by other 
means or from other sources thus my use of triangulation methodology (Miles & 
Huberman 1984; Mason 1996). Because my selfhood is caught up so strongly in the 
research process, replication in the same form by another researcher would be 
impossible. However, as I have argued earlier, the social location and experiences of 
a researcher inevitably shape research, so that the difference between “insider” 
researcher and other forms of qualitative research is a matter of degree. Yet I doubt 
that I would be able obtain the same depth of richness of data were I not perceived 
as a peer.
In my quest for validity, I drew on Kvale’s (1989) “communicative and 
pragmatic validity.” I established communicative validity by an ongoing dialogue in 
which alternative knowledge claims were debated throughout the research process 
whilst pragmatic validity involved testing the knowledge produced in action. 
Communicative validity was achieved by establishing a group of interpretation to 
ensure an initial understanding of participants about their work and my research; 
and by dialectically using follow-up questions during the interviews to help me
further ensure that I understood the nurses’ ways of conceiving of risk management 
technology. When obtaining data, I achieved pragmatic validity by observing nurses 
at work and comparing what I had observed with what they said in the interviews 
and asking follow-up questions that required the participants to demonstrate what 
statement meant in practice and observing their reactions to particular 
interpretations of their statements. Pragmatic validity increased the likelihood of 
capturing knowledge in action rather than “espoused theories” (Argyris & Schon 
1978). Sandberg’s (1995) concept of “reliability as interpretative awareness” that 
is, the acknowledgement that researchers cannot escape from their interpretations 
but must explicitly deal with them throughout the research process was adopted. In 
obtaining data, I achieved reliability as interpretative awareness in ways in which 
nurses were conceiving their practice throughout the observation and interview 
phase. I primarily asked what and how questions in order to encourage respondents 
to focus on describing what risk management meant for them; initially striving to 
treat all respondents’ statements about their practice as equally important and asking 
extensive follow-up questions that required the respondents to expand on and be 
more specific about what they meant by their statements. In achieving the above 
criteria, I do not claim that the research product is in any way definite.
Studying one’s own culture is not a new phenomenon indeed sociologists have 
variously described it as “autoethnography” (Hayano 1979), “auto-anthropology” 
(Strathem 1987), Deck (1990) uses the term “self-reflexive field account” and 
Lejeune (1989) utilises the concepts “auto-ethonology and “ethnobiographer,” and 
as a text which combines ethnography and autobiography -  the incorporation of 
elements of one’s own life experience Denzin (1989). I share the observation that 
the best qualitative researchers are those who are familiar with the phenomenon and
setting they are studying because there is a certain level of “in-built, factual trust” 
between the researcher and researched (Riemer 1977). In a stimulating piece, 
Riemer (1977 p. 467) claims that “opportunistic research strategies,” using one’s 
own “at hand” knowledge, unique biographies and situated familiarities as sources 
of research ideas and data, can be sociologically profitable. Here the researcher 
knows the language and symbolic meanings of this being studied, which enables 
him/her to avoid meaningless and irrelevant questions and the ability to probe 
sensitive areas with care. In addition, being an insider “acts as a built-in truth 
check” (Riemer 1977 p. 474) a form of triangulation. In comparison “strangers” are 
more easily misled and distracted and find it hard to get beyond the superficial 
(Miles & Huberman 1984). I believe that in conducting this research project, it was 
strongly advantageous for me to have been involved with settings that I was familiar 
with. Familiarity with respondents -  the subculture, the jargon, the unwritten codes 
of behaviour - enabled me to dig deeply into the research without having to do all 
the initial work such as becoming acquainted with norms within the settings. In 
effect the research began with my previous career as a psychiatric nurse. This means 
that I had a large amount of background knowledge on which to draw and many 
initial ideas and hunches about what would be sociologically interesting to focus on. 
For example, apart from ease of access, my familiarity with everyday life and 
routines on the sites (e.g. scheduling interviews to allow for changes) enabled me to 
avoid disruption of normal group processes; furthermore knowledge of some 
relevant research questions enhanced capacity to elicit in-depth data.
But an “insider” research is not without problems indeed researchers have 
been warned against “going native” as noted above (Biyman 1988; Miles & 
Huberman 1984). The most obvious of these is the risk that researchers studying
their own culture might fail to see culture patterns into which they are thoroughly 
acculturated (Stephenson & Greer 1981). Leach (1982 p. 124) argues that, “when 
anthropologists study facets of their own society their vision seems to become 
distorted by prejudices which derive from private rather than public experience.” 
This is indeed a difficult venture. Researchers like other members of society, are 
trapped by cultural ethnocentrism and parochialism which means that the cultural 
phenomena they encounter are not recognise as such but are seen as natural as part 
of the world order. An important element for the researcher is to avoid seeing the 
world as self-evident and familiar, and rather to conceptualise it as a strange place. 
Research then becomes a matter of “de-familiarisation” (Alvesson & Deetz 2000). 
In a word, observing and interpreting social phenomena in novel ways compared to 
culturally dominant categories and distinctions. This problem is seen as a lack of 
distance or a great similarity, which makes it difficult to look upon phenomena and 
practices that are well known and natural to the “natives” with fresh eyes. This 
requires that the researcher ask him/herself constantly what respondents think they 
are up to when witnessing the customs, symbolism and practices in organisations. 
Following Marcus and Fischer (1986 p. 137), I used the strategy of de­
familiarisation by “disruption of commonsense, doing the unexpected, placing 
familiar subjects in unfamiliar, even shocking, context” to make me “conscious of 
difference.”
Had I started the research while working as a psychiatric nurse, with little time 
for reflection, the problem of desensitisation through familiarity might have been 
more serious. However, I came back refreshed after four years and made a 
conscious effort to make the familiar strange. There may also be a problem of 
selective reporting, and a bias in selection of informants. If we accept the assertion
that the positions of “insider” and “outsider” are relative and exist on a continuum 
(Bolak 1997) that is that we cannot have completely “insider” or “outsider,” then we 
can conclude that the problems identified are not different from problems 
encountered by ethnographers in non-familiar contexts. While doing the research, 
my status was simultaneously that of an “insider” and an “outsider.” I was a relative 
“insider” by virtue of my status as a psychiatric nurse; I worked in the sector for 
about twenty years until I left to pursue a career in academia. At the same time I 
was a relative “outsider” because of my status as academic.
The approach, taken here point to the problematic nature of arriving at 
accounts from empirical material. Data in the context of social science are never so 
robust or objective as they may appear, but constructions made by the researcher in 
interaction with research subjects (Denzin & Lincoln 1994). For example, language 
use is always an action that needs to be understood in its context, rather than a 
carrier of abstract truths to be evaluated against objective reality. The accounts of 
interviewees, form this angle, may be more appropriately be understood in terms of 
a desire to create certain impressions of rationality. The implication is that the 
researcher must be aware of how important and powerful language is by 
systematically considering all empirical material and evaluating them in terms of 
situated meanings before deciding how it can be used. Social science involves 
studying value-laden phenomena of which the researcher is part. The idea o f using 
risk management strategies is for example hardly neutral even though it could be 
argued that effective application of risk management is in the interests of all patients 
and staff. But given different value criteria, what is defined as effective may vaiy 
dramatically; and therefore there is no universal definition of effectiveness capable 
of meeting all possible value criteria. So that the ways we conceptualise and write
about risk management does not simply mirror external reality existing independent 
of our conceptions. This means that we must be aware of the political dimension of 
research by paying attention to diverse interests. The acknowledgement of various 
representations, interpretations, sensitivity to complexity of language use and 
political awareness, inspires a non-authoritative form of research (Alvesson & Deetz 
2000).
This chapter describes the process of gathering data, discusses entry and access 
and provides details on gathering data. My approach has been clear about the 
complex and uncertain nature of research. Research is not an objective picture of 
social reality; but a set of impressions and interpretations characterised by feelings, 
imagination, and a particular pre-structured understanding. What is offered is one 
story -  which is empirically sensitive, and well-grounded and full of insights and 
theoretical contributions but still open to other readings. Like all empirical account, 
it has inevitability been structured in a certain way. The next chapter uses these 
insights to explore how nurses respond to risk in the contexts of their work.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE ORGANISATIONAL SETTING .
The meaning o f everyday life is contained in its particulars and to convey this to a 
reader the narrator must ground the more abstract analytic concepts o f the study in 
concrete particulars -  specific actions taken by specific people together. A richly 
descriptive narrative vignette, properly constructed, does this. (Erickson 1986 
p. 150)
Healthcare organisations are organised centrally around the issue of safety, 
which arises from the rationale “to do no harm” to the patient. However, given the 
several types and sources of hazards associated with medical technologies, in 
conjunction with the ethical and legal directives mistakes do occur in all branches of 
medicine. In psychiatry, in contrast to other branches of medicine, it is not only 
patients who come to harm from professionals’ risk decisions, the general public 
and staff may also suffer (Snowden 1994). Psychiatry is virtually always in the 
forefront of the media in part because of the radical changes in the last few years. 
The contemporary pattern of psychiatric services, of provision of care outside 
institutions and shorter admissions suggests that patients are spending longer 
periods of time “at risk” to themselves and others. Providing the multiple functions 
outside the institutional framework challenges the quest for public protection, 
control and containment. Thus the numerous critical inquiries into scandals in 
mental hospitals, revealing cruel, dehumanising aspects of custodial care, has given 
way to inquiries into scandals of community psychiatry, exposing failures to 
provide custody, public protection and continuity of care (Rose 1986; Walshe & 
Sheldon 1998 ). Within the institutional framework, when mistakes were made, the 
institution was the subject of a formal inquiry. Nowadays when errors in treatment
happen there is central focus on the management of individual cases and decision 
making by individual clinicians.
The data for the study was collected in the psychiatric hospital in the north of 
England. Its main psychiatric services were essentially intensive care, elderly, 
rehabilitation and admissions units. At the time of the study, the hospital was in a 
state of transition with increasing emphasis being placed on development of smaller 
units in the community. For four years I was a participant observer on three of the 
psychiatric units. Additional data was elicited from a nursing home also in the north 
of England. I sought to embed organisation theory by linking situated organisational 
events (accidents, incidents, hazards) to social processes in the wider society. The 
current understanding of complex organisations, as argued earlier, assumes that the 
performance aspects of a system are based on complex interaction of individuals, 
technology, society and organisation. This form of representation illustrates some of 
my basic assumptions that if an event goes wrong we should search for contributing 
factors in the other subsystems; which means that various subsystems contribute to 
safety, so that errors by each of the contributors may influence events. Hence active 
error should be seen as an opportunity to search for the latent errors instead of 
blaming individuals as the cause of an incident (Reason 1990). The focus of the 
study was to find out the perceptions of psychiatric nurses on risk management, how 
they cope with public demand for answers and significant organisational/regulatory 
changes following major accidents when the outcome of such changes may be 
uncertain, what models and techniques for event analysis are currently being 
used/deployed for managing risk and the precise goals for event analysis in learning 
to evaluate and improve risk management. More specifically the study examines the
organisational and institutional environments in which nurses work and how their 
dynamics the shape nurses’ behaviour.
I examined documented factors, such as procedures, rules, safety policy 
statements and written frameworks for assessing and managing risk. These 
described the intended organisational behaviour, and these were compared with 
observable behaviour. In addition, I considered informal factors which determine 
the “real” behaviour at the settings, namely whether the various settings behaviour 
aligned with their declaration, how detected serious safety deficits were rectified 
and whether deviations from the safety rules were taken seriously. Such factors 
offered me insights into how the settings learn lessons after disasters, taking into 
account risk management strategies, allocation of responsibilities, workings of 
communication channels and allocation of resources. I analysed the cultural 
premises of individuals at the settings, using my understanding of these cultures as I 
have come to learn about them in interviews with my informants, the process of 
participant observation, and by the collection and analyses of relevant documents. 
Given the range and complexity of the issues, this study does not intend to present 
only one interpretation, for I believe that there are several equally valid readings to 
be made, each from different perspective, each informed by different interests. The 
important thing to appreciate is that the participants themselves are not only 
engaged in the creation of texts, but also in their interpretation and, in this case, 
their multiple interpretations. The data of and explanation of researchers must 
similarly be considered as interpretations, although they are generally meta­
interpretations, in the words of Geertz (1973 p.9) “constructions of other people’s 
constructions.” It is my belief that the significant features of a setting are
represented and expressed in the participants’ interactions with one another and so 
what gets said is what is important.
The following sections present illustrative examples drawn from many 
observations of clinical decisions, considering the actions of nurses, looking back at 
the conditions in which staff was working and the context in which events occurred.
The cases 
Unit A
Unit A, a 19 bedded low secure unit is located on the ground floor of an 
elegant purpose-built building surrounded by perimeter fence. When one arrives at 
the Unit, one encounters evidence of concern for security and safety at every turn. 
There are the Unit’s perimeter doors locked by special key, all other keys remain on 
the Unit with a recorded handover of keys at the beginning and end of each shift. 
During each shift one nurse acts as a security nurse who is responsible for handing 
over keys, checking all exterior and interior security, testing alarms, monitoring all 
people entering or leaving the Unit, checking cutlery, razors, occupational 
equipment and generally supervising and maintaining security. There is information 
to visitors, which declares: “our aim is to provide a safe and supportive 
environment. To do this we require your help to reduce the possibility of harmful 
items coming into the Unit.” Non-prescribed drugs, alcohol, matches, lighters, 
razors, blades, sharp edged items, knives and scissors are not allowed and visitors 
are requested to leave bags, lighting materials, and cans among others in lockers 
provided in the reception areas. To get to the Unit, one must pass through a 
reception and a spacious recreational area adorned with paintings and needle-works 
of patients located also are table tennis and pool tables. The Unit itself is small and 
decorated in muted green and white. An enclosed garden is adjacent to the Unit for
supervised outdoor activities. It location is approximately 5 miles from the city 
centre.
Although I had previously worked in psychiatric settings, I was unprepared for 
the impact that the Unit had on me. The Unit was dominated by concerns for 
security. Patients must be prevented from absconding or breaking rules; staff and 
visitors must be protected from harm. Entry to the Unit required a handing in of an 
Identity Card in exchange for keys and panic alarms. While my study was primarily 
concerned with nursing work I wanted to build trust with patients. In this spirit, I 
requested not to have a panic alarm (a symbol of distrust as I saw it) but was turned 
down. The importance of the procedure for entry into the Unit was illustrated when 
one of the Consultants, of the Unit was refused entry because he forgot his Identity 
Card. My having a panic alarm however did not cloud my relationships with 
patients. I came to know many of them very well and some were interested to know 
about my project. While it was my intent not to discuss clinical issues in my 
interactions with patients, it did surface from time to time in their thirst for a 
medium to tell their side of the story, to complain about “unfair treatment” or to 
criticise staff. I was concerned that staff would want to know the content of my 
conversations with patients not only to feed ideas into their treatment but also to 
look for evidence of risk matters. My movement was always under the watchful eye 
of staff. The response I received from the staff was mixed. Some were very 
cooperative and actually admitted the need for research pertaining to risk 
management, a few however viewed me as a naive outsider with romantic views of 
nursing and were compelled to give me the “reality” about the Unit and the patients, 
occasionally trying to warn me against particular patients: “He is a nasty piece of 
work that one.” “Don’t turn your back on him.” The context was reminiscent of
Goffinan’s (1961) picture of total institution. All aspects o f patients’ lives are 
conducted in the same place; the same risk management strategies are applied to 
patients, days are structured with explicit rules and activities designed from 
institutional perspective. The intense activities of staff, the use of jargons, and the 
unpredictability of patients’ behaviour combined to produce a form o f cultural 
shock. Additionally, my own fears and insecurities about functioning in such an 
environment, the direction and success of the research project, and about my 
personal competence to cope played a role to my instability and disorientation as an 
observer.
The unit is divided into two wings, acute admission where patients are 
admitted for assessment of their mental health problems and level of risk to self and 
others and a rehabilitation wing, where patients are generally transferred from the 
acute wing but referrals are also considered from other sources such as acute 
admission wards, prisons and the police. The philosophy of the Unit is “to provide a 
safe and supportive environment by encouraging patients to be self-caring, 
independent and to retain responsibility for their actions with the opportunity to 
develop a plan of care in partnership with their named nursing team and with 
representatives of other disciplines.” Ethical statements that represent some of the 
values of the Unit are: “it is important that patients have opportunities to be 
involved in decision-making, that patients ought to have a chance to communicate 
their feelings freely, that nurses have a duty to ensure safe and secure environment.” 
The goal of the care team is “to ensure that patients receive a thorough assessment, 
individualised care plans, care and support for current crisis needs and assessment 
of risk to self and others.” The Unit provides assessment, care, and treatment for 
people with severe mental disorders that have resulted in manifestation of disturbed
behaviour or commitment of dangerous offences. During the research almost all the 
patients were categorised as displaying psychopathic behaviour. The Unit has a 
multidisciplinary team of Consultant psychiatrists, Senior House officer, Consultant 
Clinical Psychologist, Ward Manager (Grade G), Deputy Managers (Grade F), 
Registered Nurses (Grades E & D), Healthcare Support Workers (Grades A & B), 
Occupational Therapy Assistant, Forensic Social Workers, Community Psychiatric 
Nurse, Court Diversion Officer and an Advocate. The multidisciplinary approach as 
I found out was one of the main attractions to staff recruitment as it creates 
involvement in the Unit’s policies -  from referral to discharge and community 
aftercare and thus facilitating all staff to express their opinions and have a say in 
patient’s treatment.
The broad ethical statements reflected a belief in the value of the therapeutic 
community and commitment to ensuring patients’ safety and security. However, the 
predominance of custodial obligations contradicted the unit’s therapeutic 
community. The management of challenging behaviours such as verbal and physical 
aggression, absconding, offensive weapon making, manipulative behaviour and 
deliberate self-harm meant that the nursing role has to be incorporated within legal 
and physical boundaries of custodial care. Safety, the prime concern of nurses was 
maintained by the use of control measures such as the use of restraint, medication 
and seclusion. This illustrated the conflict that arises from the blend of caring and 
controlling functions that nurses performed. In this lies the essential paradox of the 
Unit’s treatment processes and nursing role, namely the incompatibilities of 
therapeutic custody the therapy verses custody debate: a debate about whether it is 
possible to provide patient-centred care while confining patients often for many 
years for the protection of the general public. Nurses on the unit faced moral
dilemmas relating to issues of freedom, control, free will and responsibilities of 
patients. On the unit as in other therapeutic communities, some nurses subscribed to 
absolutist beliefs that patient can develop some responsibilities for their actions and 
have a right to express their views and feelings. However many decisions were 
influenced by utilitarian sentiments (the right intervention is that which results in 
the best interests of patients and other people likely to be affected) so that it is the 
consequence of particular interventions that matters. Here the possibility of patients 
harming themselves or others superseded other considerations.
The predominant patient group of the Unit is the mentally disordered who 
exhibit veiy disturbed behaviour or who have committed dangerous offences. The 
patients are almost exclusively detained under the statutory powers of the Mental 
Health Act 1983, which involves patients linked to criminal proceedings or already 
taking prison sentences. As in general psychiatry, the patients fall into established 
diagnostic classes, but within these broad classifications there is a medley of 
separate categories; homicidal psychopaths, arsonists, violent schizophrenics, self- 
harming and psychopathic sex offenders. The patients are accepted from a variety of 
sources, which include: acute admission units, magistrate court, prisons, medium 
secure hospital, high secure hospitals, police and probation. Patients are accepted 
due to their need for the increased level of safety and security. The two wings (acute 
and rehabilitation) have different functions and house different patient groups. In 
the acute wing patients are admitted for assessment of their mental health problems 
and level of risk to self and others. Patients are generally transferred from the acute 
wing to the rehabilitation wing but referrals from some of the sources listed above 
are also considered. The overall aim is to rehabilitate patients back into the 
community, into independent living or supported accommodation as appropriate.
The Unit is made of highly specialised professionals whose interests and 
competencies affect the way the work is done, both as regards routines and the way 
the patients are assessed and treated. Daily staff cover for the Unit is adjusted 
according to circumstances for example staff cover, at night is increased if patients 
require extra nursing care. The Unit has flexible rota system with staff working 
mornings, afternoons and nights. The Unit was suppose to be solely responsible for 
24-hour cover seven days a week, without drawing on other staff under any 
circumstances in times of difficulty. During the study, the Unit was in effect 
covered on staff goodwill and were often asked to work at short notice, day or night 
and there were days where Agency Nurses with no knowledge of the Unit managed 
the Unit. The greatest problem the Unit face was securing and maintaining an 
adequate staff. There was a high staff turnover, a constant crisis orientation, a 
suspicion of senior management with daily narratives of worry, and feeling of stress 
and perception of tiresome work. Some of the frequent comments about the Unit 
heard from participants were: “It is a crazy place.” “It is a hell-hole.” “I hate this 
place.” My reading of the situation was that the intensification of interactions in 
terms of frequency and closeness involves higher demands for social and emotional 
competence.
The day commences at 0700 hours when all nurses meet in the nursing office. 
The office is located in the middle of the Unit where in addition to meetings also 
hold patient records and other documents concerning current patients. Appointments 
to be remembered are written on a white board in the office. Before handover takes 
place a head count is done, monies checked and all external doors checked. The 
night nurse reports to the day nurses, telling them what has happened during the 
night, how patients feel among other things. The talk is structured around each
patient: what they did during the night, how they feel, whether there anything
special to watch out for. While there were general comments about how patients
feel, what struck me about the report structure was the intense efforts to format
nurse communications. Lunchtime handover adopts a distinct and systematic view
in a form of a written checklist. The checklist identifies whether patients name and
section status were stated in full, whether nursing notes were taken to the handover
and information read directly from them, number present and who gave the
handover, whether information was presented clearly and accurately, whether risk
issues were clearly identified and whether the content relate to individual care plans.
The following conversation with the Manager of the Unit is illustrative:
Handover audit was formulated as part of the initiative of The 
National Service framework on communication. The audit 
team looked at how we might improve communication and 
we felt that handovers were important part of communication 
for the following reasons: First, we felt that handovers were 
not given enough respect in terms of people going in and out 
of the office and phone ringing. Second, only some risk 
issues were discussed in handovers. Third, staffs who were 
writing nursing notes might not be in handover, so 
information could be missed. Fourth, handovers were not 
starting on time and not all information was relevant. All staff 
was made aware of the handover audit and the standard set.
Patients’ leave are now publicised to minimise the risk of 
patient being granted leave without completion of Section 17 
leave form by the Responsible Medical Officer. Nursing 
notes are now read out so that a more accurate report of 
patient’s present state. Diaiy is taken into handover to ensure 
our tasks are completed throughout the day. All information 
is now clinically relevant and all nursing entries are reflected 
in care plans. Handover now takes place in quiet room, 
therefore less interruptions and improved confidentiality. A 
shift manager ensures handover starts on time and number of 
staff left to cover the Unit reflects clinical activity.
Some nurses supported what appeared to be a highly prescriptive handover 
format - an important part of risk management -  because; “it develops a better
accountability mechanisms” “it promotes better communication.” Others nurses
however expressed irritation; “it is too prescriptive” “it does not add a jot to 
assessment and management of risk” “it is a ploy to give the impression that they 
(managers) are doing something” “they are covering their backs and passing on the 
buck” “it is just a paper exercise”. There were instances of “business as usual when 
the cats are away” which “resulted in behaviours that increase risk” to patients 
through lack of communications. This was brought home to me through a number of 
“inadequate handovers” procedures when there were failures to inform the team of 
patients problems, a patient who was on five minutes observation for self harm was 
passed on as just observation which nearly resulted in the patient suffocating 
himself with a plastic bag. There were also examples of failures to plan for 
contingencies in treatment plan and to monitor situations and team activities.
Like other professionals, nurses had informal ways of assessing and managing 
risk. Despite the official procedure that nurses were expected to follow, practical 
execution of intervention encouraged other methods. Nurses use techniques that 
refuted the primacy of formal rules, suggesting that nurses have the independence to 
make choices around of acceptable practice. Thus guidelines were ignored or 
interpreted in different ways and decisions were made based on experience. Such 
techniques that nurses relied on could be interpreted as preserving their 
“professional” identities. Here we witnessed the central place of interpretation of 
risk management strategies in the conflicting meanings that were held by different 
nurses. For the nurses, risk management was not an objective entity but was a 
process of negotiation. This shows that official guidelines and procedures in terms 
of risk management are shaped and reshaped as a result of ongoing activity by 
different nurses. These types of conflicts for most part are not tackled by rational 
decision making (the reduction of conflicts). The evidence suggests that decision
making are oriented towards helping actors confront conflicts with the recognition 
that they are inherent in the system and that uniform definition of risk management 
is unlikely.
Patients are encouraged to be up at 0800 hours and have breakfast at 
0830hours. Cutlery is counted before entering dinning room and patients are not 
allowed to leave until cutlery is again counted and locked away. There was an 
emphasis in checking and reporting on events, illustrated in an incident thought 
amusing afterwards when a staff reported a missing teaspoon. Patients were kept in 
because of a missing teaspoon, which was found in jam bottle after two-hour search. 
Medication is administered at 0990 hours at the clinic room. Patients are then 
expected to tidy bedroom, and change laundry on Wednesday. Before dinner at 12 
noon patients are assessed before attending Occupational Therapy or the gym. There 
is a finance department open where patients are escorted one at a time and by two 
staff if there is deemed to be a risk of a patient absconding. Meetings are regularly 
held on the Unit. Community meetings take place every Wednesday of which all 
staff but one attend. Patients who refused to attend are not given nursing input, 
except in emergencies. The meetings are used to discuss daily living activities. 
Patients expressed their concerns and worries, however no clinical issues are 
allowed and they describe the changes they think need to take place. Where clinical 
issues cropped up as they did on many occasions during the study they are directed 
to the appropriate channels. The discussion topics concern everyday life of the Unit 
such as people playing music too loud, matters such as taste of food and disputes 
between patients. The ownership of the Community meeting is reflected in the sense 
that patients take minutes. Alternate Wednesdays are allocated for staff 
support/teaching sessions. The complexity of the work on the Unit in terms of the
nature of the catalogue of offences, the risk of violence and the potential for disaster
if things go wrong present a considerable challenge. For the nurses on the Unit,
there are periods of high anxiety, ambiguity, uncertainty and vulnerability.
Commenting on this observation, a senior nurse said:
Working with high-risk patients is stressful and good 
systems of support are necessary if  we are to practice to the 
best of our ability. We need to be competent, well supervised 
and appropriately trained. Junior staff is not allowed to be key 
workers for high-risk patients and take charge of the Unit, but 
are advised and guided by experienced nurses who have 
working knowledge of individual patients and active 
involvement in key risk management decisions. Managers 
check that risk assessments are appropriate and risk 
management strategies achieved. This is important in terms of 
support and also accountability. Nurses are given the 
opportunity to explore their own feelings and regular 
individual clinical supervision is essential part of this. 
Supervision of individual nurses are further enhanced through 
staff appraisal and linked to training. There is access to 
additional support in debriefing which is available after 
distressing incidents or negative outcomes.
However, not all nurses agreed that supervision was taken seriously as
reflected in the following comment by a junior nurse:
It is a nightmare working at this place. When I started at the 
Unit I thought there would be adequate supervision and spent 
lot of time interacting with patients and colleagues. These 
were the good few days. Then everything started to fall apart.
It started with the high turnover of staff, which meant I had to 
work more hours taking charge and without supervision, 
which is very stressful. We sometimes get Agency Nurses but 
they must as well not be there because their lack of 
knowledge of the Unit means that you have to supervise their 
work. I worked very hard and so do my colleagues but senior 
management seem oblivious to the situation on the Unit.
My observations suggest that nurses often have considerable leverage in 
negotiating some clinic decisions and general policy matters. Official policy on 
supervision of junior staff were laxly monitored and enforced. This analysis shows
that certain features of institutional life -  seemingly bound by hierarchy and rules -
are much more fluid than conventional organisational analysis would have us 
believe. This shows the problematic nature of policies, guidelines, procedures 
governing organisations and the informal sources of power within them.
Assessing and Managing Risk
The multidisciplinary team identified above is responsible for the overall 
coordination of clinical activity within the Unit, considering all admissions 
wherever possible in advance, basing closely with and advising the referring 
clinician, prioritising of referrals, monitoring and advising on care plans and overall 
discharge planning. The majority of the patients in addition to suffering from a 
major mental illness have also been through the Criminal Justice System thus many 
are subject to restriction orders (Section 37/41 of the Mental Health Act 1983) and 
have differing degrees of leave of absence depending on their current progress. In 
terms of treatment majority of the patients are on medication however other 
therapies/interventions such as Occupational Therapy, Gym, Anger Management, 
Relaxation, and Work on activities of daily living, Gardening project, Women’s 
group were offered. These activities are built into weekly activity programme for 
patients in conjunction with a named nurse who develops individual care plans and 
spends time with their patients for at least an hour session each week. Care plans are 
constantly reviewed and updated. The multidisciplinary care team meet on a weekly 
basis where each patient is discussed at length and if appropriate seen by the team. 
A care-programming meeting is held every 8-10 weeks for individual patients where 
agencies from outside the Unit are invited if they are involved in the patients care. 
The patients are involved in all stages of their planning.
All patients are admitted to the Unit by a qualified nurse and seen either by the 
junior doctor or consultant psychiatrist and undergo a period of assessment which
can be wide-ranging and detailed according to individual needs. As a minimum
patients are assessed as to their current mental health, social circumstances, physical
health and risk factors either to themselves or others. The period immediately after
admission to the Unit, especially when dealing with risk of suicide and self-harm,
was usually a time of increased risk where patients are placed on continuous
observation and daily risk assessment and shift risk assessment with safety strongly
at the centre of management plan. The need for risk assessment and management is
frequently reviewed and negotiated with the patient. Commenting on the importance
of risk assessment and management a nurse said:
Every patient has a risk care plan, which is evaluated every 
ten days. Risk assessment, is completed on admission and 
repeat risk assessment completed every six weeks. All 
patients on Level One observations for any reason have 
Shiftly Risk Assessment. Some patients, for example a 
psychotic patient hearing voices telling him/her to hang 
him/herself, a patient who has been violent and a patient who 
is sexually inappropriate may have Shiftly Risk Assessment.
Daily Risk Assessment is done when Shiftly Risk Assessment 
shows that risk has become significantly reduced. A nurse in 
charge can put a Daily Risk Assessment to Shiftly Risk 
Assessment, but changing from shiftly to daily is decided at 
multidisciplinary team meeting and Daily Risk Assessment 
can only be stopped altogether at multidisciplinary team 
meeting.
Nurses attempted to estimate the risk of future dangerousness in patients by 
identifying risk factors for each individual. Applying such a practice, however, was 
fraught with difficulties, not least because of the difficulties of assessing risk not 
forgetting civil liberties issues. For example, there were dilemmas of decisions 
about allowing patients who have expressed suicidal thoughts, threats of setting fire 
to buildings, violence and self-harm unescorted parole. It was not clear in most of 
the cases whether or not the patients would put those thoughts into action. Where 
nurses were concerned that a patient is “at risk” to self or others, then the liberty of
the patient has to be balanced with the rights of others safety. When the risk of harm
was evaluated as being great, nurses took coercive intervention (e.g. restraint, 
seclusion and administration o f medication), which could be harmful to patient. The 
restriction placed on “professional judgement” in the name of protecting patients 
and the public from risk seemed to represent the dissipation of patients’ potential; it 
constraints and limits patients actions.
The following vignette shows how a “rational decision making process” 
termed the Subject, Objective, Assessment, Plan (SOAP) was used by a nurse to 
assess the potential suicide and self-harm of a patient and revealed the difficulties of 
assessing risk:
(SUBJECTIVE) Tells me she feels “much better” today.
Feels the medication is helping her. “I can think clearly” 
denies auditory hallucinations, “the voices have been quiet 
for a few days now.” Denies any thoughts of a self-harming 
nature. ”1 don’t want to hurt myself now, it’s just when the 
voices tell me to. I find them so hard to ignore but have not 
heard voices for days now”
(OBJECTIVE) Appears calm and relaxed. No hostility or 
agitation observed. Good eye contact, even when discussing 
issue of self-harm. Smiling apprehensively. No evidence of 
pre-occupation with thoughts. Engaging willingly and openly.
Body language and facial expression is not suggestive of low 
mood.
(ASSESSMENT) Denies current thoughts of self-harm. It 
appears these only occur when hearing voices, but currently 
denies auditory hallucinations. Appears more insightful with 
prescribed medication, which has lessened the risk. Looking 
much calmer. Good eye contact indicates she is genuine in 
her expressions. I feel presently that level of risk re self-harm 
is low, but risk may increase if voices return.
(PLAN) Daily Risk Assessment to continue. Allocated 
member of staff to spend time with patient each shift, 
assessing thoughts/feelings. Should ask openly if patient 
experiencing auditory hallucinations and be aware of 
increased level of risk, if so, cany out care as per current risk 
care plan. Consider formal observations if deemed 
appropriate. Continue to monitor at medication times to 
ensure compliance.
The approach taken in the SOAP technique shows that risks were mainly relics
of particular assumptions of the scientific models used. Different assumptions made 
led to different probabilistic risk assessment. There was no certainty that the 
perceived risk could be assessed and what the effects of its management would be. 
Thus risk assessments cannot but be probabilistic and that one would never be able 
to be absolutely certain about the impact of any care plan. This pictures risk 
assessment and risk management as a flow of intertwined processes rather than a 
sum of juxtaposed decisions. Nurses were merely participants immersed in 
processes they do not control and often even do not understand. The sequential 
order of decision making steps culminating in a choice gives way to a continuous 
flow of action punctuated with moments of interpretation and negotiation.
The designated role of the team, a deliberate problem-solving approach to
assess, plan and maintain the safety of patients changes during emergencies
situations, often demand nurses to act immediately. Here it is impossible to meet the
usual requirement of careful problem definition, thorough assessment, establishment
of a therapeutic contract, development of treatment goals and monitoring of patients
performance. Case vignettes drawn from my observations are illustrative:
A 26 year-old man was admitted to the Unit following several 
extremely violent episodes, including the stabbing of his 
father. He had totally wrecked the house whilst attempts were 
made to interview him. He appeared to be experiencing active 
hallucinations and delusional thinking and was not able to 
answer questions for a prolonged period. Planning with the 
patient was difficult. He was unable to engage in the 
decision-making process, displaying constant tirade of verbal 
hostility and threats, clenching his fists and glaring at staff.
At one point, he said to a member of staff “you are the devil 
and I will stab you.” He suddenly threw a punch and was 
immediately restrained and taken to a low stimulated 
environment where intra-muscular was administered. Due to 
his continual struggle and threats, seclusion was initiated (a 
supervised confinement of the patient in a room which is 
locked for the protection of patient and others). During
seclusion a member of staff stood outside the seclusion room 
constantly and every five minutes wrote down exactly what 
the patient was doing and was reviewed every two hours by 
two nurses. Detailed records were kept in the patients’ 
progress notes of the circumstances leading up to the 
seclusion.
A 36 year-old man was brought on the Unit after a fight with 
his wife. The four police officers accompanying the patient 
reported that the patient’s wife had accused the patient of 
threatening to kill her. He was extremely restless and agitated 
pacing up and down continually shouting “let me out of here 
before I kill somebody.” The patient was physically 
restrained and eventually secluded.
The cases show that where potential violent incidents occur the immediate 
aims are to defuse the situation thus ensuring safety for all concern. Other actions 
were aimed at support for the patient and staff and developing new coping 
strategies. In both examples, there was no clear idea of the problem (problems) and 
no time to define carefully the origins of the problem. The nurses quickly reviewed 
the events; the statements of highly distressed, threatening and extremely agitated 
patients and allegations that the patients posed a danger to themselves and others, 
the prospect of legal and professional repercussions if potentially dangerous patients 
were left in the community and apparently destructive family situations. The nurses 
dealt with multiple and conflicting demands in situations in which events seem to 
occur simultaneously and nurses made serious decisions about the patients’ welfare 
with little deliberation. Under such conditions the nurses’ efforts were focused on 
decision making that brought some degree of order and structure and not on 
development of a treatment relationship. Risk management does not follow in a 
direct and linear manner as the model suggest. In emergencies, planning ahead often 
is impossible because of the rush of events. Observing decision-making during 
emergencies I entered the following in my field notes:
Nurses involved in emergencies did not base their decisions 
on extensive analyses, because of time constraints and 
organisational pressures, but seemed to use past experiences 
(framed by trial-and-error) even in situations that occurred in 
different contexts to generate ideas about approaches. The 
emphasis appeared to be on problem reduction rather than 
problem resolutions. Well-rehearsed routines offer structure 
by providing nurses with patterned sequences of behaviour.
Risk management is often symbolic in the sense of window- 
dressing activity. It is manufactured in order to reassure an 
external audience decisions are based on relevant set of 
information.
What came across strongly was the difficulty of assessing the likelihood of 
occurrence of risk situations. Most of the time it was only possible to plan a 
situation of risk in general terms which resulted in problem of distinguishing risk 
from worry, in a word worry was interpreted as “high risk” in written and spoken 
communications. On occasions when worry was high, for example in the case of 
violence, measures taken did not appear to bear a rational relationship to the risk 
and the predictable harm. There were many examples where the use of seclusion, 
special observation, and cancelling of leave was applied with unintended 
consequences. Measures taken on occasions appeared to have adverse effects. Care 
plans, which could be perceived by patients as oppressive had the potential of 
undermining their cooperation and reducing their openness. This suggests that 
violence may not simply be engendered from within the patient due to their illness, 
but may occur in a context that may include procedures and techniques used in 
managing risk. During the study it was evident that there were more frequent 
incidents of violence during the week than the weekend. The most probable 
explanation may be that there are fewer management and organisational activities 
and therefore less staff-patient contact at weekends. Such an observation is 
illustrated in the words of a nurse:
Patients who have violent episodes may be, in my opinion, 
vulnerable to poor risk assessment and management. Deep 
down, I think fear and to a certain extent dislike may affect 
decisions about them. In the name of accountability I have 
witnessed signs of imposition of plans to justify seclusion of 
patients. The environment in which we work, and our plans to 
assess and manage risk, can activate violence.
The use of the multidisciplinary team on the Unit was regarded as essential for 
developing quality of care through the achievement of coordination and 
collaboration of input from different disciplines, the development of joint initiatives, 
the achievement of better and fully informed care plans and the provision o f holistic 
care. Much of the work of the multidisciplinary team during the study focused on 
nurses’ accountability to the patients, the team and the organisation. Members were 
expected to report on risk assessment and management undertaken for or with 
patients since the previous meeting and to delineate further risk assessment and 
management to be undertaken and coordinate arrangements for patients within or 
across agencies. The team also on occasions engaged in extensive discussions about 
some patients whose risk situations were complex and where there was team 
disagreement or uncertainty about how to proceed. The meeting was held once a 
week and throughout the study there was lack of continuity of members, due to non- 
attendance of some members. Those present most of the time during the study were 
the Consultant, a Nurse, Psychologist a Pharmacist and a Social Worker. I have 
chosen the discussion of a female patient P as an example of dealing with a complex 
situation. The significant features of this particular discussion have been repeated 
frequently in the many case conferences I have attended as a researcher and 
therefore was not unique. I have edited the account somewhat for practical reasons 
and clarity:
P was a 28 lady was admitted to the Unit for assessment of 
self-harm and suicide. She was progressing veiy well, and
was due to go on leave, but disclosed she had been putting 
her medication down the sink and has for a couple of days 
had episodes of “hearing voices” which told her, her skin was 
evil and had made superficial scratches to her arm in an 
attempt to “peel off my skin.” It was apparent through risk 
assessment that P was more likely to have thoughts of self- 
harm when experiencing voices. Nurses have reinforced to P 
the importance of being honest and open when experiencing 
voices and thoughts of self-harm and has gained staff support 
by being able to approach staff to share her thoughts and 
feelings. This situation was discussed at the meeting:
Consultant: I think we should suspend her leave.... seems to 
be at greater risk of self-harm during leave because of non- 
compliance with medication.
Social Worker: In addition to the non-compliance of her 
medication, I’m a bit concerned with the family situation
... suggest we have family meeting before.....
Nurse: My daily risk assessment reveals that P thought the 
medication had worked and therefore she no longer needed 
them. It was clear that P was not aware of the need for 
medication on a long-term basis. I pointed out the importance 
re medication and has agreed to take them....
Consultant: I think we should wait for a week to see how this 
plays out.
Nurse: Through the daily risk assessments, it is evident that P 
is more likely to have thoughts of self-harm when bored and 
inactive and I feel that stopping the leave would increase risk. 
My worry is that apart from non-compliance with medication, 
P has been totally cooperative and had taken responsibility 
and approached staff when in distress and feel it is a bit 
punitive to stop leave when in fact P has complied with care 
plan.
Psychologist: I am very concerned that stopping P’s leave 
would destroy the relationship she has established with 
staff....
Pharmacist: I think P needs more education in using her 
medication.
Consultant: Taking your various points on board I am 
uncertain how we might reduce risks if I were to grant P’s 
leave.
Nurse: We will cany on with daily risk assessment and 
observe P closely in terms of medication, which can be given 
in liquid form to reduce non-compliance. Risk assessment, 
would be completed prior to leave by shift manager and leave 
would be taken only at the discretion of the shift manager. 
Leave will not take place if P is experiencing voices at that 
time or if there were any evidence of self-harming thoughts 
and it would be explained to P why leave would not take 
place.
Pharmacist: I am willing to have an input in educating P 
about medication.
Consultant: I would like the formulation of a care plan 
reflecting on all we have discussed and the measures we are 
taking to reduce risk. I will grant leave with a view to it being 
fully executed at next week’s meeting.
Efforts to achieve case autonomy and contribute to decision making often 
produce internal conflict, which at times led to loss of professional identity and 
boundaries allowing the team to slip into “collegial risk management processes” that 
limit the blame potential for any single group in the event of a tragedy by sharing 
out responsibility among the parties. Often the team approach dilutes decisions 
which professionals would otherwise make in isolation, leading to less than 
appropriate therapeutic plans, namely the embracing of procedures for risk 
assessment and management that serve the purpose of limiting blame as noted by 
many interviewees. Each discipline has developed structures and work modes 
necessary to respond to needs o f patients. For instance, managers have mechanisms 
to respond to their accountability for efficient use of resources, professionals have 
their own approaches to risk management. However, the very principles - structures, 
success, measures, and approaches to risk management -  that serve to organise 
integral disciplines, also serve to separate and disconnect the disciplines from each 
other.
People who occupy roles in different areas view risk management from 
different vantage points and have different perceptions of the reality o f risk 
management. This phenomenon contributes to the destruction of any sense of 
coherence in which risk management issues from the point of view of participants’ 
fragments into several different and incompatible solutions. Actors in each arena 
collect information needed to mange risk, but in the process often selectively ignore
or discount information available from other sources so often arriving at conflicting 
conclusions. Actors tend to define as problems only those things affecting their own 
measure of success and often one arena’s solution is another arena’s problem. Since 
independent decisions made in each arena impact upon others, each struggles to 
maintain its integrity and seeks to balance the power in the system. Rather than 
seeing themselves as collaborators attempting to work to a common purpose, rival 
relations frequently develop and actors often find themselves in a struggle for 
control of decision making. In an environment of conflicting relationships, where 
different perceptions and constraining norms prevail, uncertainty is guaranteed. The 
existence of multiple arenas typically creates a situation in which decision making is 
extremely difficult. Under these conditions o f uncertainty, rational, pragmatic and 
computational approaches to risk management tend not to work well.
UNIT B
Unit B a mixed-sex acute admission unit with 20 patients is located in an old 
reconverted building. Unit B’s philosophy encompasses “interventions being based 
on a careful assessment of the patients’ needs wishes and aspirations. Practice is 
designed around the individual, taking into account the range of past, present and 
future influencing factors”. Unit B admits the most acutely ill, namely those 
assessed as immediately dangerous to themselves or others and those seriously 
disabled to be capable of basic activities of daily living most. Like Unit A, most of 
the patients on Unit B were typically impaired intra-psychically, interpersonally and 
socially characterised by nurses as “agitated, unpredictable, manipulative and 
challenging” most with histories of violence and suicidal attempts. Some of the 
patients, severely depressed isolate themselves in their rooms or watch television 
others go in and out of the Unit. Like Unit A, no client is admitted without prior 
multidisciplinary assessment however in emergency situations it was not possible to 
involve the whole team. In such stances as many team members were consulted as 
possible and others informed of the admission. On admission a clinical team is 
identified, including a Key Worker and Named Nurse, and a programme of care is 
formulated and implemented with the patient (and/or their carers) participation and 
consent where possible. The multidisciplinary team was made up of: Psychiatric 
Consultant Registrar Junior Nurses (Grades A -  C) Staff Nurses (Grade D, E) Ward 
Managers (Grade F, G) Senior Nurses (G, H) Social Workers and Advocate.
The day starts at 0700 hours when all nurses meet in an office located in the 
middle of the Unit. The handover as compared to Unit’s A, appeared more relaxed 
concentrating on what was deemed “important” (at-risk patient) to report. Nurses 
checked to see that patient care plans were up-to-date. The relaxed atmosphere
however hides the extent to which safety procedures dominates the operation on the
Unit as the following observation illustrates:
On admission we identify risk by ensuring that relevant 
information about past and present is available, including past 
history of the patient, information from others, observation 
and mental state examination and accurate information about 
past behaviour. This helps us to define future circumstances 
likely to present increased risk. Based on past experience, it is 
often possible to recognize situations under which a patient 
will present an increased risk. Our policy is to indicate what 
must change to reduce risk and suggest how these changes 
might be brought about, to note on the probability of 
interventions, to reduce risk and to record the risk 
management strategy. A professional who identifies a risk has 
a responsibility to take action with the intention of ensuring 
that the risk is reduced and managed effectively. This requires 
the creation of a management plan agreed by all involved in 
the patient’s care. The management plan should also specify 
dates for routine reviews and circumstances requiring a 
special review (Manager).
The assessment tool represented below is highly standardised measure
designed to predict a patient’s chances of arson, violence and self-harm. The end
result is a probability of measuring the patient’s particular circumstances, as defined
by information about his/her age, gender and among other things previous
behaviour. The method is limited in the sense that it could only make prediction
estimates about the likelihood that, a behaviour would occur:
A 26 year-old man diagnosed as having “personality 
disordef ’ was admitted to the Unit. He had low self-esteem 
and difficulties in understanding the consequences of his 
behaviour. Past histoiy revealed that he has assaulted both 
parents in the past, took overdose of prescribed medication 
and has set fire to his parent’s house. At one point during the 
admission process, he requested to be let out but was 
persuaded to stay by the Key Worker. The process o f risk 
management took the following steps:
Specific predictive risks: His lack of understanding about 
consequences of his actions and poor self-esteem means there 
is a likelihood of repeating his behaviour of arson, self-harm 
or violence.
Risk Identification: In this instance the risks are of violence, 
arson and self-harm and considered as high. The aspects of 
patients’ illness and lifestyle and circumstances that have 
formed past experience were associated with the 
manifestation of each risk.
Consequences o f risks: There are consequences of serious 
harm to others, self-harm and violence if action is not taken 
with serious professional and organisational implications, if 
things go wrong.
Action required minimising risks: Risk management
strategies relating to stay in hospital require close observation 
during the early phase as he may present risks to self (leaving 
the Unit for self-harm) and others (aggression and arson). 
Risk management strategies includes compliance with 
medication; assessment to with regard to self-esteem.
Date fo r  review: Ongoing review in the early stages with 
monthly updating and two monthly evaluation of progress.
There was a need to communicate to external audience that the decisions made 
were legitimate, through demonstrating that they were made in a rational manner. 
Often this amounted to little more than symbolic behaviour. These symbolic 
behaviours were oriented towards staging a front of seemingly intelligent choice of 
the correct intervention.
Like Unit A, disruptive behaviour occurs from time to time on Unit B. 
Because patients were at times frightening, violent and hard to control, sometimes, 
immediate action was necessary to protect person or property. In these 
circumstances nurses were making risk decisions often of great complexity and 
intrinsically uncertain situations. In these conditions, professionals have to both 
frame and resolve the problem, often without precise guidance as to how to do so -  
which shows the uncertain nature of risk. Most risk assessment is based upon 
conditional knowledge because it was impossible to know in depth the complexities 
of every situation and all future possibilities and impacts which could result from 
any situation of risk. It was evident that the approach to risk was characterised to a
certain extent by risk avoidance and low tolerance of errors:
Clinical intervention is now organised on what if basis. In the 
current climate, the emphasis seems to be on increased 
protective stance in which most risks appear more important 
than most rights. In this risk set up, we cannot consider and 
substitute benefits and harm to patients and society in a way, 
which puts the welfare o f the patient as a priority but see the 
safety as the primary concern. Safety has become the 
fundamental value, in a sense in which in our efforts to help 
patients is now devoted in trying to ensure that patients are 
safe. The blame and litigation when things go wrong means 
that we have to be defensive in our decision making (senior 
nurse)
The preoccupation with safety indicates that no area of 
clinical activity can exempt its influence. Clinical 
interventions that were up till now seen as therapeutic, such 
as letting patients go out for a walk, assessing the level of 
observation to be placed on a patient, allowing a patient with 
a known history of aggression to leave the unit 
unaccompanied, are considered major risks. So that 
interventions that have been pursued because they were risky 
in order to gain benefits for patients are now classified from 
the perspective of safety awareness. (Senior nurse)
Other issues raised by respondents were connected to their fear over the
possibility that the formalised approach to risk assessment may lead to their
professional judgement being compromised and complained about the amount of
paper work that they have to do. The interesting thing about these issues was the
difference between senior and junior staff also evident at Unit A:
Our flexibility in making judgements about patients has been 
replaced by a standardised risk assessment approach. In my 
view, the time-honoured approach to risk assessment, which 
relied on personal experience, intuition and discretionary are 
now regarded as inferior. (Senior nurse).
As a beginner, I see the move towards risk management 
guidelines very useful. They are learning aids and practice 
tools that help me translate my experience and training into 
concrete practice behaviour and give me research based 
roadmap to work with patients (Junior nurse)
It is sheer hell to be in nursing at this moment in terms of 
paperwork. I spent most of my time filling forms purely to 
cover my back leaving little time for patient contact. (Senior 
nurse).
I totally disagree with the complaints about paperwork being 
a problem. It is an important part of nursing because it 
enables me to reflect and think of what I’m doing. (Junior 
nurse)
Because o f external pressures, patient care plans and documentation are given
particular attention. Nurses have to justify the need for referral of patients who are
deemed unsuitable for the unit by carefully constructed descriptions documenting
significant problems. While making a case for “at risk” patient for referral was a
strategy to protect nurses and the unit, there were instances where nurses were
convinced that patients were at risk. Nevertheless staff also acknowledged that
external audiences read and assessed accounts of patients risk in view of their
documentation. Respondents therefore, sought to produce not only “accurate” risk
assessment, to “cover their backs” if something goes wrong but to convince external
agencies as well. Like Unit A, there was difficulty in distinguishing between wony
and risk where measures taken regarding a perceived risk appeared not to be
specific and proportionate:
A 28 year-old man with a history of violence and hatred for 
women was admitted on the unit. Because of history of 
violence it was decided from the outset that he was too 
dangerous for the unit. A multidisciplinary assessment 
decided to refer the patient to a secure unit. Once regarded as 
high risk, it seemed his thoughts were judged in different 
context from that of other patients -  in which any anger he 
expressed appeared to be treated with compulsory 
medication, restraint and seclusion. This led to more anger 
and therefore more control. He attacked a female member of 
staff and was placed in seclusion indefinitely. Staff on the 
unit refused to nurse him and the documentation justified the 
interventions on the ground of the severe risk and the danger 
to self and others. After weeks of discussions between the
medical and nursing staff the patient was transferred to a 
secure unit.
Despite the quest for safety, care management problems were observed. There 
were occasions when procedures were not followed allowing a patient to have 
access to a knife resulting in attempted suicide. Missing or wrong information 
exchange and misinterpretation during handovers and lack of coherence in care 
plans created gaps in the continuity of care. Blame avoidance enveloped 
approaches to risk management because too often the risk management is seen as 
the clinician business, a task that would go well if only clinicians follow the practice 
and procedures. The usual response after and accident/incident and near-miss was to 
start looking for “someone to blame.” Some of the comments from respondents 
were: “We seem to attach a high priority to placing blame.” “When an accident 
happens it seems that someone failed and that if we can track it down everything 
will be alright.” There is no room for error because it puts your job on the line.” 
The last comment was illustrated in the sacking of a qualified nurse for giving the 
wrong drug. In the context of accidents some respondents admitted being reluctant 
to report them. Activities after event analysis appeared to ignore any element of 
organisational learning. The approach to event analysis seems to be firmly linked to 
locating blame, with a search for what the cause of event was which led to the 
accident or disaster.
UNIT C
Unit C, a purpose built children therapeutic community is set in grounds
surrounded by woods, has an atmosphere of a personalised family home. Each child
has their own room, which is light, bright and furnished with appropriate pictures
along with the child’s own personal possessions. In terms of decor, great attention
has been paid to style of furnishings and activity areas. Its large kitchen is designed
to permit children to cook and to be part of its activities. Inside the rooms are
infrared censors, monitoring each child’s movements throughout the night, ensuring
total safety of every child, yet maintaining privacy. What struck me when I entered
the Unit was the feeling of warmth. Two children were playing table tennis; one
asked me if I wanted a game, three sat in the Quiet Room reading, others were in
their rooms watching television. The Unit had a mixed therapeutic orientation -
psychoanalytical methods, behaviour modification in conjunction with family
therapy and pharmacological therapy. The Unit’s purpose is reflected in the
comment of the manager:
The Unit’s ethos is designed to the support the child and 
parent(s) in an optimum way, while encouraging each child to 
realise their full potential. Great emphasis is placed on 
building a positive environment with the expectation of long­
term improvements. I think we differ from many other Units 
in how we view our staff. For us it is central principle that 
staff includes everybody, from the most senior nurse 
practitioner, through to care assistants, domestic staff, 
administrators and maintenance staff. They are all vital part 
of the team and have understandings to deal with at risk child.
The children’s day commences at 0800 hours with an early morning call. 
Personal hygiene is attended to before breakfast, at 0990 hours, the children then 
prepare for the day’s activities some Unit based, others with outside agencies such 
as attending schools. The children have lunch at 12 followed by a free time and then 
return to activities till 1600 hours followed by relaxation time, tea and the option of
taking part in various activities. Bedtime is at around 2100 hours. Weekends are 
relatively unstructured and activities are arranged on the Unit if the children wish to 
participate. Visiting is allowed any time and there are facilities for meeting relatives 
off the Unit in small visiting rooms.
Unit C has the same multidisciplinary team as Units A and B but with special 
focus on involving parents: Consultant, Senior Registrar, Registrar, Care Assistants 
(Grades A-C), Juniors Nurses (Grades D & E), Ward Managers (Grade F &G), 
Senior Nurses (G & H), Social Worker and an Advocate. The maximum age 
accepted for admission was 13 years. Admission is through the multidisciplinary 
team including liaison with education. The Unit starts from the premise that children 
should not be admitted if it can possibly be avoided and if admitted, the length of 
stay should be as short as possible. Referrals include severe emotional disorders, 
severe conduct disorders, psychosomatic disorders, and psychosis. Each case is 
discussed with the wider staff group at weekly referral meeting to draw on the 
multidisciplinary perspective available in formulating an initial assumption. The 
aim of the meeting is to determine the nature of the problem, namely assessment, 
treatment, the legal status of the child, location of parental responsibility and 
support network. If admission is decided, a second meeting is held. Parents and the 
child are shown around the Unit and further questions about care and treatment are 
answered to give the parent(s) as much information as possible in order to reach 
their decision about admission. Involving family members was considered vital 
because of interventions following discharge and the negative effects on young 
children of being separated from their parents. The family is seen for initial 
assessment including risk assessment and search for signs of parental 
acknowledgement, and possibilities for engagement in psychological treatments:
Our risk management process has four strands. The parental 
domain includes parental mental health and state of mind 
with regard to attachment; the parent-child domain is 
concerned with parental sensitivity to the child, perceptions 
of the child, the parent’s capacity for empathy and the history 
of the parent-child relationship; factors within the child 
domain include the child’s development, functioning and 
constitutional factors; the family domain includes all areas of 
family functioning for example distribution of power within 
the family, family violence, and expression of 
affect.(Manager of the Unit)
Work with families however presented particular challenges during the study.
There were arguments for limiting family contact because of the impact on the
Unit’s routine, the effects on the children who have few visits, and family members
choosing different members of staff in whom to confide. I observed splitting within
the team between staff primarily concerned with the child and those primarily
concerned with the rest of the family. The category of the “at-risk child appear to
underpin a good deal of the Unit’s policy. Risk is representative of the family and
symbolises difficulties within the family unit. The greater the difficulties
demonstrated by the child, it appears the larger the number of issues the Unit pays
attention to within the family. Risk assessment is instrumental in the children’s daily
lives and for everyday staff-child negotiations around safety and danger as
illustrated by an observation of respondents:
Risk assessment is becoming ever more central to clinical 
practice. We are becoming increasingly aware of our 
accountability for mistakes in assessing and managing our 
patients. (Manager)
If we don’t take risk seriously we are seen as uncaring or 
irresponsible. (Junior nurse)
Our work is shrouded in almost constant monitoring of risk 
and adherence to guidelines. It is a game that we have learned 
to play. Yet there are no easy answers. Each intervention 
appears to bring its own dangers. (Senior nurse)
Risk is a constant and pervasive feature of everyday practice. 
(Junior nurse)
An important part of risk assessment on the unit was the likelihood that the
families may be the cause of the child’s mental state. From this stance, a child at
risk was a characteristic of the difficulties within the family and therefore his/her
behaviour was perceived as an accurate indicator of the family’s stability.
However families were expected to cooperate in treatment programmes by
participating in family therapy and where possible adopt the features of care plans at
home. Families in contrast locate the problem in the child and made it difficult for
them to understand why they should be participants in the treatment. Consequently
it was sometimes difficult for families to immediately understand and embrace the
value of their involvement and saw staff as interfering or making unreasonable
demands on their time. This was evident in the following cases:
A nine-year old boy was admitted after abuse and neglect at 
the hands of substance-abusing parents. On the unit he flies 
into a terrible range whenever he feels left out or forgotten.
He is quite inconsolable and will attack staff. After an 
episode, he is unable to acknowledge what has happened or 
talk about his feelings. To avoid the risk of harm to self and 
others the plan was changing a pattern of 
behaviour/interaction, building confidence, learning new 
skills such as expressing anger without hurting people by 
involving parents. The parents however felt it was the 
responsibility of professionals to sort things out.
A ten-year old boy was admitted to the unit following a 
psychotic breakdown with a school history of non- 
compliance and stealing. He becomes abusive and violent 
when grounded for leaving the unit without permission 
feeling that staff is picking on him. Refuses to comply with 
any intervention, is seen as behaving dangerously towards 
staff and out of control. Time Out (a behavioural 
management technique used for disruptive behaviour ranging 
from sitting in a special chair in a communal area to using the 
child’s own room) covered by a pre-admission parental 
consent was used. He becomes increasingly angry and 
distressed and unable to cope with staying in his room. His 
persistent aggressive behaviour required Physical Restraint
(used for abusive behaviour, aggression, self-harming and 
challenging behaviour). Staff becomes aware of how 
distressed he becomes if he has to be physically held and how 
he projects these feelings onto staff. Efforts to involve the 
parents to explore the situation proved futile. The situation 
deteriorated to an extent that Seclusion (placing a child in a 
room from which they cannot leave, used for abusive and 
aggressive behaviour - used as a last resort and which general 
parental consent was sought) which was seen as an 
appropriate risk management technique was rejected by the 
parents.
Risk Anxiety
The knowledge base and assessment skills required on the unit was different 
from those required in Units A and B because children are the target of great deal of 
social concern. The contemporary fears about children and childhood were 
enveloped in contradictions between recognising children’s autonomy against the 
increasing emphasis on child protection and the perception of children both as 
angels and devils. These contradictions were concerns for most respondents:
The increasing anxiety of society about risk has resulted in a 
protective stance in our care. Children are seen as vulnerable 
innocents to be protected from the dangers of society. Our 
guard against potential threats to their well being have led to 
a preoccupation on the unit with prevention and a need for 
constant surveillance on children with hardly any room for 
error. (Senior nurse)
There is a sense in which our patients seemed to be at risk 
regardless of their circumstances. Issues about the everyday 
experience of children -  the activities of daily living have 
become central to risk management. They inform our 
decisions about both the level of observation patients require 
and autonomy they can be permitted (Junior nurse)
There are worries about children safety and well being, but 
also fears of what children might do if they are not kept 
within the boundaries of acceptable childish conduct. (Junior 
nurse)
Many respondents expressed concerns about risk being a constant and
pervasive feature of their consciousness and everyday practices:
In my opinion the fears we have about safety limit the 
patients’ lives and experiences in a range of ways. It increases 
their dependence on us, which leads to over-protection. In the 
end the children will be incapable of taking responsible 
decisions as they grow up. (Junior senior)
The potential for providing children with a wide variety of 
challenging experiences has been lost in all the concentration 
of risk. (Senior nurse)
The use of guidelines tends to bureaucratise decisions in 
reaction to our patients. It produces a standardised response 
without taking into consideration the social context of life 
experience of individual children. Clinical intervention has 
been dressed up in a step-by-step model, which serves to 
define the boundaries of patient’s lives. This creates a self- 
fulfilling prophesy so that patients cannot be competent to do 
things which they have never been allowed to do. (Senior 
nurse)
Guidelines set the scene for the conditions under which nurses cany out their 
roles. Although there was a feeling that there is nothing new in risk management, a 
number of respondents commented on the quest for safety in recent years and the 
increased concern with accountability. Another factor which emerged was the 
burden of paper work but which was seen as necessary “to cover” themselves. Yet I 
saw many instances where nurses ignored guidelines because: “I don’t believe in 
them” “I haven’t got time”. They pointed to deficiencies in risk management 
techniques on professional values in being “wrapped” in paper work. But within this 
resistance, respondents faced difficulty in the effects of external pressures as 
reflected in the media, public policy and campaigns around safety and danger. Like 
Unit A respondents reported the greatest pressure in their attempt to accommodate 
and cope with the stress. Most talked about “the dread and fear of making mistakes” 
and “the futility of complaining” “you just have to get on with it”. The sense that 
tilings have changed as a result of: “everyday organisational relationships”,
increased work load”, “external pressures” was repeated over and over gain by 
respondents.
UNIT D
Unit D, a fifty bedded nursing home its attractive garden setting and wealth of 
charm and character is situated in a quiet residential area of the city. The Unit’s 
design combines generous space with a homely feel, with tasteful ddcor natural 
wood, fitted carpets and real plants. Bedrooms are single or twin bedded with en- 
suite facilities and are spacious. Corridors are short with comfy chairs. Residents are 
encouraged to bring personal possessions, such as a favourite table, chair and 
ornaments for their own room. Lounge areas in each of the Unit’s four wings have 
their own pleasant dining rooms. Activities are organised inside and outside the 
home and include crafts, games, and musical entertainment, as well as shopping and 
coach trips to places of interest. The entrance of the home is adorned with the 
philosophy of the home: “our philosophy is to provide a homely, welcoming and 
relaxing home from home for our residents. We aim to offer elderly people the 
opportunity to enhance their quality of life by providing a safe, manageable and 
comfortable environment, plus support and stimulation to help people to maximise 
their potential physical, intellectual, emotional and social capacity. Residents are 
encouraged to be involved in all decisions affecting their lives.” Also displayed in 
the entrance is IS09002 an internationally recognised Quality Care System award. 
The quality care system covers all activities and services of managing the home 
including nursing, medical and social care, through to the hotel services function of 
the Unit, which includes areas such as catering, cleaning, maintenance of the 
building and health and safety at work. A key part of the system is satisfaction 
surveys of residents, relatives, professionals and staff. Audit documentation is 
available for inspection from the Unit manager.
Most of the patients on Unit D suffered from dementia a chronic disorder of 
the mental processes noticeable by memory disorders, personality changes, impaired 
reasoning due to brain disease of injury. The effects of dementia manifest in loss of 
orientation where patients are unable to locate the toilets, their bedrooms, loss of 
memory, the forgetting of who their close family members are, loss of independence 
and the ability to perform simple tasks, for instance to eat and drink, to put on 
clothing. The patients also suffer from various physical disabilities either as a result 
of the dementia process, or as a consequence of the ageing process, such as arthritis, 
diabetes, poor eyesight, or loss of hearing. As a result, the patients require total 
supervision at all times with most of them needing to be dressed and fed. Many 
cannot walk or talk and majority are doubly incontinent. Patients experience some 
or all of states of aggression, wandering, delusions, depression and incontinence.
The team is made of professional nurses, a Manager, Registered Mental 
Nurses, Registered General Nurses and Enrolled Nurses who make the key 
decisions about patient care and Care Assistants (Carers) some of whom have 
undergone training and achieved National Vocational Qualification Levels 2 and 3. 
The prime responsibility for the day-to-day provision of patient care and the 
management of the Unit rested with the trained nurses. Although trained nurses 
were responsible for the type of care given to patients they provided little of the care 
themselves. With the exception of specialised nursing procedures like giving 
medication and dressing wounds, Carers took care of the patients. The bulk of the 
nurses’ time was taken up with administrative duties such as ordering supplies, and 
dealing with people seeking admission to the Unit. This meant that nurses had to 
rely heavily on the performances of the Carers. Work in the Unit was organised so 
that Carers had a set of group of patients for whom they provided care. Carers are
involved in a whole range of care namely getting patient out of bed, washing them, 
bathing them, making beds, changing soiled clothes, toileting, feeding, giving 
pressure area care by two hourly turns and doing regular paper work such as filling 
in bath and turns charts and writing daily reports. Carers perceive that working with 
elderly people with dementia requires a variety of skills such as patience, 
understanding, respect, sensitivity and commitment and resent the low value given 
their efforts.
The greatest problem the Unit faced during the study was securing and
maintaining an adequate staff. There was also a chronic problem of absenteeism,
which had implications for patient care. Often during morning and afternoon shifts
there were two trained nurses and six carers and two trained nurses and four carers
for night duty. Low staffing levels had indirect effects on patient care. Staff
experienced physical and emotional stress as a result of having insufficient time to
meet patients’ needs as illustrated in the following observation by a nurse:
The low staffing levels means that each nurse becomes 
involved in meeting the needs of all the patients on the Unit 
despite allocation. Patients therefore experienced interrupted 
contacts, which prevented staff becoming aware of patients’ 
emotional condition to respond to them appropriately. The 
high staff turnover and the delays in replacing those who left, 
the frequent use of agency nurses, the high sickness and 
absence rates means that quality of care suffers from the lack 
of continuity of staffing over a longer period.
Central to developing a plan of care for patients, Unit D faces the challenges of 
assisting their patients in reaching and maintaining their highest functional level, 
and encouragement of patients to maintain their past interests and involvements. As 
it struggles to help patients maintain their independence, however, it is also 
challenged to create care for those who can no longer care for themselves. Staff 
routinely has to balance enabling patients to retain control over their lives with an
awareness of the risks they face because of their vulnerability which takes place in a 
context where there is acute awareness of how other stakeholders might see Unit D 
if a patient is hurt as result of taking risks. Like all nursing homes, Unit D, is 
stringently regulated in ways that Units A, B, and C are not. The emphasis on 
regulatory compliance appeared to result in considerable anxiety concerning options 
for risk decision making by or on behalf of critically ill residents. Yet the way work 
was organised left carers, who received very little direct supervision from nurses, 
physically isolated with patients.
Surviving the Risk Culture
Unit D identifies risk as an important factor in their decision-making in almost
all their cases. What was noticeable is the presence of fear of being held responsible
for serious accidents that may be perceived to be lack of professional observation or
intervention, with an element of protecting one’s own professional interests
especially where an internal or external scrutiny and extensive media coverage is
likely to ensue. Staff comments in support of the above statement include:
It seems as if we are under surveillance from all fronts. The 
awareness of UKCC, relatives questioning our practice, the 
continuous surge of government legislation, inspectors and 
their unrealistic recommendations and of course the good old 
media. Scandals in a handful of nursing homes have placed us 
in unfavourable light..., which is very difficult to rectify.
There is the feeling that you should watch your back all the 
time (Manager).
It is frightening and stressful to work in such settings with a 
constant awareness that I will be held accountable if anything 
goes wrong. Protecting my registration formed the basis of all 
my interventions. (Nurse).
I am told that the responsibility of patient care rest on 
qualified staff but that does not stop me from worrying about 
what happens to the patient. I feel guilty if there are any 
injuries to patients. The last thing I want is to be involved 
with legal action (Carer).
Our responsibilities of caring is shrouded in the threat of 
litigation for dereliction o f duty if patients come to hann. The 
challenge is to define a framework in which we have some 
room to take risks and allow risks in our patients but equally 
accept our responsibilities of care, restraining patients whilst 
taking account of rights to autonomy ensuring any care is 
appropriate to the individual patient. We have contracts with 
patients’ relatives to face the realities of risk and document it 
in care plans. For example, if restraint is thought likely to be a 
necessary, permission is negotiated in advance with patients’ 
relatives, it is then recorded in writing, which is subject to 
regular review and communicated clearly to all staff 
(Manager).
I don’t know why I’m here sometimes with the whole 
emphasis on risk. While I agree totally with the involvement 
of patients’ relatives which I feel is long overdue, I think it 
has gone over the top in a sense in which we seem to 
abdicating our responsibilities. While caring for the elderly 
implies an assurance of safety and as they are too confused to 
make a rational choice about risks, I feel that like everyone 
else they have rights to take risks as part of normal living and 
that should not be denied. I believe the management of risk 
should focus on the extent to which people who need care can 
be looked after as individuals by staff who can make 
responsible risk decisions without seeking refuge in patients’ 
relatives, some of whom are either unwilling or unable to take 
part in the decision making process. I think we live in a risky 
world and therefore in any perceived dangerous situation we 
need to ask: whose danger is it, that is, whether it is the threat 
to the patient, to other patients, to the Unit’s routine or 
playing it safe. I believe we should look at how far we can 
take action to lessen any danger without incurring a graver 
threat to the well being of the patient. We should be 
concerned with safety from physical harm and yes from the 
threat of litigation; but also concern with health and dignity 
(Nurse-in-Charge)
When I started in this field the thinking was that patients 
should be encouraged to do as much as possible for 
themselves. A positive approach to activities of daily living 
was seen as beneficial because it promotes independence. 
Now we have got consumers, with more rights, on whom 
behalf decisions have to be taken to protect them from harm 
(Nurse)
Unit D finds itself operating in an environment that is subjected to criticism
from the press, politicians, the public and relatives. For the staff it is important to
strike a balance between criticism of assessing and managing risk, and the criticism
if patients suffer danger through what could be perceived as inadequate practice.
The comments show how risk increasingly defines practice and becoming the
dominant feature in the life of Unit D. There were general fears about making
mistakes, getting involved with litigation and being held accountable. There was a
feeling of vulnerability anxiety, cynicism and vacillating between shutting problems
out and tightening protective measures. Nurses and Care Assistants were therefore
not reporting accidents or ‘near misses,’ and were on occasions actively seen
downplaying the seriousness of those accidents:
During a night shift an 80 year-old man fell. Two Care 
Assistants against the policy (they should have informed the 
nurse in charge before moving the patient) move the patient 
to his bed before informing the nurse in charge. Without 
observing and checking whether the patient had sustained any 
injuries, the nurse in charge completed an accident form 
claiming no apparent injury following the fall. Observation 
was not maintained as stipulated during such accidents until 
the morning. After taking over from the night shift, the Care 
Assistant responsible for the patient noticed that the patient 
appeared to be in pain and brought it to the attention of the 
nurse in charge. Examining the patient, the nurse noticed 
swelling on his right shoulder and immediately sends the 
patient to the General Hospital for investigation, which 
diagnosed fracture for which he was treated. The patient 
deteriorated and latter died the following day.
A natural response after accidents on Unit D is to start looking for someone to 
blame. The topic of conversation, following accidents is usually illustrated with 
pointing of finger and finding out “who was in charge” and “who was on duty” 
when it happened. Accident investigations seemed to find out what infringement of 
the regulations led to the accident, who was responsible for the infringement and
whether additional regulation would prevent similar accidents The Unit seemed to
attach a high priority to assigning blame and responsibility so that some Nurses and
Care Assistants try to find ways of protecting themselves from a negative judgment
by withholding information as observed by a nurse: “ because of finger pointing we
feel reluctant to admit mistakes.” In the above case like many others everybody
involved was attempting to conceal the accident. A regulation to document the
accident in the patient’s case notes was not followed by the two nurses and resulted
in the manger, due to involvement of the police, summoning them from home to
complete documentation. A notice was placed in staff rooms reminding all qualified
staff about the importance of following procedures in reporting accidents and
incidents adding: “mistakes will not be tolerated.” The blame culture compelled
respondents to re-categorizing “accidents” (which are documented) to “incidents”
(which are not documented), downplay the seriousness of accidents and reluctance
to raise issues about patients’ safety.
A 76 year-old confused woman is uncertain of her 
surroundings and is in a state of anxiety. She wanders 
aimlessly entering and removing properties from co-patients 
rooms, disturbing their privacy. Her wandering becomes a 
source of worry as she attempts to vacate the Unit. Her family 
is anxious and concerned for her safety. The situation 
demands a close observation but the levels of staff means it is 
impossible. The question of how to manage the patient’s 
movements became crucial to the staff, co-patients and the 
patient’s family. The discussion of how to manage the 
situation draws out the distinction between the quality of life 
and the rights of the confused patient. The concerns of the 
patient’s family, is primarily that of safety. The staffs are 
faced with the need to find a balance between any restrictions 
it imposes and the patient’s right to take risks. The need for 
staff and the patient’s relatives to be content that any injuries 
sustained due to wandering are justified in a quest to maintain 
her quality of life is therefore difficult.
Wandering is usually the reason for admission and most often documented as 
the problem behaviour in the care plans of patients on Unit D. One of the major 
concerns related to wandering behaviour is the risk of fall-related injuries. Injuries 
sustained from fall can lead to litigation and therefore an important aim of staff on 
Unit D is the reduction or elimination of wandering behaviour to avoid injury and 
thus legal proceedings. During the study the management of wandering behaviours 
were through an “accepted” and discussed form of restraint, for example, cot sides, 
baffle locks and medication. Other subtle methods of restraint including removing 
walking aids, straps attached to furniture, chairs tilted back, Buxton chairs which 
folds and fastens across the lap of the patient, strategic location of furniture, use of 
commodes which provide opportunities for limited movement, or placing patients in 
positions (bean bags), from which they have difficulty in moving were used. 
Permission was needed to use cot sides where patients wander at night and where 
mattresses are placed on the floor in cased where patients were inclined to fall. 
Restraints of patients were justified because of the danger to themselves and others. 
The non-professional carers found it difficult to challenge such a practice because 
they lacked sophisticated and complex notions about mental illness. Their 
interpretations of patients’ appeared to based on lay rather than medical ideologies 
which increased their likelihood of using already established and familiar means of 
“handling” difficulties with patients namely restraint.
There were times when restraint could not be avoided or risk assessment 
applied such as in emergency cases o f physical attack on staff or patients. In such 
situation a full record was supposed to be made of the incident soon after the event 
and written in patient’s notes. But according to a nurse: “because of the finger 
pointing I don’t report anything if I don’t have to”. Most of the strategies used to
manage wandering were in contrast to the declared policy of assessing and
determining the risk of injury through a framework: namely, assessing how a patient
could be harmed and how, evaluating the risks arising from the hazard and deciding
to eliminate or reduce risk, recording the findings and reviewing and revising the
assessment on a regularly basis. Although restraint was supposed to be used as a last
resort, as in many instances, the approval of the patient’s relatives in the above case
were sought to restrain her. There was no recording of the plan to restraint the
patient and it was not reviewed during the study.
A 65 year-old man about six feet eight inches tall ex-army 
officer is adamant that one of the female patient is his wife 
and rather takes exception if  anybody including staff coming 
near them on occasions. He is very agitated and has a 
tendency of attacking both nurse and patients resulting in two 
of the latter having fractures after violence incidents. There is 
concern about his aggression by the staff, the relatives of co­
patients and a family friend who decides to stopped visits and 
all contacts.
Aggression both verbal and physical was seen as a major problem. The staff 
felt strongly about this. Yet the above case like many others did not follow the 
procedure of formally assessing and managing risk. Rather there were recordings of 
incidents of aggressive episodes, which were presented to his General Practitioner 
to justify the prescription of tranquillisers. The medication however created a 
problem of drowsiness and eventually have to be withdrawn. On number of 
occasions where it becomes harder for nurses to control the patients and prevent 
them from disrupting the daily routines of the Unit or from injuring others or 
themselves, nurses in their dealings with doctors would try, often successfully to 
persuade them of the importance or necessity of tranquillisers for “problem 
patients.”
A 67 year-old woman is adamant that she wishes to return 
home. She shows insight into her dementia and often reports 
episodes of neglect to her relatives. She has difficulty in 
mobilising continually shouting and accusing staff of hurting 
her. Her brother visits and spends about eight hours everyday 
and complaints about the lack of care given by staff.
Following a fall, which led to bruises, her brother threatened 
to sue the Unit. The named-nurse creates a folder to record all 
complaints from the brother after efforts to engage him in 
discussion about his sister’s care fails.
There were many complaints during the study about patient care: “patient not 
being washed or fed properly” “patient being drugged” “patient being left 
unattended” and “patient losing their property” among others. According to most 
respondents, while the main types of complaints have not changed, “they have 
increased and become more complex due to the threat of litigation”. There was a 
feeling that “health care has changed from a social right to a consumer right.” The 
awareness that relatives are looking over their shoulders generated personal 
vigilance over the actions of the nurses. When relatives complained to nurses about 
mistreatment, the usual response of the nurses to such claims was to deny the 
occurrence of abuse by “covering their backs.” They did this by collecting data in 
other to avert the legitimacy and the validity of the contentions. A reflexive 
monitoring of the nurses’ action was implicated in every act of practice.
Coping with risk
While good work was done on the Unit the need for accountability appeared to 
divert attention from therapeutic work to custodial ideology. Carers emphasised the 
hopeless conditions of the patients, their enfeebled mental states and the necessity of 
controlling them with drugs and restraints. Care appeared to be mostly defined 
minimally in terms of tending to the visible bodily needs of the patients. Many 
respondents spoke openly of protecting themselves. Nurses find that it is impossible
to achieve goals expounded by their professions. The lofty goals of help and service
learned during professional training give way to more realistic goals maintenance;
rather than taking active leadership in caring for patients they withdraw from this
aspect of role, become cynical and minimise their contact with patients and Care
Assistants to whom nurses delegate a great deal of discretionary power. Nurses
protect themselves by “documenting everything” and by avoiding information on
certain patients that are regarding as “hopeless,” “challenging behaviour” or because
of their “crazy relatives.” A nurse summed up the feelings of most:
I don’t do risk assessment with most of the patients. What I 
don’t know, I don’t have to do anything about. For example, 
if  I were to assess the risk of aggression its management will 
need close observation but this is not possible because of the 
staff situation. So in a sense I will be putting my neck on the 
block for putting this on the record. My strategy is usually to 
put the onus on the doctors to prescribe tranquillisers to 
control the problem. I have also involved willing patients’ 
relatives who have agreed for restraints and as added voice in 
requests from doctors that way I am always covered.
Nurses argued against assessing risk and “putting it on paper” because it 
results in blame if accidents happen which was at odds with the espoused 
organisation policy. Because of the “blame culture” there is no chance of “learning 
about the accidents.” Some Care Assistants developed their survival practices on 
qualified staff “because it is their responsibility.” Others “protect themselves” by 
“seeing that nothing untoward happens on duty,” “having four eyes,” and by 
reporting every bruise, scratch, everything to qualified staff.” In the words o f a Care 
Assistant:
If I’m on I see to it that I report everything, which I feel is not 
right to the nurses. Most of the time they find me a nuisance 
but I don’t want anything on my conscience. When I finished 
work I like to think that I have done what is expected of me, 
and that all the patients under my care are safe. I like to cover 
myself.
Another defensive orientation to practices can be linked to the regulation of
nursing homes. Announced and unannounced inspections were periods o f intense
activities to “cover ourselves”. Anticipation of a visit by inspectors was a flood of
activity as risk assessment and management forms are reviewed and updated:
They (inspectors) are not really interested in what happens to 
patients their main concern is to see whether the documents 
are in order. I make sure at all times not only during 
inspections that all our documents are reviewed and up to 
date. It always seemed to be a wasted effort though because 
they always find faults in their reports. (Manager)
I don’t see the point of rushing around every time trying to 
satisfy these inspectors. I am in the profession to care for 
patients not to jump to the whim of outsiders who haven’t got 
a clue of what goes on here. Inspectors never ask patients or 
their relatives whether they are having good quality care, but 
always whether we are up to date with our documentation.
(Nurse)
Like the other units, risk management was often symbolic window dressing; 
decisions were thwarted by smoothing, gaming, filtering and thus demonstrates that 
nurses may employ many different strategies to inhibit the visibility sought by the 
rational approach.
Risk Management in the Contexts in which it operates
Risk management is now associated with particular ways of seeing and trying 
to shape organisational process and actions as illustrated by decision processes and 
the structuring of organisational activities. Approaches of risk management have 
become not only important and valued clinical practice but also ones whose 
existence and consequences are difficult to unravel from the functioning of 
psychiatric care. The study has provided us with many interesting and useful 
insights into both the interpretation of risk management and ways of trying to 
facilitate its use in decision making situations. Although the project was not 
designed to generate complete and comparable data for the four healthcare settings, 
the data I collected suggest that the settings had differences in organisational 
cultures, structures and clinicians beliefs about cause of mental health problems; 
beliefs about competences in assessing and managing risk and how it should be 
done. There was diversity among the varying circumstances in which risk 
management practice was required. Different settings required information about 
different types of risk and varying time frames for prediction of the relevant 
behaviour. Within the settings there were different world-views, which affected not 
only how clinicians perceive risks but also affected what they consider to be 
legitimate risk management solutions. There were therefore examples o f different 
“safety culture” within and across settings. Consequently there were several cultures 
making it a challenge to develop a single culture of safety.
Each of the units had a specific bias towards one of four different ways of 
perceiving and managing risk. Like all organisations, all the examples were
dynamic, adapting and evolving. As a result they were at times substantially 
different in cultural bias during the course of the study. Despite the differences in 
the nature of the settings, contextual factors have impacted upon them in similar 
ways. The study suggests that the extent of coherence in a safety cultures and norms 
that underpin their mission and goals, procedures and policies may be an adaptive 
response to environmental and task demands on the system. The centrality of risk 
assessment and risk management has led to the units developing new ways of 
categorising, classifying, thinking and acting about their interventions. Clinicians 
face the possibility of having their units besieged by both externally developed risk 
criteria and the sheer volume of knowledge work. There was insecurity because of 
internal and external demands for knowledge; a continuous feeling of having 
insufficient knowledge and a reflexive awareness those errors can be corrected 
through better communication rules, formats and adequate risk management 
techniques.
In the terms of arena concept, there were many factors including social, 
political, legal, historical perspectives and nursing ideology, which impacted on risk 
management within the settings. These factors were important in conditioning 
structures that underpin discourses and practice in daily life, recurrent practices, 
attitudes, values and taken-for-granted knowledge in the organisations. At the 
macro-level was the role of the state and aspect of the legal system; the micro-level 
was the procedures, guidelines, the structure and the nature of patients. These 
factors had vital influences on clinical risk decisions. For example, policy 
initiatives such as the Care Programme Approach and the subsequent guidelines 
including those on the discharge of the mentally ill and the introduction of 
Supervision Registers seemed to have extended the boundaries of care and created a
climate of expectation regarding standards of care and the obligations of nurses in 
protecting the public from incidents. There were signs on all the settings that, 
attitudes toward the increase use of litigation might be additional factor to risk 
calculations when managing patients. Field data from the units also reveal the 
influence exerted by the various external cultures that were imported into, and 
nurtured within, the units’ cultures. The different patients’ population also appeared 
to influence the risk management strategies of the units due to responsiveness to 
local patients’ needs and expectations.
Production of risk management knowledge
External demands for risk knowledge and information are becoming central to 
nurses’ work. The distinguishing feature on all the units is the reflexive monitoring 
of nurses’ actions in an ongoing process concerned in every act of their work: “we 
check every thing we do” and incorporate the results of their actions to modify their 
behaviour (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990; Lash & Urry 1994). Whilst in the past 
knowledge was generated by nurses, now it involves the close interaction of many 
actors throughout the process of knowledge production. Growing awareness about 
the variety of ways in which decisions can affect the public has increased the 
number of groups that wish to influence the outcome o f the clinical process. Nurses’ 
work alongside various actors as reflected in the composition of the arena concept. 
Interviews revealed how accountability permeates the whole risk knowledge 
production: “in the definition of problems” and “response to legislation”. An 
expanding number of interest groups are demanding representation in the setting of 
policy agenda as well as the subsequent decision making process. This increases 
the sensitivity of nurses to the broader implications of what they are doing; which
demonstrates that the issue on which risk decision is made cannot be answered in 
scientific and professional/technical terms alone.
The risk management processes has to incorporate options for the 
implementation of the solutions and are affected by the values and prejudices of 
different individuals and groups that have been seen as traditionally outside the 
professional arena. They have now become active agents in the definition and 
solution of problems as well as in the evaluation of performance. This is expressed 
partly in terms of the need for “greater accountability”, but it also means nurses 
themselves cannot function effectively without “reflecting” in their attempt to 
operate from the standpoint of all actors involved. My observation revealed that 
nurses were under increasing pressure to explain their policies to the rest of society 
and in certain instances revising aspects of their clinical activities in the light of new 
information and values (Pilisuk et. al 1996). Nurses were now not regarded as 
holders of privileged expert knowledge, while other actors within the arena were to 
be enlightened and educated. Professionals can no longer define risk knowledge; 
instead it has become enveloped by debates, accountability and reflexivity. The 
dynamics of these changes, point to continuing transformation of psychiatric 
nursing. At the core of this process is how risk knowledge is “constructed” and 
disseminated, in particular the contested nature of these “constructions” in relations 
to risk definition and risk perception.
The arena model shows the inevitability of the contested nature of 
“construction” as regards risk definition and risk perceptions. Uncertainty and 
unpredictability are inherent features of knowledge-based societies in a way in 
which they never were in the past (Beck et al 1994; Stehr 1994). In such a context 
symbolic power and political mobilisation assume great importance (Thompson
1995). The politicised reaction to scientific and medical power creates major arenas 
of conflict and struggle, in which concepts are contested. All actors within the arena 
have their perceptions with respect to truth, objectivity and certainty of knowledge. 
Knowledge about risk is mediated and as such dependent on interpretation. The 
ontology of risk therefore does not give privilege to any specific form of 
knowledge. The unavoidability of interpretation makes risks considerably flexible 
and therefore opens to social definition and construction (Beck 1992). “The 
pervasiveness of mediation, the high level of indeterminacy and the inevitability of 
political involvement mean that there is no one truth, that there are no facts outside 
the relativising influence of interpretations based on context, position, perspective, 
interest, and the power to define and colour interpretation.” (Adam & van Loon 
2000 p4). Here knowledge is seen as principally embodied, contextual and 
positional, that is to say all actors engage in situated knowledge (Haraway 1988).
Paper Burden
The everyday reality of nurses on all the units is the reporting and accounting 
for events which has resulted in being “saddled with paperwork.” Although this 
view is not universal, it was a feeling many nurses experienced. Regardless of the 
type of incident nurses dealt with they were required to provide knowledge about it. 
The total amount of time spent in “doing paper work” generated frustration on some 
respondents inability to be with patients. The perceived burden of paperwork led to 
some nurses avoiding reporting some incidents. Other respondents took issue with 
the complaints arguing that paperwork was an important component of nursing. A 
component of the “problem of paperwork” is illustrated in policy manuals and 
guidelines that explain the rules governing reporting structures. On the subject of 
risk management procedures the guidelines articulated the structure of reporting and
provided a communicative framework for action. The rigorous attempts to format 
communication in clinical interventions potentially enabled nurses to prospectively 
decide whether a particular intervention fits the established format in terms of risk 
management terms, in order to intervene. In almost all organisation events 
(incidents and accidents) the initial reaction was to find out whether a form was 
available to cover it. The perceived increase in paper work was attributed to a 
pervasive climate of accountability in the wider culture. All professions including 
nurses are under increasing obligation to explain their activities. Interviews and 
observations offered examples of how accountability demands are increasing and 
leading to rigid communication rules and formats.
The effects resulting from the move towards a more standardised approach 
to the assessment and management of risk clearly signifies a major change in the 
nature of clinical practice and there were concerns about the overall impact of these 
changes on their professional status. The concerns were over the possibility that the 
formalised approach to risk assessment would ultimately lead to limits being placed 
on their freedom to make professional judgements. Some nurses felt that their 
“discretionaiy role, the ability to think and make judgements” has been diminished 
to merely obtaining information and documenting it on a standardised form. 
However, this observation tended to come from senior nurses whose approach to 
risk assessment was determined by “intuition”, “personal experience”, “gut 
reaction” and “subjectivity”. Junior nurses in contrast felt that the move towards a 
more standardised risk assessment approach helped them to reflect on their work. 
The resistance to the standardised approach was met by deciding not to “fill in 
forms” or because “it was a waste of time”.
Although reporting and accounting for accidents were largely the result of 
internal institutional sources, they were also a respond to external demands. Risk 
knowledge requirements of external institutions are important source of paper work. 
The accountability by the wider culture means that nurses are under increased 
pressure to explain their activities. To meet such demands nurse must continually 
develop and improve the formats for communicating the logic and rules of their 
actions. For example, the introduction of the Care Programme Approach has 
resulted in guidelines relevant to the notion of care which are being used by courts 
to guide their judgments and behaviour of professionals. These guidelines 
effectively contain baseline service specification, which is viewed as representing 
the standard for good practice. So patients are entered into an explicit programme of 
care, be allocated a key worker and they must receive the complexity and quality of 
service appropriate to their assessed level of needs. This requires the highest 
standards of documentation and interprofessional communication, as a court 
considering a civil action may need the guidelines. The guidance accompanying the 
introduction of the Supervision Registers hold professionals responsible for taking 
all reasonable steps to remaining in contact with a patient who has been judged to be 
at risk, in certain circumstances, regardless of their consent. This also requires 
highest standard of documentation and liaison with external agencies. These 
developments extend the boundaries of duty of care.
While paperwork is largely created by external sources, it also a product 
of how nurses themselves demand knowledge. In responding to external demand 
for greater accountability, nurses create new kinds of accountability, as well as an 
overproduction of knowledge. Nurses I interviewed indicated that the internal 
demands for accountability were intensifying. The intensification of accountability
demands were illustrated in the prescriptive communication rules observed during 
the fieldwork. There were examples of new reporting requirements regarding 
clinical practices, such as forms for checking handovers, forms for reporting on 
dealings with families and internal auditing systems through which communication 
rules were developed. Complaints about nursing care led to new forms that offer 
standard accountability devices through which “procedures are seen to be followed 
properly”. The reporting systems were used to manage communication in major 
accidents/incidents, to ensure overall communication efficiency in the organisation. 
The engagement of methodical reviewing of particular types of critical incidents 
provides communication rules that have the intention of making nurses highly 
reflexive with respect to risks involved in care and making the units appear 
accountable.
The new forms of accountability were seen by respondents as a result of 
external pressures, (patients, interest groups, policy directions) which require them 
to design knowledge to suit their purposes! Nurses see no end to the obsession of 
demand for information as “nursing move into the community”, “interest groups 
and the media become more vocal” and “legislation increased”. Responding to the 
external pressures led to “yet more creation of knowledge that we used to cover our 
backs”. There was a feeling among respondent that keeping detail and accurate 
reports was important “just in case one has to explain at a future date”. My 
fieldwork recorded the fixation with detail and the propensity to have several 
documentations of the same things in different filling systems on all the settings. 
Some nurses ascribed this fixation as “the climate in which we are practicing”, 
“fear”, and “lack of trust”. The preoccupation with documentation led sometimes to 
panic measures such as re-writing reports if something goes wrong or altering
reports: this came in the form of back-dating entries to appear as if they have been 
written before incidents to justify the risk management plans. The paradoxical result 
may well be that as more energy is spent on documentation, organisational activities 
begin to adapt to simplifying tendencies to “what counts” leading to failure of risk 
management strategies.
Organisational Errors
A common reaction on all the settings after organisational events 
(accidents/incidents) is to start looking for someone to blame. Almost all errors 
were reacted to as anomalies for which the solution is to search for and blame an 
individual. Virtually all the clinicians knew the horrible realisation of making a 
mistake: “you feel singled out and exposed” “you agonise about what to do whether 
to tell anyone”. There was no room for discussion and when mistakes are discussed, 
it is the examination of the clinical facts rather than the feelings of the clinician. In 
the absence of mechanisms for creating a safe environment for nurses to talk about 
their mistakes, they find dysfunctional ways to protect themselves. Here the focus 
on errors and procedural violations is placed on nurses at the sharp end. This 
“person approach” approach (Reason 2000) views unsafe practices as result largely 
from anomalous mental processes such as negligence, carelessness, poor motivation 
and recklessness. Logically the related countermeasures are directed mainly at 
preventing unwanted unpredictability in human behaviour. The countermeasures as 
observed include writing another procedures or adding to existing ones, naming and 
shaming, blaming, retraining and threat of litigation.
Analyses of the process of error production on the units show that error has 
multiple sources. Some of these sources lie in the individual characteristics of 
nurses so we cannot eliminate the role of the individual nurse in the error
production. Examples of errors found during the study were, loss of coherence in 
care plans that occurs during handovers, loss of information between agencies. 
Errors also occurred when nurses had to divide their attention between too many 
patients. There was also failure to follow guidelines. In some instances this failure 
was unintentional and could be corrected by training. However, it appears in many 
cases nurses failure to report was deliberate. From interviews and observation, it 
appears nurses deliberately decide not to report incidents because of:
• the shame associated with informing on fellow professionals, especially if 
they will be blamed for the incident and punished. Reporting the incident is also 
likely to create enmities between informer and co-professionals.
• self-protection, that is, to avoid being blamed by management for 
contributing to the occurrence o f the incident and suffering the adverse consequence 
of blame.
• the consequences, these include, disciplinary action, job demotion or 
termination, damaging comments in employment record and subsequent 
impediments to employment elsewhere and in some cases personal liability.
As nurses require certain autonomy, it implies that nurses must account for 
their actions and responsibilities. However, the person approach has serious 
limitations and is not adequate for the clinical arena. Several factors are implicated 
in error production; examples are the use of agency nurses not trained in risk 
management techniques and limited time available to arrive at a definitive 
diagnosis. Within the arena concept, errors are seen as having their origins in both 
human nature and organisational and societal processes. More detailed exploration 
of events revealed multiple gaps (discontinuities care) a result from effects of 
organisational and technological change. Factors that increased the likelihood of
errors included environmental conditions such as communication and patient related 
issues (complexity of illness, language and communication, personality and social 
factors), or undiagnosed conditions. Analysis after accidents/incidents pointed to 
complexity of chain of events that may have led to and adverse outcome. Some of 
the root causes of adverse clinical events appeared to lay in factors such as use of, 
for example, agency nurses, communication and supervision problems, excessive 
workload and educational and training deficiencies.
The merit of the arena model is that in looking at accountability, we must not 
only concentrate on professionals and their characteristics, but also to analyse how 
they interact with external conditions in which clinical intervention is placed. Event 
analyses on the units, just like catastrophic events such as the Challenger accident 
and recent accidents in the railways are all marked by the intricate interaction of 
many different actors and factors, often far removed in time and space from the 
moment and place of the event itself. Allocating accountability for actions, which 
have their effect through the mediation of a complex system, the functioning of 
which is outside nurses’ control to a greater or lesser extent is problematic. 
Accountability cannot be considered strictly on the individual level, but has to be 
considered in terms of co-accountability. However, it appears, management has 
incentives to blame professionals who report an incident, (namely to shift 
accountability and possibly liability onto them) and often conclude that an incident 
was caused by human error, deliberately ignoring deeper issues. Because all 
members of the units were susceptible to error and vulnerable to its consequences, 
they have less latitude to deal with their mistakes. Ironically, this approach diverted 
attention from the kind of systematic improvements that could decrease errors. But 
if  we accept the notion that the various arenas (societal, institutional and service)
contribute to safety; then errors by each of the actors may influence events, namely 
active error (often by the clinician) might be only one link in a sequence of latent 
errors.
Organisational Learning
Reporting is fundamental to the broad goal of error. Hence, barriers to or 
breakdowns of information flow as evident within the units must be considered as 
most dangerous threat to organisational learning (Argyris & Schoen 1978). An 
example of a barrier is the impact of perceived threats to an individual or an 
organisation becoming involved in litigation. Shame, blame and liability 
discouraged nurses reporting incidents. The complex legal context and the current 
litigious nature of British society and the expectation that mistakes lead to 
compensation are now widespread. Fear of being sued dictates a large range of 
nursing interventions. Litigation avoidance strategies dominate the clinical practice 
in forms that intensify the sense of suspicion in relationships such as nurse/patient 
and nurse/society. Nurses are adding additional factor to their risk calculations when 
managing patients; namely the assessment of civil action to themselves in the event 
of untoward incident. This may be leading to defensive practices in the overcautious 
surveillance by nurses as illustrated in what has been termed “walls of paper” - a 
new form of institutionalisation.
Public and regulatory reactions to information, external investigation and 
media coverage, which follow disasters, often create concerns about reporting 
incidents. The fear of being sued interferes with the willingness of professionals to 
report incidents. In addition, organisational culture opposes certain types of incident 
reporting; despite policy statements and procedures. Nurses found that incident 
reports which fault the organisation or managers are “unwelcome” and “damaging
to their prospects within their organisation”. The approach to event analysis is 
strongly associated with fixing blame. Here, the objective is to find at least one 
party who can be found to have broken the duty of care. The purpose of 
investigation after an incident is to uncover stages in the chain of events leading to 
the point at duty of care was breached. There is little analysis of the system’s causes 
of error and the information is rarely used to warn others about the potential for 
similar errors. Build into this approach is the threat for those at “whom the finger 
may finally point”. There is a natural tendency for any nurse faced with such a 
prospect to “be reticent” to “limit themselves to statements which do not damage 
their position” to “act defensively” and to “put the best gloss on their description of 
events”. This helps break the organisational learning cycle (March & Olson 1975) 
where nurses act in ways that are contradictory to their learning and insight.
The above observation suggests that accidents should be regarded as valuable 
opportunities for learning. It is an opportunity to learn how the shortcomings and 
gaps were managed, by examining the whole safety management system to cover as 
many other sequences as possible, which have led to the same or other serious 
consequences. It is a shared search for opportunities for improvement, which does 
not need to wait for actual disasters and thus pays attention to near misses, with the 
added advantage that they will be stooped before it results in severe damage. At the 
time of writing a new organisation (which will shortly begin to implement as system 
across England and Wales) within the NHS, the National Patient Safety Agency has 
been formed with a brief to learn from adverse events and act to prevent them 
happening and to promote a more open and fair culture, one in which staff who 
report incidents are valued and not denigrated. This involves creating a more risk- 
aware culture and sharing lessons that have been learnt from incidents. An
organisation learns if through its event analysis, the range of potential behaviours 
changed (Huber 1991). Thus organisational learning requires that event analysis 
traces the causal factors and determinants of an event further back into the past and 
further up the chain of management control; at each step asking whether actors 
responsible for nurses, rules and procedures, communication and organisational 
structure had taken suitable decisions to supervise, monitor and improve them.
The above analysis shows that a non-punitive and confidential voluntary 
reporting may provide more useful information about errors and their causes than 
mandatory reporting observed during the study. Mandatory reporting implies that 
the individual at fault must report the error. Yet my analysis of serious errors almost 
always reveals multiple systems failures and the involvement of many individuals. 
Voluntary reporting may provide frontline practitioners with the opportunity to tell 
the complete story without fear of retribution. The depth of information contained in 
these stories is key to understanding errors. Interviews and observations reveal that 
because nurses are forced to report errors “they were reluctant” to provide 
comprehensive information because their primary motivation “is self protection”. 
However voluntary a reporting programme is, on its own, it is inadequate in the 
absence of a strong well-designed system for analysis. The analysis shows that to 
improve safety, reporting must be accompanied by effective organisational changes. 
All the evidence suggests that reporting will occur only if  nurses feel safe doing so 
and it becomes a culturally accepted activity.
Organisational identity and space of action
Risk control was a central aspect of risk assessment and its management 
involved a variety of different strategies illustrated in risk avoidance and risk 
sharing. The increasing awareness of risk and the uncertainty in decision making led
to situations where “it is best not to take a new risk unless its outcome can be 
understood in advance” This approach “the precautionary principle”, to risk 
management was characterised by risk avoidance and low tolerance of errors. The 
consequences resulting from the precautionary principle that is, operating on “what 
i f ’ basis appear to prevent nurses from “experimentation” and resulted in “limits 
being placed on our freedom to make professional judgement.” While the “what i f ’ 
approach “offered security and safety”, “it lowered expectations and change.” 
However there was the recognition that psychiatric nursing by definition is “a risky 
business within which total avoidance of risk was not an option” and the fact that 
“any avoidance carries its own risk.” Nurses interviewed clearly expressed concerns 
that the prominence of risk management strategies distracts them from their 
organisational role. The ubiquity of this concern and the resentment of their 
expression suggest that risk management strategies are part o f a background set of 
experiences within which they articulate their sense of who they are and what they 
do in the clinical context (Whetten & Godfrey 1998).
Nurses articulated their concerns about the move towards centrally determined 
“prescriptive practice”, the “increased importance attached to assessing risk and 
protecting the public”, “the emphasis upon individual accountability” “the 
prominence upon punishment and “the decrease in the importance of understanding 
the social context of care”. Nurses interpreted the emphasis on risk management 
strategies as “crisis of identity”. Namely that some of the changes were in 
fundamental conflict with nursing values, that they have shifted the delicate balance 
of care and control, giving too much emphasis to controlling /security functions and 
therefore were in fundamental conflict with nursing values. In my view the changes 
created the situation in which aspects of nurses’ identity was relinquished,
provoking feelings of anxiety and fear in the process. The impact o f risk 
management discourse seemed to threaten the very meaning of nurses’ work. In 
consequence there was regression into a dependency and flight mode (Bion 1961).
Dependency mode manifested itself in the reassertion of professionalism and 
traditions. A significant number of nurses preserved their “professionalism” by 
concealing, downplaying and displacing risks. Because of the “blame culture that 
dominated our practice” nurses failed to regard aspects of potential risks thus giving 
contradicting message to the espoused “safety culture.” In other instances, where 
nurses felt “threatened” and “insecure” they share risk by over stating the perceive 
risks, displacing the risk onto relatives and transferring patients to other institutions. 
There was also selective implementation of policy, because policy was perceived to 
be “vague” or “open to interpretation”. In the absence of “clarity” nurses resorted to 
prevailing values namely professionalism. Fight behaviour, was characterised by a 
displacement of anger by blaming and scapegoating others for what is happening. 
Nurses exhibited a great deal of irritability and bitterness; these emotions were 
directed not toward their own organisations and practices, but toward “others” who 
might be to blame. Patients and their relatives, the government and society in 
general typically fall into that category. Extrapolating the conceptualisations derived 
from theories on mourning (Bowlby 1980) show that letting go of “old ways” of 
doing things are both cognitive and emotional processes. The perceived changes in 
nurses’ work engendered a state of turmoil, with the anxiety level rising sometimes 
to the point of panic. Anxiety associated with uncertainty of engaging in something 
new often prompts nurses to resist change. In an effort to reduce such anxiety, 
nurses in the study allow avoidance behaviour.
Risk management techniques do not operate in way as to inevitably or 
deterministically produce passive subjects. This would be to deny the agency of 
individual nurses. Rather, the introduction of risk management occurs in a contested 
manner. The reaction of nurses depended on whether they perceived themselves as 
controlling or using organisational changes to improve their own position or that of 
their clinical work, or as being controlled by them. Identity theories remind us that 
fundamental changes (for example, external attempts to bring about radical change) 
in people’s interpretative schemes is threatening not only because it may affect their 
sense of self-esteem but also disrupts people’s need for identity consistency and 
continuity (Hogg M A & Terry D J 2000).
Organisations as sensemaking communities
The analysis suggests that in risk decision making nurses make sense of what 
is happening in the organisational environment in order to develop a shared 
interpretation that can serve as a context for organisational action (Weick 1995) and 
through that enacting their social world (Berger & Luckmann 1966; Bitner 1974). 
This assumes that risk assessment and risk management mechanisms are mediated 
through social relations thus challenging its universality. This assumes that the 
concepts of risk assessment and risk management may have different and cultural 
contexts. It is possible that risk decision makers act according to rules that are 
socially and professionally acceptable rather than depending on a standardised 
framework. From the study it was evident that problems of decision making were 
concerned about how to justify and argue for certain decisions as well as making the 
decision itself. Variables such as problem framing, organisational control systems, 
social influences, organisation’s cultural risks values and problem domain; 
familiarity influence risk decision making see Fig 5.
Fig 5: Factors That Affect the Decision Context
Professional Characteristics Experience, Knowledge, Preferences, Biases, 
Heuristics, Professional identity
Organisational Variables Values, Structure, Communication System, Group 
Involvement in decision making
Social Influences Social value on risk taking, Government 
Legislation, Policy and Guidelines, External groups
Problem Formulation Complexity, Ambiguity, Unpredictability, 
Controllability, Outcomes
Professional characteristics: More experienced professionals tend to be
selective on the evidence of their past actions (March & Shopira 1987) and therefore 
take risks that less experience professionals avoid. Individuals also exhibit habitual 
and routine ways of handling risk situations that influence them to react in 
predictable ways (Douglas 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Perrow 1984).
Organisational variables: Taking risks depend on whether the outcome is 
rewarded, punished, encouraged or discouraged (Ouchi 1977). Other influences are 
the composition of the group with which risk-related decisions are made (Janis 
1972) and the organisation’s cultural risk values that determine the tendencies to 
prefer certainly versus uncertainty or risk seeking or risk avoidance (Douglas & 
Wildavsky 1982).
Social influences: Psychiatric nursing is integrative part of societal reality 
(Willshire 1999). Professionals’ perceptions of risk as with other assessment of 
organisational context are influenced by societal factors. External pressures affect 
the decision context by modelling how risky situations are handle. Professionals 
view their world through the lens of social pressures that tend to distort their 
perceptions of situational risks sometimes by overemphasising or underemphasizing 
risk (Douglas & Widavsky 1982).
Problem Formulation: Risk decision making is largely artefacts of the 
particular assumptions and arguments of the scientific models used. Different 
assumptions made by various professionals lead to different probabilistic risk 
assessment. There is no certainty in assessing and managing risk because the 
modelling o f clinical risk problem, that is the assumptions upon which such 
modelling is based, and the guidelines used, are all judgemental (Freudenburg 1996; 
Kunreuther & Slovic 1996). In finding solutions for problems nurses assess how 
safe is the solution adopted (that whether all the facts are known), if the solution is 
safe enough (questions about professional values) and whether they are overlooking 
some important factors (whether they can defend the interventions) (Freudenburg 
1996).
Professional Identity: professional identity refers to the nurse’s conception of 
what it means to be and act as a nurse. That is, it represents his/her philosophy of 
nursing, as such, it serve as a basic frame of reference in the nurse’s reflection and 
enactment in nursing practice influencing what are seen as relevant problems. The 
motivation for maintaining a constant and stable sense of self in the face of potential 
change tends to lead to resistance. Change threatens the fundamentally held beliefs 
of a group (Huy 1999). In this sense, resistance arises from the positioning nurses 
as subjects within an alternative, nursing professional discourse. For many nurses 
acceptance of risk management practices as legitimately controlling healthcare 
delivery represents a betrayal of professional identity. Reaction to the changes can 
be characterised as resistance to the alternative construction of professional identity.
In sum, the world of psychiatric nurses is influence by pressures which have 
led to the development of communication systems so as to promote certainty in 
decisions in dealing with demands of external institutions. Procedures, rules,
CHAPTER SIX
MAKING SENSE OF RISK MANGEMENT
I f  we start by recognising that instability lies at the heart o f the world, then we may 
come to realise that the optimism and the assertion o f certainty, which enables life 
to create and spread order, cannot completely overcome this instability. We may 
come to realise that, even when strategies are successful, they are still dependent 
upon the munificence o f  the environment and upon the mutability offortune (Tumer 
1978p.201)
What are we to make of our findings in terms of risk management in 
psychiatric nursing? The study has attempted to introduce evidence to suggest the 
prominence of risk management strategies in healthcare settings, which it has been 
argued are associated with significant changes in working conditions. 
Simultaneously, the evidence presented has pointed to a range of individual and 
organisational responses and an uncertain link between espoused theory and theory 
in use. In observing organisational practices, I find that different groups and 
individuals appear to draw on risk management concept in their own particular ways 
to shape their approach to their work. “Risk is manufactured, not only through the 
application of technologies, but also in the making of sense and by the technological 
sensibility of potential harm, danger or threat (Adam & van Loon 2000 p2)’\  This 
suggests that there are many realisations of risk management and by implication a 
loose connection between risk management concepts and the way these are enacted 
in organisations. Thus risk management is at the same time “real” a given entity in 
the organisational domain and constituted “social construction” the making of sense 
in the ways respondents have chosen to construe various aspects of these constructs. 
I therefore conceive risk management as a phenomenon that is created through 
discourses emergent from a collectively sustained and continually negotiated in the
formats and guidelines represented what the organisations perform. The pressure for 
knowledge of how risks are assessed and managed and the need for accountability is 
leading nurses to widen their internal communication systems to protect them 
against litigation, threats to job security and challenges to professional status. The 
communication systems establish the criteria through which nurses understand and 
articulate their preferred courses of action and as such can be regarded as the focus 
for an organisation’s selection definition of risks. It is important however to note 
that the effect of external pressures are mediated by the elaboration of internal rules 
so that both the internal and external rules become embedded in the categorizations 
the nurses use to report their activities. The main insight in the analysis shows that 
risk is not an objective aspect of the environment of the settings that can be assessed 
and managed. This suggests that risk is socially selected and continually created by 
actors who take decisions in relation to external circumstances and events 
(Luhmann 1993). From this angle, risk does not exist independently from the actors 
involved in risk taking, rather attitudes to risk as well as methods of dealing with it, 
vaiy between and within groups.
process of making sense (Strauss et al 1976). Sense making in this context refers to 
those processes of interpretation and meaning production whereby individual and 
groups think about and interpret risk management (Weick 1995).
Double Binds/Paradoxes
There were good reasons to suggest that situations occur in all the settings 
where respondents felt they were receiving mixed messages, expressed by many as 
“catch 22 situation” (Bateson 1978). Laing’s (1971 p.l) insightful words captured 
this observation: “They are playing a game. They are playing at not playing a game. 
If I show them I see they are, I shall break the rules and they will punish me. I must 
play their game, of not seeing the game.” The art of developing and handling 
interdependency in terms of assessing and managing risk sometimes placed nurses 
in a double-bind situation. Some common examples of mixed messages that 
confronted professionals in the case studies are illustrated in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 Paradoxes in Organisational Life
Espoused Policy What Counted
Take risk 
Report mistakes
Use your professional judgements 
Talk through your feelings
Safety is of utmost importance
You will be punished if you make
mistakes
Stick to the guidelines 
Resist public confession
Espoused policies represented positive values in an organisation and 
managerial context: they were in terms of risk management techniques what should 
happen. In spite of the espoused policy nurses were aware of what was worth doing 
(what counted) and were rewarded (increased status) or punished (blame, shame, 
reprimands). Risk assessment and risk management mechanisms led to paradoxical 
discoveries, for example, with all the insistence on guidelines, workshops,
appointments of risk managers, nurses learned that it paid to remain just as they 
were before -  business as usual. Thus nurses failed to report accidents or 
underplayed their significance as a defensive responsive to the blame culture that 
governed their working lives which was at odds with the safety culture. In what 
Gouldner (1954) termed “mock bureaucracy” there were rules that nurses ignored.
Discourse surrounding risk assessment and risk management was often
perceived by nurses as “hot air” that was not followed by actions and therefore a
“total waste of time” (Gergen & Whitney 1996). In addition, risk management was
seen as creating a different reality for different audiences. So that the
representations disseminated within the organisations were not necessarily those
shared within or between members of the organisations but became symbols to
pursue in order to satisfy the other actors in the arena. Therefore organisations have
to be seen to be adopting new risk management techniques to demonstrate their
legitimacy and rationality to significant others in the environment (Meyer & Rowan
1977). “Playing the game” resulted in organisational politicking, power games and
protection of careers: it led nurses to present themselves in favourable light by
buying into risk management discourse (Goffinan 1959) because they felt
“threatened” and “insecure”. The following quote from a nurse is apposite:
Risk now embraces everything we do. We have risk audits 
schemes and risk working groups. We even have risk officers 
building up little empires to justify their positions. To survive 
you have to join the flow.
The analysis shows that nurses have a special role as interpreters of their 
organisations, and in so doing become powerful senders of messages. This implies 
that knowledge development processes could be considered as an essential part of 
organisations as social systems and in that respect part of organisations’ dynamics 
and their ability to develop. It is from such processes that social reality (Berger &
Luckmann 1967) - culture(s) are shaped and reshaped. In the cases studies, new 
meanings and social patterns emerged as members struggled to make sense of and 
cope with risk management techniques. There were conflict and disagreement 
between different subgroups about why and how to handle risk decisions. These 
contradictions were also embedded in different viewpoints and insights, which were 
engendered because nurses have different vantage points in the organisational arena 
(Braten 1987). The multidisciplinary nature of their work (the participation in 
different subcultures) also internalised contradictions in individual members. In a 
sense the “social reality” is a dynamic phenomenon characterised by different 
contradictions and tensions in perspectives. It is the dialogue of different 
perspectives that creates the dynamics in which new meaning emerge. Here 
meaning is seen to occur in the dialogue of viewpoints in and between individuals 
within the reality they initiate and in which they exist.
Following Eisenberg and Goodall (1993) healthcare organisations can be 
described as dialogical entities namely that they are made up of an array of 
discourses with a variety of meanings which are brought about because participants 
expressions are intertextually shaped by prior texts that also anticipate subsequent 
ones (Bakhtin 1986). Such an observation reminds us that risk management 
ideology is not the only important phenomenon underpinning discourse and 
practice; and that we can never achieve identity or conceptual purity. In the 
healthcare context, nursing ideologies, views about the epistemological character of 
disciplines, attitudes values, taken-for-granted knowledge as well as external 
pressures are equally important. The actions and behaviours of an individual nurse 
may be conditioned but not determined by a particular arrangement of these forces 
as they play out in a given context. For instance structural changes that are imposed
on a social system by external events may often change the setting and premises for 
old rituals and invalidate the old meaning in the process (Geertz 1974). A 
combination of forces may prompt individuals either to adopt risk management 
discursive repertoires in ways, which may well be transparent to them or may be 
trapped in double bind situations. The first assumption may happen if the forces 
ideologically support nursing discourse. On the other hand, those who feel trapped 
by double binds (confronted with mixed signals generated forces) could find 
themselves in discursive negotiation; displacement, contest, creative behaviour and 
confrontation that may affect the ability to learn from experience and correct errors.
Examples of discursive negotiation, opposition and reconstruction of risk 
knowledge and practice were evident within the settings. Aspects of nursing 
interventions aligned with risk management discourse, here, risk analysis was seen 
as giving better information for decision making and valuable in improving safety. 
This was illustrated in two ways: first the centrality of care in the case studies was 
seen as the primary rationale namely to initiate successful treatment outcomes with 
minimum harm and errors. Second, for most nurses many of the suggestions that 
flow from risk management discourse were what Perrow (1987) termed 
“motherhood items” and therefore difficult to argue against. In contrast, there were 
concerns about patient participation in and ownership of care plans and by 
implications empowerment of patients that challenged the risk management 
techniques. Nurses took control through effective strategies of resistance by 
“ignoring guidelines”, “concealing accidents/incidents,” and “exaggerating 
organisation events.” This disregard appeared deliberate -  claiming professional 
reasons or pointing out the unpredictability of psychiatric illness. These challenges 
to risk management discourse are developed by the interaction and combination of
nursing ideology with other structural features such as experience of nurses, 
treatment disagreements, unclear task and societal demands for care of the mentally 
ill.
These dynamics support the relevance of the arena concept that clinical 
activity comprised of social context, - social interaction as well as discursive 
production - within which multiple communities of practice form and find 
coherence. Using the metaphor of an arena, conflicts in interpretation of risk can be 
described as a struggle between various actors on the arena stage. Categorising 
discourses on risk requires careful planning, thoughtful preparation and flexibility to 
change procedures on the demand of the affected constituencies. Clinical activity 
from this stance needs a structure that ensures the integration of clinical expertise, 
regulatory requirements and public values. The combination of these different 
inputs contributes to the deliberation process as regards the type of expertise and 
knowledge that claim legitimacy within a rational decision making procedure 
(Rennl998). Risk management knowledge is a result of complex and intricate work 
by the various actors constituting an arena network. From the analysis, an 
organisation’s stance on risk management practice is the outcome of dialogue 
among the perspectives adopted by the various actors: a dialogue that reflects 
distribution of power and influence that determines the quality of the action taken 
(Gheradi & Nicolini 2000).
Clinical Implications
The descriptions of the cultural assumptions in the four settings provide 
evidence that there are problems in developing clinical guidelines for risk 
management practice. There is huge diversity among varying circumstances in 
which judgement of risk management may be required. In addition there are
important logistic limitations in making these judgements within a clinical and 
organisational context (Borum 1996). Different settings because of their different 
culture and the type of patients may require information about different types of 
risk, or have changing time frames for prediction of the relevant behaviour. This 
leads to diverse risk management tasks and thus the requirement of varied types of 
decisions and their critical action thresholds. While optimal assessment practices 
may be reached by consensus, the demand in certain clinical situations may need 
decisions to be made with a degree of immediacy that would limit the 
comprehensiveness of an examination. The jostling of interests among 
organisational stakeholders, bargaining and negotiation between groups and 
individuals and lack of information makes decision making uncertain. This 
uncertainty complicates and curtails the ability of nurses to predict the evolution and 
outcome of patients’ medical conditions and the results of nursing interventions 
taken on their behalf.
What additional insights do we gain if we look at how the techniques o f risk 
management deal with uncertainties and indeterminacies of professionals’ 
interactions within the settings? There are three assumptions that formal risk 
management can be perceived, predicted and controlled. First, is the sense in which 
in risk management practice causation is considered as a linear and mechanistic 
phenomenon. It is evident in the study that there are difficulties with definition of 
risk, with the location of acceptability criteria and with the interpretation that is 
placed on the outcomes of risk management (Pidgeon 1988). The incompleteness 
dilemma uncovered by the analysis portrays the practice of risk management with 
an additional difficult paradox: a nurse can never know completely what he/she 
does not know. Nurses do not always make correct judgements about clinical risk
but fall prey to biases (Shrader-Frechette 1998): they often follow intuition in ways 
in which patients are defined as “at risk” and posing threat to themselves or others. 
This illustrates the hermeneutic dimension of risk responses, which is apparent from 
background assumptions, self-interpretation and interpretation of clinical activities 
(Lash 1993). Responses to risk may therefore not necessarily take place on a 
rational or conscious level. The findings show that risk-related practices includes 
both activities that needed high levels of problematisation (using guidelines and 
models) but also practices that are experienced as second nature to nurses. The 
above observation reveals the habitual and acculturated nature of risk-related 
actions (Bourdieu 1984).
There is an important issue here relating to the use of expertise and 
knowledge as illustrated in the -  lay assessments of risk as irrational or ignorant 
versus experts as rational - controversies over risk management strategies. Wayne 
(1989; 1996) has countered the disparagement of lay assessments of risk as 
“ignorant” or “irrational” by experts bodies by arguing the extent to which scientific 
knowledge is itself formulaic and contextual. Other work on the public’s perception 
of risks as discussed above showed that the public had a rich notion of risks which 
took into account values and qualitative factors while experts typically focused on 
technical dimensions of risks (Slovic 1992). This shows that both “experts” and lay- 
peoples’ perceptions of risks may be mistaken because of their use of mental 
shortcuts or psychological heuristics and biases. There were instances where the use 
of “expertise” -  risk identification, analysis and management -  compounded the 
problem because of the high ambiguity that surrounded available scientific 
evidence. Here the problem can be considered to be trans-scientific, namely that it 
goes beyond the ability of science to prove (Smith 1990) so that the use of expertise
within the decision making process may be limiting. The recognition that public 
concerns about risk are equally valid suggests a broader notion of rationality and the 
need to incorporate all views in risk-related decision making. Integrating viewpoints 
may help resolve risk-related conflicts (the politics of knowledge in which different 
actors continually compete over risk definition) because it may build trust between 
actors with different perspectives on risk management (Pildes & Sunstein 1995).
The approach to risk management that assumes a linear model also tends to 
ignore the role played by power relations. If we accept that the concept of risk 
mediates between knowledge and power, then risk management is primarily a 
specialised language and set of practices (Foucault 1972). The decision to frame 
clinical problems in terms of risk, for example, rules out other possible ways of 
talking about harms to patients. Assessing and managing risk implicitly empower 
nurses as “experts” and excludes other actors in the arena as inarticulate, irrelevant 
or incompetent (Jasanoff 1999). The designation of the label “at risk” often serves 
to reinforce the marginalized status of actors. The labelling of certain patients as at 
“at risk” positioned them as vulnerable, passive, powerless or as particularly 
dangerous to themselves or others and therefore needing intervention, monitoring 
and surveillance. In terms of individual perception of risk, the attitude nurses held to 
their practice, their experiences, the culture of their organisations tended to 
influence their approaches towards risk. Nurses ignored, overplayed and 
downplayed certain risk situations thus individualising the risk they were routinely 
exposed to in their practices (Nelkin & Brown 1984). Actors’ social location and 
their access to social resources are integral to the ways in which they conceptualise 
and deal with risk (Rennl998). Rather than acting as independent agents to the risks 
they perceive, they act as members of social groups and social networks.
A second issue in this connection is the notion that risk originates in the 
inanimate world even though human behaviour as we have seen can aggravate its 
intensity. Attributing risk to inanimate objects in general increases the sense of 
control and social order (Jasanoff 1999). In the words of Jasanoff (1999 p.143) “it is 
easier, after all, to manage things than people, even when it is known that people are 
part of the problem.” There are complicated ways in which the physical and human 
elements of organisational systems interact to produce risky conditions and periodic 
disasters (Clarke 1989; Perrow 1984; Turner 1978). There was evidence of active 
failures (unsafe acts and omissions) by nurses during risk-related activities in the 
forms of lapses through misreading a situation and deviations from safe operating 
practices, procedures or standards. Incidents/accidents resulted from fallible 
managerial and institutional decisions (latent failures) such as heavy workloads, 
ineffective knowledge and experience, defective supervision and inadequate 
communication system. These were factors that influence staff performance with the 
potential to precipitate errors and affect patient outcome. Thus no single vehicle is 
necessarily to blame for accidents/incidents; responsibility is distributed through a 
political and cultural system that kept professionals unaware of the decisions full 
complexity and therefore ignorant o f all the possible scenarios at which decisions 
could fail (Vaughan 1996).
The third observation about formal risk management is the nature of 
uncertainty and social perceptions of it. Although the findings reveal that risk 
management is important and powerful in its ability to conceptualise uncertainty it 
also gives rise to some well-founded concerns. What emerges from the study is the 
socially embedded character of much of that professionals do not know, as much as 
what they claim they know about mental illness. In the words of a respondent:
“Despite all the advances of psychiatric c a re  the guidelines, policies, targets,
audits, evidence-based practice we are not getting better at prediction.” The 
relationships between scientific inputs (guidelines, models, procedures) and 
successful decision making were not always a positive one. This was because of the 
high degree of uncertainty in clinical interventions. In risk management debates, the 
resolution of issues for potentially “risky” activities appeared to be the function of 
power of various actors in the debates rather than the quality of the scientific point 
of views articulated by them. This perspective provokes some important questions 
about the nature of decision making for risky activities. For example to what extent 
should technical expertise be given precedence over other inputs into decision 
making in interventions of high uncertainty? How do different views within the 
main body of expertise become integrated into the clinical making process? Other 
issues are the extent to which the decision making takes account o f uncertainty 
when developing policies, procedures, and guidelines for the control of potentially 
risky decisions.
In addition to the above issues is the need to take into account the role of 
experts’ (nurses) cognitive schema and the limiting effect that may have in those 
debates where the issues are considered to be trans-scientific. So that while it may 
hold true to assume that in a well-defined problem with a unique solution “experts” 
may have sufficient insight into the nature of a problem to help them solve them, it 
may be a false assumption for those decisions in which the decisions are ill-defined. 
Under these conditions, it is possible that cognitive narrowing may take place as 
experts seek to interpret the problem within the rules of their own paradigm. Certain 
problems, however, may require a paradigm shift in order to cope with the demands 
of the issues raised and may, in turn, account for the lack of effective
communications between actors. This demonstrates that there is a political and 
cultural dimension to ways of thinking about uncertainty that may influence experts’ 
approaches to grappling with the unknown. The challenge for nurses therefore is to 
be more open and humble in admitting their uncertainties about clinical 
interventions and to admit effectively that there are areas that science does not have 
the means to know (Wynne & Mayer 1993).
The dominant view of clinical decision making as a precise, certain and 
scientific practice is questionable. When clinicians make decisions they take a lot of 
clinical “facts” from a variety of sources about individual patients and often depend 
more on their sense of the situation than on general medical knowledge (Fogel 
1980). This indicates that clinicians often compensate for uncertainty by drawing on 
commonsense understandings of the situation. Thus instead of following guidelines 
to explain clinical phenomenon, clinicians frequently renegotiate these guidelines. 
There is immense diversity among vaiying circumstances in which judgements may 
be required and as significant are the logistics limitations in making these 
judgements within a clinical or organisational context. As pointed out by Borum 
(1996 p.953) “Different settings may require information about different types of 
decisions of risk, or they may have varying time frames for prediction of relevant 
behaviour. Different risk assessment tasks require different types of decisions and 
vary in their critical action thresholds.” Indeed, Shorter (1993) suggests that 
following a model is inadequate because in following rules people create, challenge, 
change, check and correct them as well. Similarly Berg (1992) in introducing the 
concept of “routines” observes that the decisions clinicians make routinely embody 
the safety norm and suggests that clinical practice does not always adhere to 
universal rules. To make a decision clinicians need a lot of different types of
information in order to build up a sufficient clinical picture; which leads to a degree 
of uncertainty about how to combine all the information available.
The prominence of risk analysis brings with it the potential to redefine the 
boundaries and relations between professionals and service users. Pressures to be 
more efficient coexist with standardising procedures and professional judgements 
that challenge notions of professional accountability and regulation (Pollit 1993). 
Furthermore there is blurring of role distinctions and demands for multi­
professional collaboration and a rise in complex ethical issues that require 
interdisciplinary collaboration. The theme running through our analysis has been 
that clinical uncertainty characterises the experience of mental health professionals 
from several directions. Clinical uncertainty arises from the fact that professionals 
have limited and varying capacity to deal with information in other words, they are 
subject to bounded rationality - the assumption that all rational humans would take 
decisions to maximise their profit, or preferred advantage (Simon 1979). In practice 
perception would intervene between the decision maker and the ‘objective’ 
environment. Human perception is therefore a filter through which risks are viewed. 
Since not all the alternatives are known or reliably assessed, the decision maker 
would aim for a satisfactory rather than a maximum outcome when faced with a 
complex situation. This suggests that imperfect knowledge compels the decision 
maker to construct a simpler and more personalised model on which to act. Here the 
choice from a range of alternatives would be based on individual 
knowledge/experience; an experience which determines perceptions upon which the 
assessor respond to risk. Also there may be differences in the capacity of 
professionals due to varying competencies, resources and positions. The way 
professionals experience various kinds of uncertainty (risk aversion) may vary, as
does their evaluation of different combinations of stakes and probabilities. There is 
another ambiguity linked to risk analysis, that is, uncertainty concerning the 
evaluation of risk factors. How do practitioners know whether the outcome of their 
assessment and management of risk will be successful?
One potentially useful metaphor for describing the context of risk decision­
making is that of organisational knowledge. Following Gherardi and Nicolini 
(2000b p. 10) we can consider risk decision-making “as a form of organisational 
expertise, or in other words, a form of knowing that is sustained in the organisation 
by the interaction among various collective actors.” This cultural approach to 
organisational knowledge (Brown & Duguid 1991; Gherardi 1999; Weick 1991; 
Wenger 1998) enables us to explore the relationship between organising and 
knowing as a social and collective phenomenon and therefore cannot be seen as 
substances residing in the heads of members. Here knowledge is viewed as a form 
of distributed social expertise, in a sense, knowledge-in-practice situated in the 
historical and cultural context in which it occurs. From such a viewpoint, we can 
think of organisational knowledge as relational, situated in the systems of ongoing 
practices which is continually reproduced and negotiated, always rooted in a context 
of interaction and therefore always dynamic and provisional. To understand the 
social construction of risk decision-making, it will be useful to investigate how risk 
decisions techniques are enacted in work practices and also to examine the network 
of relations in practice among those who assess and manage risk.
The analysis suggests that powerful actors are in a position to shift the balance 
of risk discourse but equally it is possible for actors to employ sets o f discursive 
repertoires that articulate and sustain completely different sets of assumptions. The 
study indicates that may nurses may be adopting the outside guise and language of
risk management techniques whilst continuing to practice as they have always done. 
In reacting to processes of risk assessment and risk management, respondents have 
sometimes accommodated, ignored or circumvented, (re)negotiated, mediated and 
moderated pressures to the effects of changes in their clinical practice. However the 
strength and significance of cultural change within the four settings must be 
recognised. Rosenthal et al (1997) remind us that systematic exposure to particular 
change discourses can have a considerable impact on attitudes and perceptions. 
Thus, in terms of risk assessment and risk management what is happening within 
the settings and perhaps in the healthcare systems is not just adoption of a fad that 
can elapse. The environment of clinical practice, along with the kind of knowledge 
that is valued is changing. With clinical practice embedded in wider social, 
economic and political values, there is no return to a romantic past.
In the context of the research it is clear that risk management concept is 
impinging into the domain of clinical practice -  the significance of risk 
management, accountability, the need for negotiation, the need for open discussions 
of errors -  all merit careful analysis. The sociological perspective suggests that 
perceptions and attitudes towards risks are shaped by the culture and worldviews 
shared by the social groups to which the individual belongs (Douglas 1992; Rayner 
1992). There is ample evidence in the study, which demonstrates that risk 
assessments and risk management do not take place in a vacuum but are carried out 
in ways that are indissolubly linked to the social context. Nurses involved in the 
development of risk management strategies take these contexts into consideration as 
they make each initial selection of their clinical objectives that will guide their 
interventions. Clinical judgement does not therefore operate in an idealised form; 
often during the study it was drastically limited by the influence of other non-
clinical judgement (e.g. social and political factors). The meaning of risk 
management is the results of joint practices in an arena from the various cultural 
referents, artefacts, rules and constraints that derive inside or outside the formal 
boundaries of the organisation. This implies that all participants have an opportunity 
to influence the outcome of the decision making process. Organising and structuring 
discourses on risk entails careful planning and flexibility to change procedures on 
the demand of the affected constituencies in a word incorporating technical 
expertise, regulatory requirements and public values.
Risk management as culture and practice
How does the preceding discussion bear on the risks that are now confronting 
psychiatric patients? What are the challenges that face practitioners in defining risk 
that leads to intervention and accuracy of prediction of that risk? The discussion 
shows thus far that risk concepts are not simply neutral descriptions of our world, 
but are culturally and politically conditioned ways of interpreting our relationships 
to the world. What conclusions can we draw from what we have learned about the 
socially embedded character of risk assessment and risk management concepts that 
are currently being deployed to deal with people with mental health problems? 
There has been a tendency to take for granted that guidelines will resonate in the 
same way with all types of patients and in all contexts. Risk management, from this 
view, should present no challenges to practitioners: perceived difficulties are the 
development of commitment and the technical capacity to adhere to guidelines. The 
assumption is that practitioners will perceive clinical threats and challenges in the 
same way, particularly if they are shown how to intervene on scientific basis.
Our analysis suggests that attempts in developing risk assessment guidelines 
base entirely on “clinical judgement” are futile as risk is mainly determined by
social and cultural factors. The existence of separate cultural orientations means that 
the effectiveness of risk decision strategies will be dependent upon how well the 
information is integrated in terms of concerns of the various actors. It is also evident 
from the findings that viewing risk management as a linear and mechanistic 
phenomenon is problematic. Risk is the outcome of a complex process of social 
construction encompassing cultural and political elements that influence both 
individuals and institutions (Douglas 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). From this 
standpoint, we can argue that approaches to risk are together determined by 
processes of thought or perception relating to individual cognition and by the 
cultural dynamics typical of social contexts of membership. Each organisational 
setting develops its own definition and culture of risk assessment and risk 
management, and it is on the basis of this definition and culture, rather than on a set 
of probability calculations or rational judgements. Consequently, risk management 
is a process that is constantly sustained by organisational practices -  in a sense a 
form of organisational action and knowing. In addition risk management practice in 
organisations is constituted by plurality and conflict than by consensus (Gherardi 
2000).
The above observation indicates the limitation of the ideal of complete 
scientific objectivity and therefore the need to look at risk management and its 
impact on clinical interventions in some new ways. Our understanding of “risk” has 
changed from a phenomenon that is real if hard to measure accessible only to 
experts, to something constructed out of experience by “experts” and “laypeople” 
alike. Risk in this sense is culturally embedded and has texture and meaning that 
vary from one social setting to another. Trying to assess risk is therefore essentially 
a social and political exercise, even if practitioners adopt quantitative risk
assessment techniques. Practitioners’ judgements about the nature and severity of 
clinical risk inevitably incorporate tacit understandings concerning the cause and 
uncertainty, which are by no means universally shared even in similarly situated 
settings. Against this backdrop, it makes little sense to manage risk on the basis of 
standardised guidelines, insulation from public demands, and claims to superior 
expertise. The different conception of risk-related processes that emerges from the 
study calls for a more open-ended process, with multiple access points for opposing 
views and unconventional perspective and an acknowledgement of its own 
provisional status. The empirical analysis o f the institutional environment of the 
four settings and of it impacts on the perception and management of risk has yielded 
the following insights:
• Linking o f  analysis (science) with deliberation (politics): Observation of risk 
activities on the setting shows that decisions are not value-free or apolitical but 
rather other actors affected by the decisions have an input in the decision making 
process. This generates a politics of knowledge in which different actors continually 
compete over risk definition. Risk is largely artefacts of the particular assumptions 
and arguments of the scientific models used.
• Importance on feedback: The framing of initial risk assessment is almost 
always revisited and redrawn in light of experience. Risk assessment is probabilistic 
and there is no certainty of the clinical impact of any strategy pursued. The 
modelling of a clinical problem, the assumptions upon which such modelling are 
based inevitably on clinical judgemental.
These insights do not reject but enhance the traditional linear model of risk 
assessment/risk management by considering it as a complex process, one that is 
cyclical and grounded in, not separate from deliberative politics. The insights
subscribe to the contention that argues that risk is a phenomenon by which 
information processes, institutional structures, social-group behaviour and 
individual responses shape the social experiences of risk, thereby contributing to 
risk consequences (Kasperson et al 1998). An assertion is held that information 
system and the characteristics of public response are essential elements that define 
the nature and magnitude of risk perceptions. Food scares such as BSE, pesticide 
residues in fruit and vegetables genetically modified foods among others could be 
cited as an illustration of this notion -social amplification of risk perception. 
Despite the expert community determination that the estimated probabilities of 
hazards from eating those foods were low, major public concerns remained high 
perhaps because of media coverage of the consequences of, rather than the 
possibilities of contracting disease. Similarly, contrary to the evidence, there is held 
association in the public consciousness between madness and danger because of 
media coverage. Increasingly it is not the actual but potential harm that has become 
the major public concerns, with people having different perceptions of the potential 
harm that can be caused.
The social amplification of risk perception concept, suggests that crisis events 
interact with social, psychological, institutional and cultural processes in ways that 
can intensify or attenuate perceptions of risk. Furthermore, it argues that 
behavioural responses can trigger secondary consequences that have indirect effects, 
which can exceed the risk of direct harm to individuals (Kasperson 1992). Risk 
amplification occurs when these indirect effects precipitate additional institutional 
responses and protective actions. Not taking new risks unless their outcomes can be 
understood in advance as observed in the settings provides examples of the 
secondary impacts that can occur as a result of risk amplification. Public concern is
here translated into regulatory change, an attempt to prevent a recurrence of the 
problem. The approach to risk management that operate on “what i f ’ basis -  
precautionary principle -  centred on political rather than professional reasons, raises 
issues of trust, expert knowledge and the broader question of ethical approaches to 
decision making under uncertainty.
Nurses therefore find themselves in a culture that is peculiarly occupied with 
hazards. What makes the situation more fraught is that this culture is increasingly 
ambivalent about nurses’ judgements about risk. Thus the idea of risk management 
as a purely technical matter involving calculations of the probabilities of harm based 
upon the available evidence, viewed as the province of experts alone becomes 
problematic. Certainly recent years have seen the questioning of expert judgements 
by supposedly inexpert lay people. For instance, assurances about safety of nuclear 
power, chemical pesticides, food irradiation, British beef and international terrorism 
have been met with public scepticism. Reasons given for these competing 
epistemologies have been associated with “lack of understanding of the nature of 
technical or scientific process, lack of confidence in “expert opinions” about 
hazardous operations and processes, and increasing public scepticism in the 
certainty, or capability, of scientific theories or technical solutions to provide 
answers to complex environmental and health problems (Smith & McCloskey 1998 
p. 46). Cohen (1999) suggests that science exists in two separate domains. One view 
takes science as rigorous methodology based on objectivity and truth finding - the 
disposition to a rational worldview. In the other, scientific knowledge plays the 
function of civic epistemology; an intellectual tool which people with humanistic 
inclinations and stronger egalitarian leanings, use both for securing social identity 
and defining self. Faced with dangers where scientific evidence as in psychiatry is
not sufficiently unambiguous to link possible cause and effect, people look for 
different approach (civic science) where the tolerance of any risk may be a function 
of the fairness and integrity of consultation/involvement process as much as it may 
be of the scientific judgements involved.
The Challenges Ahead
It is clear that attention needs to be focused on public awareness and open 
discussions; a creation of opportunities for participating in public decisions that is 
part of an ongoing meaningful dialogue. The public needs to be better informed 
about the complexity of healthcare including the issues of risk assessment/risk 
management and the broader social issues intertwined with care. The arena concept 
seems to offer a conceptual framework for creating the opportunities within which 
dialogue can take place. But such dialogue is greatly impeded by organisational 
factors and the fact that the various contending actors operate within the logic of 
alternative discourses. Among the organisational factors are the uncertainty in 
knowledge; the organisation of nursing care; professional control versus 
organisational prerogatives; the complexity of treatment task structure and 
inadequate information processing:
• Uncertainty in knowledge. Contemporary social theories as discussed earlier 
have drawn our attention to the uncertainty and instability of knowledge, 
particularly the uncritical confidence in science. The status of expert knowledge 
(medical knowledge) is becoming increasingly contestable (Carter 1995). People are 
no longer willing to accept the belief that only the health professionals are capable 
of understanding the complex and technical issues of healthcare. Indeed Mechanic 
(1996) proposes that all social institutions including medicine have fallen from 
public trust.
• Organisation o f nursing care. The organisation of nursing care involves 
numerous service departments and many types of professionals. This means that 
nurses intersect with and are constituted by a wide range of risk professions and 
their forms of “expert” knowledge (Abbot 1988). In such an inter-institutional 
environment there is a constant negotiation about risk management. Each 
profession, unit/service tends to view its risk concerns as unique. Yet the complex 
nature of risk management calls for much sharing and overlapping among the 
various actors.
• Professional control versus organisational prerogatives. Nursing attempts to 
control and define its own practices and members (Freidson 1986). It builds 
rationales and collective defences against outsides and the right to define standards 
of practice and mistakes (Hughes 1971). In risk management terms these efforts are 
essentially directed at protecting the profession’s identity of its preferred mode of 
work. The difficulties encountered in inter-professional and intra-professional 
interactions concerning risks pose problems for risk management. These are largely 
derived from complex interplay of illness, technology and nursing organisation. In 
addition actors outside nursing concerned with standard of care, equity, legal issues 
will continue to press their views about what is judge to be professional prerogative. 
The establishing of organisational accountability for risk management then requires 
interactions and negotiations that are not only inter-professionals but involve groups 
outside nursing.
• Complexity o f  treatment task structure. The elusiveness of the definition of 
madness (Wiltshire 1999) does not fit the rational application of risk management 
technology. Psychiatric illness makes a traditional predictable service difficult to 
achieve. Many nursing interventions and their consequences are highly uncertain
and unclear. Given the wide varieties of treatment options, there are lively debates 
among professionals as to respective risk benefits and also the appropriateness of 
different interventions for different illnesses.
• Inadequate information processing: Breakdowns are due to self-defensive 
mechanisms, impacts of perceived threats of an individual or an organisation 
becoming involved in liability litigation or of becoming the target of regulatory 
punishment. Mixed messages reduce the ability to communicate and learn from 
experience (March & Olson 1975).
Lessons for theory and practice
The study has shown that there are different types of risk and different 
approaches to their assessment and management. The “science-based” approach 
emphasises the instrumental use of knowledge. A second paradigm based in social 
science stresses the social circumstances: the social construction of risk, the 
perception of risk and the possibility of alternative contexts. Professionals, 
policymakers and individuals operate in a social context that influences how they 
construct their views of the significance of clinical risks (Wildavsky & Dake 1991). 
Moreover, the concept of risk entails more than just expert assessments of the 
probability and harm of an activity. Knowledge of the ways accidents/incidents 
occur is often incomplete and most risks are characterised by conflicting scientific 
expert evidence and opinion. Consequently the public and expert values inevitably 
influence risk assessment and therefore the notion of separating scientific risk 
assessment and risk management is doubtful (Jasanoff 1999; Wynne 1991). Thus 
the social, political and cultural complexities of risk management processes 
manifest themselves across healthcare organisations and place demands on risk 
decision making. This interplay between “science” and “politics” emerges as a
major theme of this study. An additional important vital issue is the role and 
credibility of science in assessing and managing risks.
Cultural differences and divergent value commitments and interests tend to 
lead to intense conflicts between affected actors. Resolving these conflicts require a 
process in which stakeholders are given the opportunity to take part in the decision 
making process. In what is term “rational discourse”, - a communication process in 
which all affected parties resolve a conflict -  the argument is that there is a need for 
an organisational model of risk debates that acknowledges the conditions of the 
respective risk arena (Habennans 1984; Renn 1998). There is also an appeal 
(because of the complexities in assessing risks) for risk characterisation to become 
an important part of risk assessment (Stem & Fineberg 1996). Here, risk 
“characterisation” should include information on scientific uncertainties of the 
estimates and the scientific controversies surrounding them, who endures the risks 
and who benefits, the perceptions and concerns of the interested and affected parties 
and the different culturally linked views on the acceptability of the risks. But is it 
possible to involve others in decision making? A major problem of participation 
concerns the cultural, political, social differences and peculiarities of each actor 
involved in the processes. People have different perceptions of the legitimacy of 
decision making processes and have different attitudes to risk issues. The 
experience from the case studies is a reminder that risk management issues cannot 
be adequately understood with only expert assessments of the probabilities and 
consequences of the risks at issue. As noted, professionals across and within settings 
provided remarkably different risks assessment o f the same issues. The research 
documented the inherently subjective processes of “expert” risk analysis and the 
conflicts and contradictions that arose among professionals. An important lesson for
practice is that risk management proceeds in the face of conflicting expert 
assessment of the risks and widely different perceptions and concerns about the 
risks on the part of the interested parties. These different perceptions among 
professionals and the interested and affected parties make adequate communication 
all the more important.
Risk communication namely informing actors (for example patients, relatives 
and public) about specific risks, about actions to alleviate those risks, educating 
about risks and increasing mutual trust and credibility about risks has become an 
important part of professionals’ work. Mental health organisations however face 
ethical issues when communicating risks. They face on all three levels (professional, 
the institutional and societal) ethically ambiguous situations for which solutions are 
more difficult to identify and evaluate (Jungermann 1997):
Problems on the professional level o f  communication: In all the settings a patient is 
supposed to be involved with the decision making process and to give his/her 
consent. The procedure requires that the nurse inform the patient about the potential 
risks of the intervention. However for a patient who may be affected cognitively, 
emotionally and behaviourally he/she may not be able to understand the 
information. Such difficulties often cause ethical issues. For example, how can 
nurses find the right balance between respecting the autonomy of the patient? How 
can nurses avoid imposing directly their own views? Related to this is the 
unpredictability and uniqueness of the patient. Nurses are increasingly confronted 
by what seems to be an insoluble dilemma. There is a strong and rapidly growing 
awareness that patients, like everyone else, have rights that should not be denied 
them because they are in need of care. But care implies an assurance of safety and 
many of those receiving it are too contused to make “rational” choice about the
risks they are running. Questions facing nursing in risk decisions are: Exactly what 
is the risk feared? How serious is it? How likely is it? Whose risk is it? -  Is it to the 
patient, to other patients, the public, and reputation of nurses or the organisation? A 
related question is how far can any action be taken to lessen the risk without 
incurring a greater threat to the welfare of the patient? Here, nurses are faced with 
concerns not only with safety of a patient’s harm to self and others but also with 
health, dignity, normality of lifestyle and freedom from fear. Mental health nurses 
are increasingly faced with polarised versions of interventions, namely the duty to 
care and rights of patients with serious mental health problems.
Problems on the Institutional level: The plurality of risk constructions and interests 
complicate the decision making processes. As distrust of professionals continues to 
increase risk decision making will be increasingly difficult. In such situations, 
suggestions have been made to dispense with over-reliance on administrative and 
scientific expertise and to open the risk debates to all interested parties (Beck 1994; 
Renn & Klinke 2001). It is difficult however to see how nurses can take decisions in 
situations of emergencies. Thus a healthcare organisation might want to involve all 
relevant interest groups and inform them of perceived risks. But the uncertainty 
surrounding risk issues may render this impossible.
Problems on the societal level: Society is extremely ambivalent about the mental 
health patients demanding care and control in equal measures. People over the 
centuries have been making efforts to control the amount of danger they are exposed 
to their lives. For instance lepers and the mentally ill were banished from cities and 
witches were burned: the separation of polluted bodies from healthy spaces 
(Douglas 1962). Within this framework, the concept, risk is used for marginalizing 
an Other (patient) who is perceived as posing a threat to self and others. As
mentioned earlier, members of “risky” marginalized groups are viewed by the 
dominant group as polluting public spaces leading to strategies of exclusion and 
surveillance. Douglas (1962) also reminds us of the paradoxical nature of our 
yeanling for purity; that which is categorised as polluting is seen as acceptable. For 
example, some campaigners concerned with the welfare of mental patients have 
presented mental illness as just normal part of life thus challenging the notion of 
“normality” and confronting the split between “sanity” and “madness.” At the same 
time however we are witnessing the construction of new psychiatric conditions, 
syndromes, addictions and the medicalisation of social problems. The presentation 
of multiple perspectives from many sources (governmental agencies, media, and 
interest groups among others): all present views of clinical risks that reflect their 
specific values and interests.
Overall, the events and outcomes of the study raise questions about the 
widespread assumption of science; reason and rationality as necessarily the bases 
for good decision making. In studying the micropolitics of decision making I have 
tried to provide insight not just into the specific cases, but in the larger question of 
risk management strategies in other organisations. The dilemmas and other 
observations in the case studies suggest some questions for future research on what 
constitutes effective communication and how risk communication may be 
improved. First, how can the differing risk assessment and risk management within 
and between the arenas be reconciled? Second, how can democratic risk 
management processes be established to reconcile competing perception and 
cultural constructions of risk problems across the arenas?
Concluding Remarks
The study sets out to extend and refine our understanding of how psychiatric 
nurses at the coalface construct their risk knowledge as part of their interactions 
with others. The findings direct researchers to new ways of thinking about key areas 
of psychiatric nursing. Various legislative enactments in the form of clinical 
guidelines permeated the decision making process. The clinical environment is 
characterised by a perpetual elaboration of guidelines that regulated how knowledge 
is communicated and used. In this context, nurses are increasingly subjected to 
external institutional pressures to work within a controlled framework. The need to 
be accountable, led nurses to elaborate internal communication rules which gave the 
impression of their adherence to the standardised guidelines. It also developed self­
defensive mechanisms in which nurses protected themselves from perceived threats 
becoming involved in liability litigation or target of professional regulatory 
punishment.
The study can be usefully located within the literature of professional roles 
under the new managerialism in the public sector. Changing institutional contexts 
are tending to break down established professional jurisdictions into more 
contingent relationships of knowledge work and status. In the healthcare arena, we 
are observing the intensive interpenetration of managerial and nursing practices and 
knowledge, with resulting blurring and renegotiation of professional boundaries 
between nursing and management (Cohen & Musson 2000). Consequently, nurses 
secure their sense of meaning and reality from participation in various discursive 
and disciplinary practices that constitute them as subjects (Halford & Leonard 
1999). The study shows that risk discourse might be expected to appear in different
forms in different arenas as it interacts with other discourses. Nurses tend to 
interpret risk discourse in relation to their particular circumstances and experiences.
Risk management is now well established as one of the main preoccupations 
of nursing practice and its relative significance is likely to increase in the future. 
Participants however, see risk management as problematic -criticised as remote 
from reality -  risk management is perceived to be unhelpfully rigid. Risk 
management rigidity is regarded as translating into organisation-wide rigidity as it 
permeates and transcends all levels. Masked by such criticism however, is an 
implicit acknowledgement by my informants of the power of risk management’s 
subtle ability to maintain its dominance, despite their cynicism with its relevance 
and appropriateness. Risk management is seen by some nurses to generate tidy 
, information that can be audited and, therefore, that derives its significance and 
legitimacy from its capacity to satisfy statutory requirements. Risk management is 
also recognised by nurses as a technique that removes and insulates nursing care 
from the complexities and uncertainties of risk decision making. Using the 
metaphor of the arena risk management is seen as a struggle between various actors 
who mobilise social resources to gain attention, support and trust of the general 
public. Risk management from this angle becomes a means of resolving values 
conflicts (Renn 1998).
Nursing care is not only a matter of intervention in the fives of patients but 
also a response to institutional and societal demands for risk knowledge. As a result 
the loci of nursing activity are communication systems - rules, guidelines, forms -  
shaped by external sources. This makes nursing work highly visible and limits the 
discretion of nurses. The analysis of how notions of risk management have began 
to permeate the everyday perceptions, languages, and behaviour of nurses is not to
claim that they have been colonised by it. Rather, both the external pressures and 
professional values in how nurses see their activities constantly mediate the effects, 
for example, the definitions of risk management are immensely contested in all the 
case studies. This shows that all risk decisions are socially situated and constrained 
environmentally and organisationally. So no matter how idealistic, a nurse 
intervention is embedded in negotiated compromises. Risk management strategies 
therefore play numerous roles. It provides an image of rationality (Meyer & Rowan 
1977); it becomes a framework for accountability and for compensating liability 
claims concerning errors in clinical interventions illustrated in standardised forms. It 
also presents a communicative structure of what knowledge to be communicated to 
what actors and in what forms. Risk management also appears to have resulted in 
unintended consequences and produces a no-win situation by destroying elements of 
professional/expert work which nurses were attracted to in the first place. Strategies 
designed to make nurses methodical at the same time encouraged rigid and 
inflexible behaviour.
The findings also direct researchers to the importance of understanding how 
risk issues are perceived and constructed by interested and affected actors. 
Worldviews and interests can greatly influence how issues are framed and how risks 
are perceived. Clinical risk management is not only for safety of patients but also a 
response to institutional demands for knowledge of risk. This shows us how the 
profession and its working environment are changing in a society governed by risk 
knowledge. The proposed theoretical model argues for changes in how researchers 
should theorise about and study risk by the consideration of the potentially 
important impact societal, organisational contexts (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). 
One contribution of this study is that it draws together previously unrelated factors
and shows how they provide the basis for theoretical model of risk management that 
is more complete and accurate than previous models. In placing psychiatric nursing 
in a more societal and organisational framework, the study contributes to the 
sociology of professions. It shows how professions are changing in a society 
governed by knowledge of risk. Another contribution has been to make researchers 
think much harder about processes and interactions that were previously invisible, 
denied, or thought unproblematic.
Another important lesson from the study may be the need to look beyond the 
functional and instrumental aspects of the rational model. Namely how it relates to 
people’s underlying and often hidden assumptions about who they are and what 
aspects of those assumptions is change likely to trigger. The study shows that even 
small apparently insignificant changes may signal much more fundamental 
transformations for those involved in the project. The study suggests that 
organisational identity embodies contradictory identifications based on a wide range 
of positions that individuals take within organisations. This allows integration of 
stakeholder groups as participants in the hegemonic discourse that seeks to shape 
the identities of members. An approach that focuses on the shaping of identities 
within the organisation would provide a basis for understanding how such 
differentiation was linked to the shaping of positional identity in the organisation. 
Such an analysis would point to areas where conflict is most likely to arise and the 
ways in which such conflict could be managed. Identifying what sorts of collective 
changes are likely to threaten deep-seated identity beliefs will help us to make sense 
of how to mange change.
The study has yielded many intriguing and interesting insights concerning the 
role of risk management and by implication nurses in psychiatric settings. There are,
however, some caveats that should be borne in mind when interpreting these 
insights. By limiting my primary attention to nurses the study downplays the 
contributions that other groups make in the decision making process. Second, at the 
time of the study, my sample of the settings were in an atmosphere of major change 
situations and many of the processes I was examining were still fluid. It is therefore 
possible that my findings are of a more transitory nature than initially suspected. 
Despite theseJimitations, the study sheds light on what I consider to be interesting 
dynamics of risk management as a practice. An important message for practice is 
that risk management more often than not proceed in the face of conflicting actors’ 
(interested parties) assessments of risks and widely different perceptions and 
concerns about the risks. The research has questioned the widespread assumptions 
that science, reason and rationality are necessarily the bases for “good” risk decision 
making.
Clinical judgement as noted above does not operate in an idealised form. The 
arena model shows that clinical judgement within the organisations studied and 
undoubtedly in many areas of professional practice, is drastically limited by the 
influence of other nonclinical forces. It is misguided therefore to believe that 
clinical judgement could ever be so influential as to supersede all other social, 
economic, and political factors that affect people’s life. Clinical judgement always 
occurs in a political context and therefore cannot reasonably be viewed as 
independent o f it. The solution to the problem of clinical judgement being besieged 
by nonclinical forces is not to push for even better techniques in decision making. 
According to the perspective developed by the study, risk decision making is best 
understood as a field of competing social discourses. Each risk discourse is “real” to
the extent that it participates in the development, enactment and reproduction of 
clinical practices.
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